Sweeney v. City of Decatur
2017 IL App (4th) 160492
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Bradley Sweeney was appointed Decatur police chief in Jan 2015; Tim Gleason became city manager in Mar 2015.
- Sweeney twice told Gleason that Gleason’s use of a police car and uniformed officer for personal travel was improper; Deputy Chief Getz nonetheless drove Gleason to the airport.
- Sweeney refused to make a public statement supporting Gleason’s proposed local motor fuel tax and later voiced opposition to tax increases at a Feb 2, 2016 department-head meeting.
- Gleason subsequently asked Sweeney to resign; when Sweeney refused he received written notice of termination in Feb 2016.
- Sweeney sued the City alleging (1) violation of the Whistleblower Act (740 ILCS 174/15(b)) and (2) common-law retaliatory discharge (including First Amendment free-speech theory).
- The trial court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice under section 2-615; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether reporting to the alleged violator (Gleason) was a "disclosure to a government or law enforcement agency" under Whistleblower Act §15(b) | Sweeney argues telling Gleason his conduct was improper constituted a protected disclosure to a government agent and thus §15(b) protection | City contends §15(b) requires reporting to a government or law-enforcement agency (not merely telling the alleged wrongdoer), so Sweeney's statements to Gleason are not covered | Court held §15(b) does not protect merely informing the violator; Sweeney failed to plead a protected disclosure, so Whistleblower Act claim dismissed |
| Whether Sweeney pleaded whistleblowing sufficient to establish a clear public-policy mandate for retaliatory discharge | Sweeney contends his alleged reporting/refusal to participate amounted to whistleblowing that implicates public policy prohibiting misuse of public resources and enforcement of ethics/criminal statutes | City argues Sweeney did not allege he reported the misconduct to an appropriate agency or refused to participate, so no whistleblowing occurred | Court held Sweeney did not plead whistleblowing (he only told the violator it was improper), so retaliatory discharge based on whistleblowing fails |
| Whether Sweeney’s speech at a department meeting is First Amendment–protected speech giving rise to retaliatory discharge | Sweeney asserts his Feb 2 tax-opposition comments addressed matters of public concern and were protected | City argues (and court considered) Sweeney did not plead the Garcetti/Lane two-step showing he spoke as a citizen rather than as an employee | Court held Sweeney failed to plead facts showing he spoke as a citizen on matters of public concern under Garcetti/Lane, so no clearly mandated public policy based on First Amendment speech |
| Pleading sufficiency and dismissal standard | Sweeney contends his facts support both claims and should survive a 2-615 motion | City maintains the complaint facially fails to state legally cognizable claims | Court applied 2-615 de novo review and affirmed dismissal with prejudice because the complaint's allegations, accepted as true, did not state legally sufficient claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Brame v. City of North Chicago, 955 N.E.2d 1269 (Ill. App. 2011) (construed §15(b) to allow reports to governmental employer, but distinguished on facts)
- Sardiga v. Northern Trust Co., 948 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. App. 2011) (explains Whistleblower Act protects reporting to agency or refusal to participate)
- Larsen v. Provena Hospitals, 27 N.E.3d 1033 (Ill. App. 2015) (Whistleblower Act purpose: protect reporting of conduct affecting public health/safety)
- Michael v. Precision Alliance Group, LLC, 21 N.E.3d 1183 (Ill. 2014) (retaliatory discharge tort elements and narrow scope)
- Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978) (establishes retaliatory discharge cause of action)
- Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981) (public policy is found in constitution, statutes, and decisions)
- Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354 (Ill. 1985) (First Amendment does not create a clear public-policy protection against private-employer discharge)
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (framework for public-employee First Amendment speech protection)
- Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (reaffirms Garcetti two-step inquiry for public-employee speech)