189 Conn. App. 23
Conn. App. Ct.2019Background
- Taing was hired in April 2013 and promoted to account executive in January 2014; she repeatedly received performance evaluations documenting habitual tardiness.
- July 18, 2014: Taing received a written warning for multiple late arrivals and was told further tardiness could result in termination; management worked with her on scheduling and allowed schedule adjustments twice for childcare.
- On or about December 16, 2014, Taing notified HR and supervisors that she was pregnant.
- December 19, 2014: Taing received a final written warning listing numerous late occurrences and warning that another tardy occurrence would result in termination.
- December 24, 2014: Taing arrived late, was sent home; she was terminated on December 29, 2014, and told the reason was tardiness.
- Taing sued under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act for pregnancy discrimination; the trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment and Taing appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a genuine issue of fact exists that termination was pretext for pregnancy discrimination | Taing contends similarly situated nonpregnant coworkers were late on Dec 24 but were not sent home or disciplined, so termination was pretextual | CAMRAC argues Taing had a long history of chronic tardiness and prior written warnings culminating in a final warning that made termination for another tardy event lawful; coworkers lacked comparable disciplinary histories | Court held Taing failed to show any coworker was similarly situated with the same extensive attendance history or final written warning; no triable issue of pretext |
| Whether summary judgment standard was properly applied | Taing asserts credibility disputes and circumstantial evidence create material issues for a jury | CAMRAC maintains documentary evidence of repeated tardiness and warnings entitles it to judgment as a matter of law | Court applied plenary review and held summary judgment appropriate because plaintiff’s admissible evidence did not permit a rational finder to infer discrimination |
| Whether credibility issues about manager’s testimony (verbal warnings to others) defeat summary judgment | Taing argues manager’s failure to record verbal warnings suggests fabrication and supports an inference of discrimination | CAMRAC relies on testimony and records showing discipline history for Taing and assertions that other employees received verbal warnings | Court held Taing’s speculative assertions and opinion about motives were insufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute admissible at trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821 (discusses summary judgment standard)
- Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390 (Connecticut antidiscrimination statutes interpreted consistent with federal law)
- Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn. 148 (look to federal Title VII precedents in state discrimination analysis)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (framework for disparate treatment claims)
- Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc., 316 Conn. 65 (describes burden-shifting and pretext inquiry)
- Jacobs v. General Electric Co., 275 Conn. 395 (pretext proof: employer’s stated reason must be shown unworthy of belief or not sole reason)
- Garcia v. Hartford Police Dept., 706 F.3d 120 (plaintiff need only show prohibited factor was at least one motivating factor)
- Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 97 Conn. App. 527 (opinions about motive insufficient to create admissible factual dispute)
- Harris v. Dept. of Correction, 154 Conn. App. 425 (comparing disciplinary histories for "similarly situated" analysis)