Strycharz v. Cady
148 A.3d 1011
| Conn. | 2016Background
- High school student Joseph Strycharz was struck on a public highway after leaving the school bus port to cross Norwich Avenue and sued school officials and the town for negligent supervision and indemnification under § 7-465.
- Norwich Avenue in front of Bacon Academy was a busy two-lane state highway with documented traffic-safety concerns; the board had voted to hire a crossing/traffic agent but the agent would not start until after the new budget in October.
- School policy required morning bus-port supervision (two staff members on a rotating roster); principal Mathieu delegated roster preparation to assistant principal McCubrey, who testified she prepared outlines but could not locate a final roster; no evidence exists identifying staff on duty the morning of the accident.
- Trial court granted summary judgment to most municipal defendants on governmental-immunity grounds, treating the supervision duties as discretionary; it also held that even if a ministerial roster duty existed, Mathieu, McCubrey and Sward had satisfied it as a matter of law.
- On appeal the Supreme Court (majority) reversed summary judgment as to McCubrey and Sward (genuine dispute whether roster was created/distributed) but affirmed summary judgment otherwise, holding: (1) the duty to assign and distribute the roster is ministerial, (2) the duty to ensure staff actually performed posts is discretionary, and (3) plaintiff remained an identifiable victim only to the extent he was under school custody but failed to show the imminent-harm exception applied because defendants lacked apparent knowledge that students were leaving school grounds before class.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nature of ministerial duty re: bus duty roster | Duty includes preparing and distributing roster and ensuring staff know assignments | Duty is limited to creating roster; supervision enforcement is discretionary | Duty to assign and distribute roster is ministerial; duty to ensure staff actually perform posts is discretionary |
| Whether Mathieu/McCubrey/Sward discharged ministerial duty | Roster was not effectively created/distributed; genuine factual dispute | They created/distributed roster (Mathieu delegated; McCubrey prepared roster) | Mathieu satisfied duty as a matter of law (proper delegation); genuine issue as to McCubrey and Sward — summary judgment reversed as to them |
| Identifiable-person status after plaintiff left school grounds | Class status attaches when school takes custody and continues despite voluntary departure | Plaintiff forfeited identifiable status by leaving school property in violation of policy | Plaintiff remained a member of the identifiable class only while under school's custody; school may be liable for off-premises injury if negligence on school grounds proximately caused it |
| Applicability of imminent-harm exception (post-Haynes standard) | Intersection danger + failure to supervise made harm imminent and apparent; Haynes supports remand | Risk was ongoing/continuous (not imminent); defendants lacked apparent knowledge students were leaving early; immunity applies | Imminent-harm exception did not apply: plaintiff failed to show it was apparent to defendants that students were crossing Norwich Ave. before school; summary judgment affirmed on discretionary-act claims (except McCubrey and Sward roster issue) |
Key Cases Cited
- Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640 (Conn. 1994) (on school duty to protect students from dangers on school grounds)
- Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501 (Conn. 1989) (imminence analysis and limits of exception to governmental immunity)
- Haynes v. Middletown, 314 Conn. 303 (Conn. 2014) (clarified imminent-harm standard: danger must be so likely that defendant had a clear, unequivocal duty to act immediately)
- Coley v. Hartford, 312 Conn. 150 (Conn. 2014) (discretionary-vs-ministerial act analysis and role of judgment/exercise of discretion)
- Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310 (Conn. 2006) (identifiable-victim/imminent-harm exception elements)
- Gauvin v. New Haven, 187 Conn. 180 (Conn. 1982) (official testimony can establish the nature/scope of an official duty)
- Soderlund v. Merrigan, 110 Conn.App. 389 (Conn. App. 2008) (interpreting when a procedural requirement is mandatory)
- Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101 (Conn. 1998) (prior treatment of imminency in limited temporal/geographic scenarios)