*1 сannot complain on the minds jurors, party to him. is into the record he prejudicial evidence which put We v. agree Henry (1954), (People not err in therefore, trial court did defendant, while two evidence first into photographs allowing however, error, The trial court’s the third. excluding as to defendant’s question plaintiffs attorney permitting is sufficient existence of the loan-receipt agreements ato trial. entitle the new plaintiffs reasons, For judgment foregoing is for a affirmed, cause remanded court appellate trial. new and remanded.
Affirmed (No. 49950 . KELSAY, MOTOROLA,
MARILYN Appellant, JO INC., Appellee. Opinion Rehearing denied Dec. 1979. filed Jan. 1978 . *5 KLUCZYNSKI, J., part. took no
UNDERWOOD, J., concurring part part. dissenting Thomson, Zanoni, Thomson, Weintraub & Flynn, McElvain, McElvain, Bloomington (Mike counsel), for appellant. Ferri,
Robert and Richard H. V. Nystrom Chicago, for appellee. Friedman, Schur, Katz,
Harold A. M. Irving Jerome Friedman, Katz, E. and Warren Schur & Eagle, Eagle, Action for amicus curiae Community Program Chicago, the UAW. RYAN delivered the opinion
MR. JUSTICE *6 court:
Plaintiff, filed a the Kelsay, complaint Marilyn Jo County, circuit court seeking compensatory Livingston Motorola, her ex-employer, and punitive damages against her with The employment Inc. alleged plaintiff her as retaliation defendant had been terminated filing directed The trial court claim. a workmen’s compensation assessed the damages favor and jury a verdict in plaintiff’s $1,000 damages compensatory in the amount court remitted the com $25,000 damages. punitive $749, the to which reprеsents wages pensatory she and the lost between time was discharged plaintiff a the Fourth District she found new On time job. appeal, court, of the trial Court reversed judgment Appellate cause of has no against that an holding Ill. 3d 1016.) discharge. App. (51 court reached a the same different Because a panel on the same filed day in an (Leach result opinion contrary 51 Ill. 3d Grain App. 1022), Co. (1977), Lauhoff to this a certificate of court issued importance appellate resolve the R. so that we may court 316) (see conflict. her while at cut thumb
Plaintiff suffered a working imme- in Pontiac. She received the Motorola factory her a local where hospital, medical attention at diate later that thumb was stitched. She returned work same thereafter, advice of Shortly afternoon. plaintiff sought her claim for counsel workmen’s compensation regarding claim thumb sent notice of the Counsel injury. impending Motorola, Inc. employer, at Plaintiff with the spoke manager personnel Aherns, Motorola Donald after he received notice of plant, the workmen’s suit. Aherns told compensation plaintiff situation, was aware of the that she corporation ” would be “more than adequately compensat[ed] by for her and that there no thumb was corporation injury, need for her her claim. He also to follow with through informed that it was policy plaintiff corporation’s who to terminate pursued employment employees it, аnd advised the claims workmen’s compensation against Plaintiff, little to “think about it” a longer. plaintiff however, and, her decided claim after proceed Aherns of her decision, final Her informing discharged. claim Motorola was against eventually settled. above, as noted Subsequently, sought plaintiff relief circuit court County Livingston against defendant, Motorola, for her retaliatory discharge corporation. First,
This raises several issues. should this appeal State cause of action for recognize retaliatory discharge? *7 so, If is such an action one rise to a which claim may give and, so, for if the of was award punitive damages, jury’s $25,000 in the instant case? punitive damages proper
The that no cause of actiоn should employer argues exist in this for of an State the retaliatory discharge that, He contends as of the time of employee. plaintiff’s there was in the Workmen’s discharge, nothing Compensa et 1973, 48, tion Act Rev. Stat. ch. 138.1 seq.) (Ill. par. that on the unfettered to impinged employer’s right terminate without cause an whose employment employee Further, contract at will. the employer argues of a cause of for recognition discharge the of the inconsistent with totally exclusivity provision itself, which Act specifically provides: provided, together compensation herein “The Act, of the shall be the measure provisions of this any any engaged
responsibility employer of in Section 3 of or enumerated enterprises businesses 48, 1973, 138.11.) par. ch. (Ill. ***.” Rev. Stat. Act decision legislature’s Finally, employer argues for criminal employers to punishment solely provide *** to who, or threaten after discharge “discharge *** of his exercise an because of the rights employee Rev. Act” Stat. to him remedies by (Ill. granted [the] for a civil without ch. providing par. 138.4(h)), so who are precludes discharged, employees instant case. action in the the plaintiff’s Rev. Act Stat. The Workmen’s (Ill. Compensation et substitutes entirely 138.1 ch. seq.) par. for all remedies, and procedure new system rights, and liabilities law common rights existing previously to Act and subject between employers employees out of and or death arising accidental employees injuries Ill. L. & Prac. in the course of employment. (37 Pursuant to Workmen’s sec. Compensation (1958).) Act, the employee scheme by statutory implemented tort, to sue his law employer his common rights up gave and in the course out of but injuries arising recovery to without any automatic his became regard employment who up fault on his gave right employer, part. defenses, was compelled common law the numerous plead a strict and fixed under became his but liability pay, scheme, and was subjected statutory comprehensive for fellow whose compassion jurors sympathies Am. led to often recovery. (See high employees Jur. 1 et This trade Workmen’s seq. sec. (1976).) funda off between promoted Act, to afford which was protection mental purрose them with equi- prompt employees providing
181 v. table for their See O’Brien injuries. compensation Rautenbush 10 Ill. 167. (1956), Act, of its
The Workmen’s Compensation light of a nature. is a humane law remedial beneficent purpose, Ill. It Oil Co. v. Industrial Com. 2d 590.) (Shell for efficient remedies for and provides protection and, such, as welfare employees general promotes this State. its enactment by Consequently, legislature of sound was furtherance public policy. (Deibeikis are Link-Belt Co. We convinced that to a cause public policy uphold implement exist for action should retaliatory discharge. 1975,
While that in noting subsequent plaintiff’s the Workmen’s was Act amended discharge, Compensation it unlawful for an or to interfere with making emplоyer coerce the his under the in the exercise of employee rights 48, 1975, Act Rev. Stat. ch. par. 138.4(h)), (111. as of the time discharge, plaintiff’s argues had neither nor provided any prohibited legislature from the for a of a filing discharge resulting such, workmen’s claim. As its compensation authority will, terminate the whose contract was at employee, absolute. In this he cites various statutes in which regard has seen fit to limit the legislature employer’s right Rev. act Stat. discharge (the wage assignment (111. ch. Men’s Tenure Service par. 39.11), Employment 126y2, Act Rev. Stat. and the Fair ch. par. (111. 33), Practices Act Rev. Stat. ch. Employment (111. et notes that none of these par. correctly seq.)), limitations are to the instant case. applicable
We are not сonvinced otherwise employer’s absolute to terminate an at will should power employee when that is exercised to prevail power prevent from his statutory under asserting rights noted, Workmen’s As we have Act. enacted the as a workmen’s law *9 efficient and for scheme to expedi- provide comprehensive scheme would This remedies for tious injured employees. to were undermined if permitted employers seriously terminate abuse their by threatening discharge power the We under Act. for compensation employees seeking a faced with such that when cannot the fact ignore have common law whose dilemma rights many employees, Act, to retain their would choose been the by supplanted effect, left a thus, in would be without and jobs, result, This which either common law statutory. of the relieves the responsibility employer effectively is untenable him expressly by legislature, placed upon as to the and is contrary policy expressed public that Act. We cannot believe Workmen’s Compensation of an in the absence explicit proscription even legislature, a result. intended such retaliatory discharge, against that the Court We Appeals recognize in conclusion has reached contrary Seventh Circuit In Act. the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation construing v. Glass Co. Cir. Loucks Star City F.2d 1977), (7th benefit without the court considered question involved on the decision of this court question any prior had not as the and hеld that inasmuch provided the employ- for a retaliatory discharge, prohibition against at er was free to exercise its traditional discharge right statutes in Decisions of the Federal courts will. construing court. For the reasons are not on this this State binding stated, the construction we adopted above believe of this State. Loucks contravenes the public policy have held that an in other Two recent cases States has a cause against Indiana Gas Co. v. Central Frampton retaliatory discharge. Sventko and Ind. N.E.2d 151. Co. 69 Mich. 245 N.W.2d Kroger App. on the had been In Frampton, injured plaintiff Later, she and received workmen’s compensation. job, made a claim for increased and received a disability causе, settlement. Soon thereafter she was fired without an action for and against brought discharge action, In causé of the Indiana employer. sustaining Court noted that cause of action Supreme prohibit under such circumstances be to sanction the would ability their into to coerce employees forgoing employers so destroy unilaterally defy rights doing act. See function State’s workmen’s compensation Larson, A. Workmen’s sec. 68.36 2A (Supp. 1978). Sventko,
Similarly, plaintiff discharged her a workmen’s claim against employ- filing Court, er. The Michigan Appellate holding *10 an for should have retaliatory employee discharge, free to at will is not an stated that “employer discharge is an intention when the reason the discharge оn the of the to contravene the public part employer 644, 647, state.” 69 Mich. policy App. [the] 151, 153. N.W.2d courts that have
There are decisions of other State Annot., held the 63 A.L.R.3d to contrary (see believe, however, We that the reasoning (1975)). and Sventko is and conforms with Frampton persuasive the the in our public policy expressed by legislature the decision of workmen’s act. compensation Concerning Co., v. Central Indiana Gas we with the Frampton agree that is comment of Professor A. Larson odd that “[i]t Larson, A. such a decision was so in coming.” long (2A Workmen’s sec. 68.36 We do (Supp. 1978).) not that is Frampton employer’s argument agree from the instant case because Indiana distinguishable reliance on Court Indiana’s Supreme “placed express to circumvent ‘device’ statutory any language prohibiting Act,” v. Star City liabilities under the employers’ (Loucks Glass and Co. Cir. 551 F.2d 748), (7th 1977), no can be found in the Illinois because analogous language Court have used statute. While the Indiana may Supreme decision, its the over- to buttress the statutory language enunciated the court is that riding principle statute embraced the workmen’s important compensation to should be available that policy public that workers. it cannot Certainly injured argued the Act devices absence from any language prohibiting their under the circumvent duties whereby may employers that is Act can be mean interpreted retaliatory discharge of this than it is less to the State public repugnant policy that of Indiana. that the exclusivity argues provision employer Act, that section which the provisions provides of the Act be the measure of “shall responsibility 1973, ch. Rev. Stat. 138.11) any employer” par. (Ill. Motorola an action precludes discharge. because this conclusion compelled argues intended that shows section clearly ’ employees should rights Act be exclusive providing First, not do that section was and remedies. We agree. to the extent meant limit recovery by employees to work-related Act regard injuries, provided by from inde intended to insulate a construc Second, cannot actions. we accept tort pendent allow employers put 11 which would tion of section their between jobs in a choosing position employees As we have Act. under already remedies their seeking *11 results it is discussed, such anomalous necessary to prevent be for It would to allow an action retaliatory discharge. of the to the action on the basis bar language illogical itself, is to ensure fundamental which Act purpose have who and remedies to compensable employees rights is we feel it interpret claims. improper Accordingly, 11 section in the manner by employer. suggested The the absence any provi- employer argues sions for civil remedies for retaliatory discharge amendments, it a for an which make criminal offense such a Rev. to threaten or effect discharge (Ill. Stat. ch. is a decision conscious par. 138.4(h)), civil shall exist. no such by remedy noted, We do not As have dis we agree. is offensive to the of this State as charge public policy stated in the Workmen’s Act. This policy can be and enforced only effectively implemented a civil distinct from allowing remedy damages, any criminal sanctions which on may imposed employers the Act after of a 1975. small violating imposition fine, State, to the benefit of does enuring nothing alleviate the of those who are threatened plight employees retaliation their those who lose forgo rights, their when to file jobs claims under they Act. proceed conceivable, It is moreover, that some would employers risk the threat criminal in order sanсtion their escape Further, under the Act. the fact that an act responsibility is in nature does not bar civil and where a penal remedy, statute is enacted for the benefit of a class of particular individuals a violation of its terms result in civil as may well as criminal even former liability, though v. mentioned. Heimgaertner Benjamin specifically Electric Co. 6 Ill. Manufacturing 152. Sears,
In Teale & Co. Roebuck Ill. 2d this court held that a no cause of had discharged employee action for for dis compensatory punitive damages from charge violation what referred employment to as the Discrimination Act” Stat. Rev. “Age (Ill. ch. In that case the Act did not pars. 887). authorize a civil it but did specifically damages, for a criminal for a of the prоvide violation Act. penalty However, this court found of the within Act language an “internal restriction militates strongly against, [which] if indeed it does not preclude, expansion statutory
186 1, Ill. The court sanction 2d by implication.” (66 5.) flows from the found restrictive inference when to civil of the statute conclusive compared language remedies General had which Assembly expressly discrimination. for other of types employment provided $25,000 We the award of now consider punitive connection, In this two merit con- points damages. first, sideration, whether punitive may damages generally second, in cases for and be awarded retaliatory discharge, in whether award for such was proper jury’s damages the instant case. this been in State thаt
It has established punitive long when torts are be awarded or may exemplary damages malice, fraud, violence or deliberate committed with actual acts or when the defendant willfully, oppression, a of as to indicate wanton such disregard gross negligence v. Coal Co. Haenni of others the rights (Consolidated Ill. Where may 614). punitive damages (1893), assessed, in the nature and are allowed they punishment the defendant a to deter as warning example future. from like offenses others committing And, Ill. Rawalt (Eshelman is a damages jury while measurement punitive of whether the facts of question question, preliminary case the imposition punitive a justify damages particular v. Izzo of law. Knierim one properly 73, 87. of the deterrent effeсt
In absence punitive an dissuade employer there would be little to employee from discharging engaging practice claim. For example a workmen’s filing $749 entitled to case, only compen- this the plaintiff real above very We noted possibility satory damages. risk threat of would criminal some employers in order to their under the sanction escape responsibilities conduct, as Act. The statute makes such is involved case, offense Rev. ch. Stat. petty (Ill. par. which is a fine not to exceed $500 138.26), punishable Rev. Stat. ch. (Ill. par. 9—1(4)). 1005 — on the the small additional imposition obligation pay discharged wrongfuHy *13 would do little to of discourage practice of this which mocks retaliatory public policy discharge, Stаte as announced in the Workmen’s Act. deterrence, of of In the absence other effective means must punitive damages permitted prevent of for workmen’s employees discharging filing compensa tion claims. to the the defend
Contrary by arguments presented ant, there is no reason to rule out an totally persuasive of in an action for award punitive damages retaliatory The cases and authorities cited defendant discharge. of his are Those cases and support arguments inapposite. authorities recognize generally proposition accepted that are for not recoverable exemplary damages wrongful Master and Servant sec. e.g., 56 58 discharge. (See, C.J.S. However, rests on of validity proposition (1948).) the fact that such a cause of action sounds contract (53 and Servant sec. 63 Master Am. 2d (1970)), Jur. for breach of contract have not actions traditionally given Williston, 11 rise to claims for punitive damages (see However, sec. 1340 ed. Contracts (3d 1968)). general rule where, here, has no as the cause of action application a tort. premised upon (Leding separate independent ham v. Blue Plan Cross Care Hospital Hospital of Service rev’d on other 3d Corp. Ill. 29 (1975), App. circumstances, 64 Ill. such grounds Under (1976), 338.) when the facts bemay properly permit, punitive damages awarded.
However, case, under are the facts we present $25,000 to conclude the award for as thаt compelled noted, As we have punitive improper. damages to that of a is similar function punitive damages i.e., as a criminal wrongdoer penalty, punishment and others from to deter such and as means wrongdoer Mattyasovszky future. like offenses in the committing (See v. West Towns Bus Co. Ill. Because 2d 31.) (1975), nature, are not favored in the their punitive damages penal to see law, and the courts must take caution punitive are awarded. unwisely improperly (See damages v. Eshelman Rawalt Adherence rule us conclude that to this punitive compels where, here, cause action should not be awarded as a novel one. for their award is basis forming of Nees Hocks In this we find the reasoning regard, Ore. In 536 P.2d persuasive. because she went on case, who was dismissed an employee her an action duty jury brought against Court Supreme Oregon discharge. and allowed the the cause recovery sustained but recovery denying damages, compensatory *14 held: punitive damages, be
“If could we held that damages punitive case we would be in the per- awarded present defendants for conduct mitting jury punish determined before- could not have which they assessment hand was even actionable. The functions some of the same has punitive law of criminal as the sanctions [citation]. constitu- cannot criminal law sanctions of the when the criminality tionally imposed known before- is not conduct being capable 210, 220-21, 536 hand.” Ore. P.2d (272 517.) case. At the instant considerations
Similar apply no there was time provision plaintiff’s discharge for unlawful an it Act discharge employee making Also, at that time there relief under its seeking provisions.
189 was no decision of this court that a holding retaliatory in such cases was actionable. The discharge opinion Indiana Court in was filed on Supreme Frampton May one month before the in this only case was plaintiff Sventko was not decided discharged. Michigan Court until 1976. As Appellate absence of against which would alert the defendant authority the existence of a cause of action for for discharging plaintiff claim, her there was pursuing authority which would have caused defendant reasonably conclude that its conduct was not Plaintiff actionable. will, an term but at emplоyee specific such an generally, employer may discharge whenever and for whatever he chooses cause without Am. Master Servant sec. incurring liability. 2d (53 Jur. Also, 43 at the time there (1970).) plaintiff’s discharge, had been decisions in other States had held that such relief was not discharge seeking actionable. v. Petrus 365 Mo. (Christy 295 (1956), 122; Greenville, Raley S.W.2d Inc. Darling Shop of S.C. 59 In (1950), 148.) summary, S.E.2d cause of here action asserted was novel and there was no which would have statutory judicial pronouncement caused the defendant to believe that its conduct was actionable while there was which would reason authority cause one to believe that it was not. Under these ably circumstances, hold that we although plaintiff entitled to we conclude that it compensatory damages, would be unfair to sustain an award extremely against defendant v. Patton punitive damages. People (See 43; Ill. Bassi v. 2d Ill. 2d Langloss (1961), 190; re In Luster We hold that be awarded cases such as punitive damages may properly *15 the one under for consideration retaliatory discharge However, to the date this is filed. we subsequent opinion hold that it for trial court to award improper in case. this
punitive damages court In appellate summary, judgment for discharge of action cause denying plaintiff amount $749 in the Plaintiff’s award is reversed. affirmed, is but court the trial by compensatory damages is $25,000 for trial court’s order punitive reversed. reversed; circuit court
Appellate in court part affirmed reversed part. no took KLUCZYNSKI MR. part JUSTICE of this or decision case. consideration UNDERWOOD, part MR. concurring JUSTICE in part: dissenting an tells
I no brief who write will be that employee industrially injured filed. Such if a is claim discharged statements, even assurances when that accompanied connected with the all will be expenses injury paid, do not to one’s really sense fairness. appeal Plaintiff’s in favor of a of action for cause retali- arguments atory if limited to compensatory damages, discharges, have well be a considerable and such an may appeal, desirable such My discharges. disagreement merits of that the stems from belief my majority assess, for the those were clearly legislature arguments them, did and the not adoрt majority is, me, this it case seems opinion simply substitution of a preferences majority members of court for the considered judgment General Assembly.
It is it obvious only say stating fundamental in our system government function is vested in the branch. The law-making legislative
191 in this case field intrusion into the majority’s legislative has which been lack of self-restraint the judicial typifies our history. and comment source of concern throughout to it as follows: Chief Marshall Mr. spoke “[The Justice *** in case. has no will any judicial] department Judicial to of effect the is never exercised for purpose giving power of for the of the always purpose the will giving judge; words, the or in other to effect to the will of legislature; the United law.” v. Bank States the will of the (Osborn of 866, 204, 738, 6 L. Ed. U.S. 22 (1824), (9 Wheat.) the It is essential to powers preservation separation branch those of us who serve the that judicial to the desires and actions subordinate our preferences as are and executive branches as those long legislative terms. in constitutional expressed Harlan, v. Sanders Wesberry Mr. dissenting Justice 48, 11 526, L. Ed. 84 S. Ct. 376 U.S. not it thus: does confer “The Constitution phrased on the Court into situation blanket authority step every have where branch fallen may political thought short. The of this institution ultimately stability depends branches of its the other alert only keep upon being bounds but within constitutional equally upon government func own limitations on Court’s of the recognition in the constitutional tions system.” it is the admonition: “But here is
Precisely point aon statute additiоns which not our function engraft or should have think the we logically might legislature United States v. made.” Cooper Corp. U.S. 600, 605, 1071, 1075, L. Ed. 61 S. Ct.
(Roberts, J.). their creation a civil assertion
My colleagues’ is in order to remedy adequately implement required Workmen’s Act beneficent purpose was so one wonder if the need makes great, why, the more been earlier in than had not question presented I of the Act’s existence. Nor do understand how 65 years is it that on the basis of a record devoid of proof frequency able to majority discharges discern so much more than the clearly Act “would be undermined” without seriously new which the court now manufactures. contract in this case was employment terminable at will of either as the concedes. But party majority the action it takes transfоrms that today, majority contract, as the Court of Seventh Circuit Appeals into tenured suggested, every employment *17 who files a claim an compensation against employer. *** it could be that “Certainly argued acceptance claim here would be tantamount [plaintiff’s] writing into the Illinois statute a for tenure in event provision of an industrial v. Star Glass injury.” Co. (Loucks City Cir. Henceforth, (7th F.2d no 1977), 746-47.) indolent, matter how insubordinate or obnoxious an be, if he has filed a employee may claim thereafter dis- against employer, may employer him at the risk of only to defend a charge compelled being suit retaliatory unlimited discharge punitive which well could or damages, severely impair destroy of small businesses. solvency notes, As the а 1975 amendment to the majority Workmen’s Act makes it a criminal offense Compensation for an to threaten or effect a employer discharge retaliation for an exercise of his under employee’s rights the Act. Rev. Stat. ch. While (Ill. par. 138.4(h).) that amendment post-dated which we episode case, deal in this it is relevant and certainly illuminating the General of the Assembly’s Workmen’s understanding Act and the intent Compensation legislative adopting the amendment. the Act had not been Obviously thought and to to one preclude retaliatory so provide discharges a cause of action for, did, if it discharged damages, amendment was We unnecessary. presume legislature did not intend to a useless act perform (People McCoy 63 Ill. and the rule is that 2d “where a 45), amended, statute is it will be that the presumed intended to effect some it law as change formerly ” existed. ex rel. Gibson v. Cannon (People [Citation.] 65 Ill. In adopting amendment, it is clear to me that the members of the General were for the Assembly first they thought creating, time, a and established retaliatory discharges what considered to be sufficient deterrent. they did They include civil on liability part It is unrealistic to employee. discharged suppose drafted, those who those who and the members sponsored of the General which Assembly Illinois on adopted law discharges simply civil ignored question remedies if those remedies are in fact as vital to the effective administration of the Act as the now majоrity asserts. itHad been desirable, either necessary thought civil action for such as were considered appro have been would included priate comprehensive Workmen’s Act as it has just integrated been in similar enactments hereinafter referred legislative considerations, to. Not to be deterred these however, state in my their colleagues wisdom exercising superior *18 the policy against “can be retaliatory discharge only effectively and implemented enforced a civil by allowing Ill. at damages” 2d (74 185).
I do not doubt that the is “convinced majority that to and uphold this implement a cause of public policy should exist for retaliatory as the discharge,” opinion states Ill. at 2d but that fact (74 should 181), irrelevаnt, be for the was not so convinced. decision, Today’s me, it seems to the and simply function of usurps power branch of legislative evidences an un government —and by to exercise the willingness self-restraint majority so essential if the is to maintain its judiciary function. proper matter how situation
No emotionally pre- appealing sented, lies within the limits of only our power law-making and the mandate of our common our law heritage constitutions; it does include specific legisla- amending feel, is in some however tion which we rightly, lacking a cause does it not include Particularly providing respect. both and of action punitive compensatory including omitted. which the General deliberately Assembly action, has In this cause of mаjority creating recent in Teale v. overruled this court’s opinion effectively Sears, Roebuck Co. while & Teale, In to it. employee brought purporting distinguish to be under a civil action discharge alleged wrongful Rev. Stat. ch. Discrimination Act the Age (Ill. it Act made unlawful to That pars. 887.) through a a because of his and provided person age discharge criminal so. Act contained The penalty doing of far more certain and declaration policy legislative relied formulations than policy explicit public general case before the court. now majority upon 1 stated: Section Assembly practice that the declares
“(a) The General properly quali- employment against discriminating contrary is to аge of their American persons fied because opportunity ***. principles liberty equality [***] otherwise lawful employment to right (c) *** hereby age because of is
without discrimination all people right as declared to be recognized herein. protected provided shall as of the State which be policy hereby It declared (d) and declared recognized protect right State such and to eliminate all (c) of this Section paragraph This Act permitted. to the fullest extent discrimination policy.” (Emphasis such shall be construed effectuate added.) (Ill. par. Rev. Stat. ch. this court statement public policy Despite strong held that that statute and declined unanimously expand *19 no civil for the existed. alleged wrongful discharge Schaefer, court, Mr. first for noted speaking Justice he Act does not civil action expressly authorize “[t] 1, for Ill. He then stated: damages.” (66 when “And we look terms beyond statute examine the civil remedies which the General has Assembly expressly provided discrimination, other the restrictive types inference that flows from language statute itself becomes conclusive. Some of the variant forms of sanction are these:
Discrimination under employment or contracts works public buildings public race, color, on account of sex or national is and a violation is a Class prohibited, origin B The statute also misdemeanor. specifically same provides recovery (apparently amount as the criminal in a civil action fine) by Rev. person. brought aggrieved 1973, 29, Stat. ch. 22. pars. official or
Any any operator public of accommodation or amusement who place discriminates reason of any by against person race, color, national or ancestry religion, or mental aof physical handicap guilty Class B misdemeanor and is made specifically liable to the for not less person aggrieved $1,000 than nor more than to be $100 recovered in a civil action. Additional rem edies abatement way injunction nuisance are also Ill. Rev. Stat. provided. ch. 13 — 1 13 — 4. pars. through which has been
Any hospital adjudicated to have denied admission to any person race, creed, because of loses its colоr from taxation. Ill. Rev. Stat. exemption ch. 500.7. par. *20 board, school member of a super Any intendent, school or other officer principal color, information who seeks concerning race, affilia or nationality, religion religious his tion of connection any person a is liable to employment assignment, of less than nor more than $100 penalty recovered be person $500 aggrieved action, of a a civil and in addition is guilty 1973, ch. Rev. B misdemeanor. Stat. Class 122, 24 — 4. par. authorized by civil remedies limited
The carefully it demonstrate, that in our opinion, these statutes a derive by implication would incongruous violation for a unlimited to recover right 1, 66 Ill. 5-6. this statute.” relied in Teale also on the The court legislatively declared rеstriction created “shall be thereby right as herein.” the Workmen’s protected Similarly provided in the case us states that Act before Compensation measure “shall be the Act provisions ***.” Rev. Stat. (Ill. any employer responsibility at least as ch. Certainly language par. 138.11.) held the Teale court restrictive as that which precluded of this court now which a civil very majority it is in its creates. Teale is not only reasoning, persuasive adhere, should which this court controlling precedent or, least, overrule. at have the candor to believes Frampton
The majority seemingly Ind. v. Indiana Gas Co. Central (Frampton Co. and Sventko Kroger N.E.2d 425) (Sventko decisions 69 Mich. 151) 245 N.W.2d App. case. The to this Frampton its emotional approaсh support however, court, the cause of action retaliatory upheld a to be it found such a because discharge discharge statute “device” which Indiana specifically prohibited. Also, in our act. neither the No similar appears language had Indiana nor prescribed penalties Michigan legislature fact, as ours has done. In for retaliatory discharges that have considered this have of courts majority question a denied cause recovery, recognize private refusing case, In the recent action most retaliatory discharge. Loucks v. Star Glass Cir. Co. City F.2d 1977), (7th law, court, Illinois determined that interpreting the absence of a in the Workmen’s provision Act was a deliberate cause creаting private decision of the “We think it Illinois policy legislature: rather unlikely prohibition discharge would have been omitted from this comprehensive if it had been intended.” 551 F.2d integrated legislation *21 745, 1187, 748. See also v. Petrus 365 Mo. Christy (1956), 122; Narens v. 295 Campbell Sixty-Six Express, S.W.2d 204; Inc. 347 Shop Raley S.W.2d (Mo. 1961), Darling Greenville, 536, Inc. S.C. 59 148. 216 S.E.2d (1950), Since I do not that a cause of action exists for agree either I concur with compensatory punitive damages, are court’s not available holding punitive damages in this case. I with the obiter dicta plaintiff disagree statements availability regarding punitive damages future cases. As was out pointed opinion dissenting in Churchill v. Western & Co. Ry. Norfolk 150: “The doctrine punitive 2d damages not favored law and the [citations], power giving punitive should be exercised caution great and should be they confined within the properly narrowest of limitations where the Surely has [citation].” forbidden certain actions and provided specific penalty violation, for a this court has no on authority, generalized policy to hold the grounds, insufficient legislated penalty a stiffer one. provide the General Obviously, Assembly felt it decided sufficient; penalty upon
otherwise, course, it would have a more severe provided civil remedies or both. penalty, White, Mr. As said Roe v. Wade dissenting, Justice 410 U.S. at L. Ed. at S. Ct. at 763: “As an exercise of raw the Court judicial power, has to do what it does but in perhaps authority today; my view its is an judgment improvident extravagant exercise of review that Constitu- judicial power tion extends to this Court.”
I would affirm the court. appellate judgment
(No. 50514 . CO., COAL v. THE UNITED ELECTRIC Appellant, Cole, et INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION al. —(Joseph Appellee.)
Opinion Nov. Rehearing denied 1979. filed Jan. 1978 .