84 F.4th 874
9th Cir.2023Background
- In 1997 Stephen Moreland Redd was convicted and sentenced to death in California; state law (Cal. Gov’t Code § 68662 / Cal. Penal Code § 1509) requires superior courts to offer and, upon a finding of indigence and acceptance, appoint habeas counsel for capital prisoners.
- Redd accepted the offer and has waited ~26 years for appointed state habeas counsel; he alleges many witnesses have died, memories faded, and evidence was lost, impairing his ability to develop habeas claims and to later pursue federal habeas relief.
- Redd sued state judicial officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaration that the long delay in appointing counsel violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.
- The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim; Redd appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit held (1) Redd has standing and declaratory relief would likely redress his injury; (2) O’Shea abstention was not required; (3) Redd plausibly alleged a deprivation of a state-created property interest in appointed habeas counsel sufficient to state a due process claim; (4) his liberty-interest theory (that delay prevented him from vindicating a habeas right) was not plausibly pled as drafted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing / Redressability | A declaratory judgment that the delay violated due process would increase likelihood of appointment and redress injury | State officers claim relief would not redress delay or is beyond their control | Court: Redd has standing; declaratory relief likely to at least partially redress injury |
| Abstention (O’Shea) | Federal court may declare system unconstitutional without ongoing supervision | State officers: federal adjudication would intrude on state judicial administration and require monitoring | Court: O’Shea abstention inapplicable to Redd’s individual declaratory claim; no injunction sought and risk of ongoing federal oversight is low |
| Property interest in appointed habeas counsel | California statute creates a mandatory entitlement to counsel; 26‑year deprivation plausibly destroyed the entitlement and violates due process under Mathews/Logan balancing | State officers: statute lacks a specific timing deadline; Redd got what state law provides | Court: Statute’s mandatory language creates a protected, state‑created property interest; the extreme delay plausibly shows inadequate process — claim survives dismissal |
| Liberty interest in petitioning for habeas | Delay in appointing counsel prevented meaningful petitioning; state procedures effectively bar pro se continuation after accepting counsel | State officers: no federal constitutional right to state habeas counsel; a prisoner may proceed pro se | Court: Redd’s complaint failed to allege he was barred from withdrawing his request for counsel or that he tried to proceed pro se; liberty‑interest claim not plausibly pled as drafted |
Key Cases Cited
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (no federal constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings)
- Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (same principle applied to capital prisoners)
- Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (no constitutional right to counsel for collateral attacks)
- O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (abstention where federal relief would require ongoing federal supervision of state prosecutions)
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions except in narrow circumstances)
- Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (state‑created procedural entitlements can be protected property interests)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (balancing test for required procedural protections)
- Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (declaratory relief can redress state‑law‑based denials by removing the state official’s justification)
- Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (limits on federal intrusion into state postconviction procedures; federal relief only when state procedures are fundamentally inadequate)
- Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.) (excessive state delay in adjudication can violate due process)
- Ashmus v. Calderon, 123 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.) (delay in appointment of counsel incompatible with statutory requirement of appointment "upon" acceptance)