*1 facts, kind same with stantially substantially same of medical the Industrial Commis- degree certainty, results, reaches sion it diametrically opposed appears I believe the here Commission something gone wrong. acted the manifest evidence in against weight the claimant in view of denying compensation, particularly the fact that the claimant introduced medical testimony the effect that his could or been have aneurysm might related, evidence, work while the offered no lay I or medical. therefore would the decision to reverse bring it into with Mould. harmony Valley
MR. CLARK in this dissent. joins JUSTICE (No. 53780. PALMATEER, v. INTERNATIONAL
RAY Appellant, COMPANY,
HARVESTER Appellee. rehearing Opinion April on denial 1981.—Modified filed 8, 1981. June *3 Meehan, & of Rock Walker Island Coryn, (Gerald J. Meehan, of counsel), appellant. Katz, Haake, I. Stuart G. Lefstein,
Isador R. Dale McAndrews, of Katz, Telleen, Island, Durkee 8c of Rock for appellee.
MR. SIMON delivered opinion JUSTICE court: Palmateer, of his plaintiff, Ray dis- complains International Harvester He had
charge Company (IH). worked for IH for 16 a from unionized years, rising job an rate ato hourly on a fixed managerial position salary. Following Palmateer filed a four-count com- discharge, IH, plaint in count that he II had suffered against alleging retaliatory Pal- discharge. According complaint, mateer was fired both for information to local supplying law-enforcеment authorities that an IH employee might involved a violation of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1—1 et and for par. seq.) agreeing assist and trial of the if investigation The circuit court of Rock Island ruled requested. County failed to state a complaint cause of action dis- it; missed court affirmed in a appellate divided Ill. opinion. We Palmateer leave (85 App. granted to determine the contours appeal tort retalia- Motorola, tory discharge approved Inc. Kelsay 2d 172. in retaliation Kelsay plaintiff claim. The court worker’s filing compensation *4 noted that favored the exercise of public policy strongly could workеr’s if be compensation employees rights; claims, fired for that filing compensation a dissent crea- be frustrated. would Despite urging left to of a tort should tion new be legislature, said, are that to court “We convinced imple- uphold exist this a cause of action should ment The court retaliatory discharge.” (74 181.) 2d claim for and decided that then considered the damages, would be retaliatory allowed punitive damages cases, tort, of the new but future. The creation only at a time other conflicted decisions in when jurisdictions actionable, was suf- on whether such would firing was not that Motorola ficiently unexpected required directed, This court how- Kеlsay. pay punitive damages ever, would be that in cases subsequent punitive damages available. 74 Ill. 189. 2d Illinois number of With Kelsay, growing joined the tort of States retaliatory discharge. recognizing tort is an rule an “at-will” exception general time or no cause. is terminable at for any employment any & 51 Ill. Park District Driveway (Pleasure Jones is This rule a harsh outgrowth App. general notion reciprocal rights obligations can if the end relationships employment —that condition, at then the time under any any employment have same Indi should right. (Summers, Protection Time vidual Dismissal: Against Unjust Statute, As one L. Rev. 19th Va. 484-85 (1976).) court it: century put I I not refuse to trade with one? May
“May any not one? IMay fоrbid to trade with family my any or not dismiss domestic servant for dealing, my domestic, even I And if where forbid? my visiting, mechanic, or farm-hand, or my why my *** teamster? *** will, their All dismiss may employes
129 cause, few, be or for for no cause many they good or even for without be- cause morally wrong, of v. thereby legal wrong.” Payne ing guilty 507, 81 Tenn. Western & Atlantic Co. R.R. (1884), 518-20. the
Recent has out analysis shortcomings pointed theWith rise of mutuality theory. large corporations and specialized employing relatively conducting operations immobile have other mar- workers who often no place skills, ket em- their that the and employer recognition not stand on realistic. do is ployee equal footing (Blades, At Will Individual Freedom: vs. On Employment Limiting Power, L. Abusive Exercise 67 Colum. Employer of 1404, addition, Rev. em- unchecked (1967).) like unchecked been ployer has power, employee power, seen to a distinct threat care- present public policy considered and a fully as whole. As a by society adopted result, it is now that a balance must be recognized proper maintained in interest among employer’s operating business and interest efficiently profitably, employee’s in a livelihood, and interest in earning society’s seeing its carried out. public policies of
By tort retaliatory recognizing Kelsay discharge, the common law to a acknowledged principle parties contract may it and incorporate rights obligations which are to the ex clearly injurious People public. (See rel. v. Gas Ill. Trust Co. Peabody Chicago (1889), This is cases forcefully principle expressed which an insist is in dis- employer contempt an the civic employee who exercises charging right on a duty v. 49 Ill. serving Vitucci jury. (People (1964), 171, 172; Ill. App. 2d People Huggins App. (1930), 238, 243; Ill. see also Rev. Stat. ch. 155—3 par. it a of court or (making to fire an contempt discipline court as a when attending subpoenaed But the heel of the lies in the Achilles principle witness).) When a contravenes definition public policy. committed way policy any еmployer public However, retains wrong. right legal in cases clear mandate of fire “where no workers will is involved” Grain Co. (Leach Lauhoff constitutes But what App. 1026). mandated clearly public policy? no definition the term. In
There is general, precise can said that concerns what right it the citizens and what affects State collectively. just *6 and It is to be found in the constitution statutes State’s silent, and, are in its decisions. when they judicial (Smith 143, v. Board Education 405 (1950), there no line of demarcation dividing Although precise are the from matters matters subject policies a of cases in other States survey involving purely personal, that a must strike shows matter retaliatory disсharges duties, a heart of citizen’s social rights, responsi- Thus, actions for bilities before tort will be allowed. have been allowed where retaliatory a statute. was fired for violate to employee refusing are: v. Brotherhood Petermann International Examples 184, 344 Teamsters Local 174 396 Cal. App. 2d (1959), v. to commit Tameny refusing 25 (for perjury); P.2d 167, 610 Atlantic Co. Cal. 3d 27 P.2d (1980), Richfield 1330, 164 Cal. 839 engage price- Rptr. refusing (for Va. Harless v. First National Bank 246 1978), fixing); (W. a consumer credit violate (for refusing S.E.2d 270 416, v. Mallon 160 Super. O’Sullivan code); (1978), N.J. without a 149 medicine 390 refusing practice A.2d (for It has also been allowed where license). v. Hocks for to evade
fired jury duty refusing (Nees & 210, 512; v. Fowler Or. Reuther 536 P.2d 272 (1975), Williams, 28, Inc. Pa. 386 A.2d Super. 119), 255 (1978), activities union in statutorily protected engaging
131
Inn, Inc.
Golden Cock
192
v. Clearman’s
(1961),
(Glenn
a claim
793,
13
Rptr.
filing
Cal.
769),
Cal.
App.
a
v.
under
statute
Kroger
worker’s compensation
(Sventko
644,
151;
Co.
69 Mich.
N.W.2d
App.
(1976),
245
v. Central Indiana Gas
Ind6.
Co.
260
Frampton
(1973),
N.E.2d
297
425).
The action has not been
worker was
allowed where
over
internal
in a
dispute
company’s
manage
——
ment
v.
Mont.
system
Orgain
(Keneally
(1980),
---,
606
took too much
where
worker
P.2d 127),
sick leave
137 Vt.
409
Keogh
(Jones
(1979),
where the worker tried to examine the com
581),
A.2d
books in his
as a shareholder
pany’s
capacity
(Campbell
Industries,
v. Ford
Inc.
Or.
546
(1976),
P.2d
the worker
where
impugned
141),
company’s integrity
Lines,
v. Pulley
Inc.
(Abrisz
Freight
(Iowa 1978),
where
worker refused to be examined
N.W.2d 454),
evaluator
v. Motor
psychological-stress
Supply
(Larsen
Co.
117 Ariz.
where the
(1977),
P.2d 907),
worker was
school
attending night
(Scroghan Kraftco
or
Corp.
where the
(Ky. App.
S.W.2d
1977),
811),
worker
used the
Christmas fund
improperly
employer’s
v. Minidoka
District
Idaho
Irrigation
(Jackson
330,
is but is denied where it is clear that only equally interests are at stake. nature of the private Where the muddled, interest at stake is have con courts given as answers to of the tort whether flicting protection action is available. results inconsistent where Compare for was to sexual discrimination opposition or harassment v. Co. Schlitz (McCluney Brewing (E.D. Jos. 24, Wis. F. 489 v. Beebe Rubber 1980), Supp. Monge 130, Co. 114 N.H. 316 for refusal to (1974), 549), A.2d official v. falsify reports (Hinrichs Tranquilaire Hospital Detroit, 1130, v. So. and Trombetta 352 (Ala. 1977), 2d 132 489, &
Toledo
Ironton R.R. Co.
Mich.
81
App.
(1978),
and over internal company disputes
It is clear Palmateer has here was alleged fired violation of an established The claim public policy. he information to supplying local that an IH law-enforcement agency employee might Code, Criminal violating agreeing gather and for intend further evidence employee, implicating trial, if came to that. it at the testify employee’s ing case, these of the of the Because procedural posture v. as true. Chicago must be accepted (Fitzgerald allegations 179, is no Ill. There & Trust Co. 187.) Title 2d (1978), basic, in the more more implicit nothing v. Palko Connecticut of ordered liberty concept (see 319, 325, 288, 292, 58 Ct. L. Ed. S. U.S. (1937), of a criminal 149, than the enforcement State’s 152), 49, 61-62; v. 77 Ill. Hewitt Hewitt code. 2d (1979), (See 337, is no There (1979), Jarrett Jarrett than fundamental or more more important policy public lives and the effective the one protection favoring Preamble; of citizens. Ill. Const. See property 5 U.S. Madison Cranch) Marbury (1 Ed. L. 69. re- or statutory provision constitutional
No specific out in the active ferreting to take an citizen part quires crime, nevertheless but poliсy prosecution favors the “Public favors citizen crime-fighters. citizens crime, pos- and the cooperation exposure effective imple- thereof is essential knowledge sessing faith who Persons good of that acting mentation policy. commit- crimes have been believe have cause to probable them by deterred from should not be reporting ted *8 suits those accused.” unfounded (Joiner fear of by Bank 44.) Benton Community (1980), malicious actions for prosecu involved Although Joiner tion, the for the citizen who same can be said employee conduct Palmateer’s fears Public favors discharge. policy to the law-enforcement infоrmation volunteering Palma of crime Once was reported, agency. possibility officials a to further assist teer under statutory duty was 1979, ch. do so. Rev. when Stat. (Ill. par. requested Palmateer’s Public thus also favors policy agree 8.) 31 - ment to assist and prosecution investigation crime. suspected of the tort of
The foundation retaliatory and there is a clear in the lies public protection policy, policy prosecution favoring investigation a of action criminal offenses. Palmateer stated cause for retaliatory discharge. even dis-
IH contends that if there is Code, violations of the that public Criminal couraging that the crime has tоo wide a IH out points sweep. of a here more than the theft screw- $2 might nothing sound business driver. It feels that in exercise of its fire a it to be able to ought managerial judgment properly resorts to the who recklessly precipitously to handle such a prob- criminal system personnel justice lem. But this misses response point. magnitude not the It the crime is issue here. was the General Assem- who decided bly, People’s representatives, theft of a that should be screwdriver $2 problem resolved resort to the criminal IH’s system. justice sound, override business no matter how cannot judgment, not so absolute a that decision. “[T]he are that there not limits to sovereign job pre- v. Atlаntic Co. rogative.” (Tameny Richfield 1330, 1336, Cal. 167, 178, 610 Rptr. Cal. 3d P.2d IH take indeed if it The law is feeble permits into its own em- matters hands its by retaliating against who law. ployees cooperate enforcing *9 IH of also decries the lack of Palmateer’s specificity Because the crime was not complaint. precise suspected forth, Palmateer, set no one the unnamed em- beyond and the local law-enforcement knows ployee, agency yet the of the It is understandable particulars investigation. that, in view of the of of the novelty complaint type filed, was Palmateer refrained from his fellow identifying the IH did not move for a employee thrоugh complaint. statement, more definite as was under its section 45 right of the Civil Practice Act Rev. Stat. ch. par. (Ill. Instead it moved to dismiss the merely 45(1)). complaint for to state a of “No cause action. is bad failing pleading in substance which contains such reason- information as the informs of the nature of the ably claim opposite party or defense which he is called to meet.” Rev. upon (Ill. Stat. ch. This is less par. complaint 42(2).) be, than it could but it informed IH of the crux specific of the desires, claim and stated a of If IH cause action. on remand there are under the Civil Prac- ample procedures tice Act and the rules of this court needed mеat put any on the of the bones complaint. IH contends that there be an
Finally, Kelsay requires adversarial before the of for cause action relationship is Even under retaliatory discharge allowed. this theory, it seems that whenever a claim is filed a former em- the former ployee, employment relationship already into an adversarial degenerated least in relationship, the broad sense term. But more importantly, Kelsay no such on the put requirement action, cause and we see no rationale for such a limitation. All that is is required that the in retaliation employer discharge activities, and that employee’s be in contravention of a mandated clearly public policy.
In order to treat alike, like situations we believe it is in this damages punitive fair prayer dispose treated were as damages in the same manner punitive case noted, court set aside puni- this As in Kelsay. already that, cases award, involving in tive directing damage would tort of damages retaliatory discharge, punitive was discharged future cases. The allowed in plaintiff only court’s before this opinion months filing Therefore, to be consistent with holding Kelsay. awarded here. should not be damages Kelsay, punitive II of Palma- The cause action count expressed dismissed, and cause teer’s complaint improperly returned to the circuit court for further should be pro- ensue, it not certain that a trial will Because ceedings. on the we decline IH’s invitation to our opinion express to be at a trial. instructions given retaliatory-discharge should, which has That if await another case necessary, v. Ortho a fuller Pierce record. generated *10 (Compare 335, 399 Pharmaceutical Corp. Super. (1979), N.J. dismissal plaintiff appealed A.2d 1023.) I, III and IV of those counts portions complaint; them circuit court dismissing appellate judgments are of the therefore be left undisturbed. The judgments II, and circuit courts to count with respect appellate of thаt for damages, for count except prayer punitive reversed, court are and the remanded to the circuit cause is with of Rock Island further County proceedings to count II. respect in court
Appellate part affirmed circuit court reversed in part; and reversed in part affirmed remanded, cause in part; directions. with UNDERWOOD, MR. dissenting: JUSTICE v. in Kelsay dissent in reasons stated my For I believe Ill. Motorola, 2d Inc. (1978), that dissent erred. The in court there thoughts expressed here. are self-restraint judicial equally applicable regarding of the addition, I share Mr. criticism Ryan’s Justice court’s action in this case. RYAN,
MR. also dissenting: JUSTICE I authored the Kelsay Although opinion Motorоla, Inc. 74 Ill. I cannot agree 2d (1978), extend the cause of action for retaliatory discharge ap that case into the nebulous area proved judicially created as has been done public policy, opinion this case. I fear that the result of this will indeed opinion fulfill the of Mr. Underwood’s dissent in prophesy Justice “Henceforth, indolent, no matter insubordi how Kelsay. *** nate be, or obnoxious an employee may [the] thereafter employer may him at the risk of only to defend a being suit for compelled retaliatory discharge and unlimited Motorola, ***.” punitive damages Kelsay Inc. 74 Ill. 2d 192. relied on the
Kelsay fact had legislature established the clearly workers public policy injured had a to file right claims for with compensation Industrial Commission. We there held that discharging such a claim filing violated that public Here the policy. the cause of public policy supporting action cannot be found in any expression legisla- ture, but in the belief that only vague public policy that we requires all become “citizen crime-fighters” (85 132). of our Many cases state that is to be found in the constitution and the statutes of this State *11 and, when these are silent, in the decisions of courts. ex rel. Nelson (People v. Wiersema State Bank (1935), 75, 86; 361 Ill. Illinois Bankers Association v. Collins Life 548, 551; 341 Ill. (1930), v. & Illinois Trust Zeigler Bank Savings 180, Ill. 245 There are other (1910), 193.)
137 that the this court of which say opinions simply public be of this State is to found in its constitution policy statutes and make no role of mention of the judicial 598; 588, decisions. Smith Hill v. Ill. 12 2d (See (1958), Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Ill. Bank (1933), 554, 567; ex rel. v. Gas Trust Co. People Peabody Chicago 268, 130 Ill. role Whatever (1889), 296.) accepted be in it is judiciary may declaring policy, public that the generally acknowledged question public policy is first and foremost a matter Nudd concern. legislative v. 504, Matsoukas on rev’d (1955), App. 2d 608; other Ill.7 grounds Bank (1956), Fidelity Savings v. Aulik 613; Wis. (1948), 32 N.W.2d Scroghan Corp. 811. (Ky. App. S.W.2d 1977), Kraftco In Petermann v. International Brotherhood Team sters, Local 396 174 Cal. (1959), App. 2d P.2d 25, the court stated that is a public policy vague exprеs sion and to subject definition. In precise Zeigler Trust & Illinois Bank this court also stated that Savings there is no definition of precise In public policy. attempt to define ing this public court stated that it is policy, that of law which declares no principle one law may do that which be fully has a to to the tendency injurious welfare or to be public against public good. (People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank 361 Ill. 75, 86; Knass v. & Madison Kedzie State Bank (1933), definition,
354 Ill. of this converse Stati6ng it can be said that has a that which favors be to the welfare beneficial or to be tendency public definition, of such good. view public general correctness statement that is a vague public and is not definitiоn cannot expression subject precise no should be questioned. Certainly, subject to suit and unlimited based on a nebu punitive damages lous that he an charge doing which has a be beneficial to welfare tendency
or for the To a of action for sustain cause public good. the the limitations on employer’s retaliatory discharge, must be more right discharge employees precisely defined.
In v. United 456 Pa. States Steel Geary Corp. (1974), manufacturer, for salesman a steel A.2d after to his later having originally complained superior, his immediate to a bypassed complained superior about the of a company vice-president safety product the manufactured. salesman The was company discharged tort, and thereafter his sued in he contending acted had in best of the and of interests general public The Court of stated employer. Supreme Pennsylvania that, essence, contended that his conduct plaintiff should be because his The intentions were protected good. court noted that no doubt are most who dis- employees could make same claim. The court affirmed charged the lower court’s dismissal of the and observed complaint does motives praiseworthiness plaintiff’s not detract from the interest in legitimate company’s pre- its normal from serving operational procedures disruption. The court voiced its concern to the as of such suits impact on the interest of legitimate hiring employers the best The stated that retaining court personnel. threat of suit ever-present well inhibit the might making of critical judgments by employers concerning employees’ qualifications.
In v. Lines, Abrisz Inc. Pulley Freight (Iowa 1978), 454, a her sued em- 270 N.W.2d discharged employee who had her ployer, letter writing sup- a fellow claim for porting employee’s unemployment letter, In the she her criticized compensation. severely business The her claims employer’s policies. reasons discharge contravening public policy. The Court of had Iowa stated that Supreme plaintiff not established that her violated policy. public conduct violative not declare should “Courts (Abrisz Freight v. Pulley so.” it is unless clearly Lines, N.W.2d Inc. 1978), (Iowa this matter we keep “In considering also stated: court those of as well as mind rights employer, Lines, Freight are Abrisz Pulley important.” employee, 454, 456. Inc. N.W.2d 1978), 270 (Iowa Corp. App. 1977), Scroghan (Ky. Kraftco *13 he an- after 811, the had been plaintiff discharged S.W.2d He law school at his intentions to attend night. nounced that his sued his former employer, contending discharge continued that education violated policy, public urging as a in the established United States. been public policy court, is first and fore- after that The public policy noting determination, stated: a matter legislative most fit to has not seen establish any “The legislature area, are not that in this and convinced we policy the of is a area for exercise this proper judicial v. Corp. activism.” Scroghan App. (Ky. Kraftco 811, 551 S.W.2d 812. 1977), Abrisz, the con- Geary, Scroghan employees’
duct can be said to a to be beneficial to have tendency or but the welfare to be for the public public good, declare, fiat, courts refused to that judicial discharging by for such conduct contravened employees policy. public an The of these three cases is not to be intеnded citing exhaustive examination of the are cited subject. They that are not to create demonstrate the courts willing a for a because cause of action employee simply his conduct was or because the may praiseworthy public some benefit it. have derived from Because of the vagueness concept public a dis- most of that allowed have jurisdictions policy, retalia- a cause of action for maintain charged employee have discharge against tory public policy required such the mandate clear discharge well-defined,
140 and that there be be clear and public policy cоmpelling, v. such Percival discharge. strong against General Motors Mo. F. Corp. Supp. (E.D. 1975), 1322, 1126; Cir. Campbell (8th 1976), F.2d aff’d Industries, 141; Ford Inc. Or. (1976), 274 P.2d 581; Vt. Keogh (1979), A.2d Jones Harless v. First National Bank Va. 246 S.E.2d (W. 1978), 270; v. United Geary States Steel 456 Pa. Corp. (1974), 171, 319 174. A.2d
In Becket v. & Welton Becket Associates (1974), 39 Cal. 114 Cal. App. Rptr. employee, estate, as the executor an filed suit had against he When refused to terminate employer. litigation, he was He then sued his discharged. employer, contending that his was in retaliation for action protected court, law, by California public policy. analyzing that, noted action, in cases an such allowing was evidenced either or a criminal statute by statute specifically designed rights protеct The court out employee. that there was no articu- pointed lated public policy through action which was legislative violated employer. *14 In Tameny Atlantic Co. Cal. 27 (1980), Richfield 177,
3d 167, 1330, 1336, 839, 610 164 Cal. P.2d Rptr. 845, Mr. Tobriner, court, for the acknowl- writing Justice that edged California for cases many wrongful were based on statutes discharge which barred specifically for out, certain conduct. The discharge opinion pointed however, that also courts allowed em- to maintain actions for where ployees retaliatory discharge statutes general certain or affording employees rights “articulated a which privileges public policy fundamental contravened.” employer’s discharge clearly (Emphasis v. Atlantic Cal. Co. added.) (Tameny (1980), Richfield 1336, 839, 177, 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. P.2d The courts in the cases above, cited by referring clear and compelling clear and public policy, well-defined and strong policy, public public policy, fundamental exist may that acknowledge public policy, have been there in cases where degrees. Only varying and fundamental, articulated, compelling, clearly strong, contravened can a which well-defined policies action for retaliatory rise to a tort these give policies clear articulation of such policy The discharge. been found in pronоuncement. almost always legislative courts considering discussed two cases by usually in actions was retaliatory discharge, recovery permitted faith.” In based on “bad Monge for retaliatory discharge 114 N.H. Co. A.2d v. Beebe Rubber (1974), after she refused 549, a female was discharged out her foreman. The New with Supreme go Hampshire motivated Court held that termination employment retaliation, consti- on bad faith or malice was based by In Fortune contract. a breach of the tuting employment 96, 364 Mass. Co. National Cash Register after 1251, a salesman sued his former employer N.E.2d that contract of he The court held was discharged. faith contained an covenant good implied employment not fair and that a termination made good dealing are These cases a breach of the contract. faith constitutes line from readily distinguishable strong-public-policy discussed, cases, that, in the last cases recovery two for and not and allowed for breach of contract was sought tort, not were sought. damages punitive in our It is indeed plaintiff praiseworthy His out crime. interested in complaint, case is ferreting that will on his however, not conduct part does allege has been area it of any within bring dis- articulated plaintiff legislature. with to violate or complying charged failing statute of our obstruction-of-justice (Ill. requirements the section or of ch. Rev. Stat. par. 4), 31— *15 our statute to aid an officer Rev. concerning refusing (Ill. Stat. ch. These sections were par. 8). 31— referred in the If the would majority opinion. plaintiff been clear, have reason, for such a discharged strong, articulated would have been fundamental contravened and an action in tort would then be appro- however, does not priate. even complaint, allege had crime been committed or that the plaintiff reported to the law-enforcement that a crime had been agency committed. It only was alleges plaintiff because he to a law-enforcement that an reported agency of the defendant employee in a involved viola- might tion of the criminal code and that he had to assist agreed the law-enforcement in further informa- agency gathering tion. It should be remembered that the not a was plaintiff unionized but held a employee, in position management. the role of a
By “citizen under- assuming crime-fighter” to ferret out crime for the taking police plaintiff, his could affect labor through spying, relations seriously Also, his conduct, his employer. without consulting with could proper management personnel, impair internal words, In other company’s security program. here had taken it himself to plaintiff become upon involved crime when it was neither fighting required law, nor by employment, obviously against the wishes of his employer.
By from the rule that departing an at-will general is employment terminable the discretion of the courts are employer, attempting give recognition the desire and of an expectation continued so, however, employment. the courts should doing concentrate on solely promoting employee’s expecta- tions. The courts must that the allowance of a recognize tort action for from, retaliatory discharge departure and an to, exception rule. The general legitimate interest of the guiding poliсies destiny *16 tort new be The cannot ignored. of his operation and is its nurturing in infancy. retaliatory discharge interests the balance courts must this remedy, shaping of fashioning with the and of hope employer employee the that will accommodate legitimate expecta- a remedy harsh- the of from both. In the emerging tions of process rule, swinging the former we must guard against ness of In Percival to the extreme. opposite pendulum 1126, Cir. Motors F.2d Corp. General (8th 1976), stated: the court an that as far as “It should be in mind kept concerned, an relationship employment ***.” as well as an rights; employer stated: The district court Percival opinion non- this “The courts which hаve recognized done so cautiously, cause action have statutory be main- that a balance must proper recognizing interest earning tained between employee’s his livelihood and the interest employer’s operat- and his business profitably.” ing efficiently Percival v. General Motors (Emphasis added.) 400 F. 1323. Mo. Corp. (E.D. Supp. 1975), ais in this State business climate deteriorating of that discussion interest. A substantial general topic It be dissent. must is not this subject appropriate a however, not that Illinois is attracting acknowledged, and that amount new and business great industry I do a rate. are troublesome industries State leaving contribute not this court should further believe businеss creating vague environment by declining an which will permit concept could com- an unwanted one who employee, through relations of labor-management pletely disruptive activities, only and citizen crime-fighter spying police at the risk of sued in tort only compensa- being but also for tory damages, damages. punitive effect I am not alone in concern adverse over my the loose retaliatory-discharge application I noted the concern will have on business. above remedy Court of in Geary voiced by Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Iowa in Abrisz. In Pierce Supreme Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. Super. N.J. 1023, 1026, the court statеd: 399 A.2d interests in con- employer’s legitimate
“[T]he his business and ducting employing retaining the best available cannot be personnel unjusti- fiably impaired.”
The court went on to state:
“In addition exception general rule] [to must flood of unwar- *17 guard against potential ranted and that result disputes litigation might doctrine, notions from such a based on vague Hence, of if to be such an there is public policy. rule, to the it must at-will exception employment be circumscribed so as to tightly apply only cases matters of clear involving truly significant and and substantial well-defined thereof.” violations (Emphasis added.) (Peirce Ortho Pharmaceutical 166 Corp. N.J. 335, 342, 399 Super. A.2d v. Beebe the New Rubber Co. Monge Hampshire Court, while on a contract allowing Supreme recovery for a “bad faith” nonetheless acknowl- theory discharge, the interests of edged necessity balancing employer and The court stated: employee. a rule
“Such affords the certain stability employee and does not interfere with employment dis- normal exercise of his to employer’s right which is him to charge, necessary operate permit his business and efficiently profitably.” Monge 130, 133, Beebe Rubber 114 N.H. Co. (1974), 316 A.2d 551-52. At Blades, cites Employment
The majority opinion The Abusive Freedom: On Limiting Will Individual vs. Power, L. Rev. Colum. Employer Exercise Of an Blades, expansion Professor while promoting (1967). wrongful to sue of an right employer employee’s such litiga- effect of the adverse recognizes discharge, business: tion on the employer’s “ danger average identify jury will here is the that [T]
with, believe, employee. possibility therefore This and by disgruntled em- give could rise vexatious lawsuits fabricating plausible employer coercion. ployees tales employees potential If vexatious suits great, employers exercising their is too be inhibited will judgment employees as to should or should best which *** employer’s prerogative be to make retained. [T]he good employees independent, judgments about faith L. system.” Colum. important enterprise in our free (1967). Rev. between
In оrder to establish balance the necessary interests, I that would hold employer employee dis- maintain an action for retaliatory may has been of some when violative charge only articulated. has been that clearly strong public policy clear found in articulation would be legis- Usually, I do an should lative enactment. not think that be defend a tort action and possibly compelled forced to disgruntled compen- pay discharged employee because substantial satory, damages possibly punitive, of a of some violation vague concept *18 four members never been articulated by anyone except of this court.
I therefore dissent. respectfully MR. in this MORAN dissent. joins JUSTICE