Stender v. Archstone-Smith, 958 F.3d 938

Minority-shareholder plaintiffs brought a class action challenging a merger; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants, which this Court affirmed.
After the merits rulings, defendants sought costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); the district court taxed $479,666.22 in costs, including $230,250.01 for electronic legal research and attorney travel/lodging based on Colorado cost statutes and precedent.
Federal law (Rule 54(d) as construed with 28 U.S.C. § 1920) limits taxable costs to specific categories and does not authorize electronic research or attorney travel/lodging.
Colorado statutes and case law treat the statutory cost list as illustrative and permit a broader array of costs at the trial court’s discretion.
The central legal question became whether a federal diversity court may award costs authorized by generally applicable state law when those costs are excluded by Rule 54(d)/§1920; the Tenth Circuit vacated the award and remanded for recomputation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
May a federal diversity court award state-authorized costs that Rule 54(d)/§1920 does not permit?	Only costs enumerated in §1920 are taxable; electronic research and attorney travel/lodging are not authorized.	Colorado’s general cost statutes and precedent allow those items; district court applied state law.	Rule 54(d) (as limited by §1920) governs in federal court; state law cannot authorize additional costs.
Is applying Rule 54(d) to displace Colorado law ultra vires under the Rules Enabling Act?	Rule 54(d) is procedural and within the Rules Enabling Act; it does not abridge substantive rights.	State law should control where it establishes cost rules; displacing it would alter remedies.	Applying Rule 54(d) is not ultra vires; it regulates procedure and validly preempts conflicting state cost rules under Shady Grove.
Was the plaintiffs’ challenge to the costs award preserved for appeal?	Plaintiffs argued the clerk and court could only award §1920 costs and cited Crawford Fitting; they contested specific items.	District court said plaintiffs failed to adequately raise federal-preemption argument below.	The Court found preservation sufficient (closely) and therefore reviewed the merits; plain-error review not required.

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (framework: a Federal Rule governs if it answers the same question as state law and is not ultra vires)
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987) (§1920 defines “costs” under Rule 54(d); courts cannot tax costs beyond statutory categories)
Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012) (reaffirming limits on taxable costs and the role of §1920)
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (procedural/substantive distinction for Rules Enabling Act analysis)
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (historical context for standardized federal costs)
Chaparral Res. v. Monsanto, 849 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1988) (Tenth Circuit discussion of awards beyond federal statutory costs)
Garcia v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 209 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2000) (application of state cost provision in a federal case)
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (narrowest-grounds rule for fragmented Supreme Court decisions)