Susan Vaughan v. Anderson Regional Medical Ctr
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2699
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Susan Vaughan, a nurse supervisor, sued Anderson Regional Medical Center for wrongful termination in retaliation for raising age-discrimination complaints under the ADEA, seeking pain-and-suffering (general compensatory) and punitive damages.
- The district court dismissed Vaughan’s claims for pain-and-suffering and punitive damages based on Fifth Circuit precedent (Dean v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co.) but certified the question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) due to a circuit split and EEOC guidance to the contrary.
- The Fifth Circuit panel reviewed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, accepting Vaughan’s well-pleaded facts as true and applying the Twombly plausibility standard.
- The central legal question: whether Dean’s bar on general compensatory and punitive damages in private ADEA suits applies to ADEA retaliation claims.
- Vaughan argued intervening legal changes (1977 FLSA amendments, EEOC interpretations, and transfer of enforcement to the EEOC) undermined Dean; the panel analyzed and rejected each basis to overrule Dean.
- The panel affirmed, holding Dean controls and disallows pain-and-suffering and punitive damages in all private actions brought under the ADEA, including retaliation claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dean’s bar on general compensatory and punitive damages applies to ADEA retaliation claims | Dean addressed discrimination claims only; Vaughan: retaliation claims are distinct and the 1977 FLSA amendments (and EEOC guidance) expanded remedies to include emotional and punitive damages | Dean’s categorical language covers all “private actions posited upon the ADEA,” so it bars such damages for retaliation claims too | Dean applies to ADEA retaliation claims; such damages are not recoverable |
| Whether the 1977 FLSA amendments constitute an intervening change undermining Dean | The FLSA amendments enlarged remedies for retaliation and were meant to be read consistently with ADEA retaliation remedies | The FLSA amendments borrowed remedial language substantively identical to what ADEA already had; they do not change Dean’s analysis | 1977 FLSA amendments do not justify overruling Dean |
| Whether EEOC interpretation or Moskowitz decision justify departing from Dean | EEOC guidance and Moskowitz support allowing compensatory and punitive damages for ADEA retaliation | EEOC guidance is only persuasive (Skidmore) and Moskowitz is unpersuasive; an agency view or nonbinding circuit case cannot overcome binding precedent | EEOC view and Moskowitz do not displace Dean |
| Whether transfer of enforcement functions from Secretary of Labor to EEOC constitutes intervening change | Transfer altered administrative enforcement dynamics, potentially permitting broader remedies | The statutory text still reflects the ADEA’s administrative-preference structure; substitution of EEOC for Secretary does not alter Dean’s rationale | Transfer does not constitute intervening change; Dean remains controlling |
Key Cases Cited
- Dean v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977) (holds ADEA private actions do not permit punitive or general pain-and-suffering damages)
- True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2009) (standards for Rule 12(b)(6) de novo review and pleading plausibility)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Sprong v. Fidelity Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2015) (describes the Fifth Circuit’s rule of orderliness limiting panels from overruling precedent)
- Moskowitz v. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 5 F.3d 279 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluded 1977 FLSA amendments expanded remedies for retaliation; here treated as unpersuasive)
- Smith v. Berry Co., 165 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 1999) (applied Dean post-1977 and reaffirmed unavailability of punitive and pain-and-suffering damages under ADEA)
- Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (cited re: deference concepts to agency interpretations)
- Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008) (recognizes weight of agency experience; discusses Skidmore deference)
- Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (treats pre‑Oct. 1, 1981 Fifth Circuit decisions as binding in the Eleventh Circuit)
- Snapp v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928 (11th Cir. 2000) (cited as circuit applying Dean’s reasoning)