Tammy Skidmore v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co
1f4th206
| 4th Cir. | 2021Background
- Tammy Skidmore owns a house adjacent to Loop Creek; Norfolk Southern’s railroad tracks lie about 70–80 feet east across the creek. Norfolk Southern installed a culvert in 2001 that Skidmore alleges altered the creek flow and has eroded the bank under her foundation.
- Skidmore sued Norfolk Southern in West Virginia state court (2017) asserting negligence, private nuisance, and trespass.
- After surveying title, Norfolk Southern discovered a 1903 railroad right-of-way that extends across Loop Creek and under part of Skidmore’s house.
- Skidmore amended her complaint (Aug. 23, 2018) to add adverse possession and prescriptive-easement quiet-title claims; Norfolk Southern removed to federal court under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) asserting complete preemption (Sept. 20, 2018).
- The district court found ICCTA complete preemption and concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, dismissing the quiet-title claims. The Fourth Circuit affirmed removal timeliness and that ICCTA completely preempted Skidmore’s adverse-possession/prescriptive-easement claims, but vacated the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded for conversion of the claims into federal ICCTA claims and further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of removal | Removal untimely; 30‑day clock started at original complaint or when NS amended answer | Removal timely; 30‑day clock began when Skidmore first pleaded quiet‑title claims (amended complaint) | Removal was timely (NS removed within 30 days of amended complaint) |
| Whether ICCTA (§10501(b)) completely preempts quiet‑title claims | ICCTA does not displace state quiet‑title claims here because NS never used the land / no immediate rail use | §10501(b) displaces state claims that would deprive a railroad of right‑of‑way or otherwise govern rail transportation, including adverse possession and exclusive prescriptive easement | §10501(b) completely preempts Skidmore’s adverse‑possession and exclusive prescriptive‑easement claims |
| Effect of complete preemption on jurisdiction | If ICCTA doesn’t apply, federal court lacks jurisdiction; dismissal appropriate | Complete preemption confers federal jurisdiction and requires conversion to federal causes of action, not dismissal for lack of jurisdiction | District court erred to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; complete preemption gives federal jurisdiction and claims must be converted to federal ICCTA claims |
| Disposition of remaining state‑law tort claims (negligence, nuisance, trespass) | These should proceed or be reconsidered under state law | Some tort claims depend on ownership and may be affected by preemption; court should reassess after resolving ICCTA claims | Court must reexamine those claims on remand; relief for preempted claims is limited to remedies under ICCTA |
Key Cases Cited
- Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 2005) (explains complete‑preemption doctrine and its jurisdictional consequences)
- PCS Phosphate Co. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2009) (interpreting §10501(b) preemption scope and distinction between direct regulation and incidental effects)
- Edwards v. CSX Transp., Inc., 983 F.3d 112 (4th Cir. 2020) (holds §10501(b) can preempt common‑law tort claims when they effectively govern rail transportation)
- Elam v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (concludes ICCTA preempts certain state adverse‑possession claims against railroad rights‑of‑way)
- Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2017) (recognizes STB precedent preempting adverse‑possession efforts to treat railroad rights‑of‑way as abandoned)
- Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993) (complete preemption can apply outside the Supreme Court’s narrow examples)
- Singh v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 335 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2003) (when complete preemption applies, state claims are converted into federal claims and remedies are limited to the federal statute)
- Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 2002) (a court should not dismiss a completely preempted state claim for lack of jurisdiction; it must treat it as federal)
- Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968) (jurisdictional preemption distinct from availability of state remedies)
- Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (example of Supreme Court recognition of statutes that completely preempt state law)