Stop Reckless Economic Instability Caused by Democrats v. Federal Election Commission, 814 F.3d 221

Background

Plaintiffs: three nonconnected political committees (Stop PAC, Tea Party Leadership Fund, ARCC) and intervenor American Future challenged FECA contribution limits in 2014; Stop PAC and American Future sought relief from the $2,600 per‑election limit for non‑MPCs and the 6‑month waiting period to qualify as a multicandidate political committee (MPC).
The Fund (an existing MPC) and ARCC challenged lower annual limits that apply to MPCs for contributions to national ($15,000) and state/local ($5,000) party committees (versus higher limits available to non‑MPCs that have satisfied other MPC criteria but not the waiting period).
District court granted summary judgment to the FEC on all counts, holding no constitutional violation under First or Fifth Amendment theories.
On appeal, the FEC argued the district court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction over Counts I and II because the plaintiffs became MPCs before judgment (mootness) and also disputed standing; it separately defended the merits of Count III.
Fourth Circuit: vacated and remanded Counts I and II for dismissal as moot (no application of the capable‑of‑repetition exception because plaintiffs would not be subject to the rule again), and affirmed summary judgment to the FEC on Count III (equal‑protection challenge to MPC contribution caps).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are Counts I & II (challenge to $2,600 per‑election limit and 6‑month waiting period) justiciable or moot?	Stop PAC/American Future: exception for "capable of repetition, yet evading review" applies in election cases; relief remains necessary.	FEC: plaintiffs became MPCs before decision, so the contested limit no longer applies and claims are moot; no same‑party expectation to recur.	Moot. Counts I & II became moot when plaintiffs became MPCs; the capable‑of‑repetition exception fails because same‑complaining‑party requirement is not met. Vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Standing to bring Counts I & II	Stop PAC: injury from being prevented from contributing more in those elections; organization of political activity may occur shortly before elections.	FEC: Stop PAC caused its own injury by late registration and therefore lacks standing.	Court did not decide standing because mootness resolved the jurisdictional issue; lower‑court failure to resolve mootness was error.
Is the waiting‑period limit a First Amendment violation (Count II)?	Stop PAC: waiting period chills speech/association by restricting contributions during pre‑MPC period.	FEC: no cognizable constitutional injury; precedent (Buckley, CMA) limits such claims.	Not reached on appeal because Count II was moot. District court had found no cognizable First Amendment injury.
Does FECA’s differential annual limits on MPCs (Count III) violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal‑protection component?	Fund/ARCC: reducing party‑committee caps for MPCs (vs. higher caps for non‑MPCs that have only the waiting period left) discriminates against MPCs.	FEC: no invidious discrimination — comparing treatment across FECA as a whole shows political committees overall are favored; reductions for party contributions are offset by higher candidate contribution limits for MPCs.	Held for FEC. Court applied CMA reasoning: no actionable discrimination because MPCs, considered in context of FECA as a whole, are not disadvantaged; summary judgment for the FEC affirmed on Count III.

Key Cases Cited

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (limits on campaign contributions/expenditures and political‑committee definitions)
California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (equal‑protection analysis comparing overall statutory regime, not isolated provision)
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (federal courts must address jurisdiction before merits)
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911) (articulating capable‑of‑repetition‑yet‑evading‑review doctrine)
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (case or controversy must exist at all stages)
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (capable‑of‑repetition exception requires reasonable expectation that same complaining party will be subject to the same action)
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (same‑party requirement applied in election‑related context)
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (when jurisdiction ceases, court must dismiss)
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (election disputes often too short for full litigation; supports repetition prong)
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (explaining both elements of the capable‑of‑repetition exception)