Sutton v. Bell, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11553

Background

Sutton was sentenced to death for murdering inmate Carl Estep in 1985; the primary guilt-phase evidence came from three inmate witnesses and a motive tied to a drug deal.
Sutton was convicted of Estep’s murder and sentenced based on three aggravating factors: prior violent felony, confinement at the time, and that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
Sutton challenged trial counsel’s effectiveness under Strickland, alleging (a) failure to object to courtroom security and a “shanks incident,” (b) failure to object to three prosecutorial misconduct instances, (c) failure to challenge penalty-phase jury instructions on the heinous/atrocious/cruel aggravator, and (d) failure to adequately investigate/present mitigating evidence about prison violence and his troubled background.
The district court denied habeas relief; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying AEDPA deferential review and ruling Sutton failed to show deficient performance or prejudice.
This opinion includes separate concurrence and dissents addressing the admissibility of Sutton’s prior offenses and the weight of mitigation evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel’s Flynn/Flynn-like objections were required for security practices	Sutton argues Flynn v. Flynn error occurred; guards’ presence prejudiced.	State court reasonably found no Flynn error; security necessary for trial.	No reversible Flynn error; state court reasonable.
Whether prosecutorial misconduct in guilt-phase closing affected outcome	Prosecutor’s remarks misled/jurors about defendant’s guilt and constructs of self-defense.	Objections would have been unlikely to change verdict given weight of evidence.	No prejudice; overwhelming evidence of guilt supports denial.
Whether penalty-phase remarks about deterrence and future danger were improper	Prosecutor’s future-dangerousness and deterrence arguments improperly influenced sentencing.	Arguments were permissible under federal law and not prejudicial given aggravators.	Not prejudicial under AEDPA; proper aggravators outweighed any error.
Whether penalty-phase jury instructions on heinous, atrocious, or cruel were unconstitutionally vague	Jury instruction vague, prejudicing consideration of aggravator.	State court narrowed the aggravator; no constitutional error.	No prejudice; Tennessee’s narrowing construction cures potential error.
Whether counsel adequately investigated/presented mitigating evidence	Counsel failed to investigate Sutton’s troubled childhood and present mitigating evidence; prejudicial.	Mitigation evidence would be cumulative and likely countered by rebuttal evidence; no prejudice.	No reasonable probability of life sentence; mitigation not overwhelming; no AEDPA prejudice.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (reweighing mitigating evidence under AEDPA/Strickland framework)
Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (2005) (deference to state-court narrowing of aggravator; harmless-error principle)
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (penalty-phase considerations and death-penalty jurisprudence)
Musladin v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006) (open question of applying Flynn to spectators’ conduct)
Flynn v. United States, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) (trial-phase courtroom security and prejudice doctrine)
Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn. 1979) (limits on admissible mitigating evidence in Tennessee capital sentencing)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (extensive mitigation evaluation and prejudice analysis)