Stryker v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 780 F.3d 163

Larry Stryker submitted information to the SEC (2004–July 2009) about alleged misconduct by Advanced Tech. Group Ltd. (ATG); the SEC opened an investigation in March 2009 and interviewed Stryker in April 2009.
The SEC filed and later settled an enforcement action against ATG and an individual; the settlement (2010) resulted in liability of about $19 million and court approval in 2011.
Stryker applied for a Dodd‑Frank whistleblower award on January 11, 2011, claiming the SEC relied on his information in the enforcement action.
The SEC’s rules (Rule 21F-4(b)(1)(iv)) require that "original information" be provided to the Commission for the first time after July 21, 2010; a statutory safe harbor (15 U.S.C. § 78u-7(b)) covers submissions made in writing after July 21, 2010 but before SEC rules’ effective date.
The SEC denied Stryker’s award because his submissions were made before July 21, 2010 and thus did not meet the rule’s timing requirement or fall within the statutory safe harbor. Stryker petitioned for review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether information submitted to the SEC before July 21, 2010 can qualify as "original information" for a Dodd‑Frank whistleblower award	Stryker: Rule’s July 21, 2010 cutoff conflicts with statute; pre‑July 21 submissions should qualify	SEC: Congress required submission in the form and manner prescribed by SEC rules; only the narrow safe harbor covers pre‑rule submissions after July 21, 2010	Court: Chevron deference applies; SEC’s rule disqualifying pre‑July 21, 2010 submissions is reasonable and valid
Whether Chevron deference is appropriate to uphold Rule 21F-4(b)(1)(iv)	Stryker: Agency rule conflicts with statutory purpose to incentivize whistleblowers	SEC: Congress delegated rulemaking authority and left ambiguity on timing; agency interpretation is permissible	Court: Chevron step 1 not clearly resolved; at step 2 court defers to SEC as reasonable

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes are entitled to deference)
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (statutory exceptions imply Congress considered and limited other exceptions)
Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.) (deference to reasonable agency interpretations)
Mei Juan Zhang v. Holder, 672 F.3d 178 (2d Cir.) (agency interpretation need not be the only permissible construction)
N.Y. ex rel. N.Y. State Office of Children & Family Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 556 F.3d 90 (2d Cir.) (describing Chevron two‑step framework)
United States v. Connolly, 552 F.3d 86 (2d Cir.) (applying Chevron two‑step inquiry)
Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 460 F.3d 361 (2d Cir.) (statutory construction on exceptions)