State v. Wooten
2016 Ohio 6980
Ohio Ct. App.2016Background
- On March 13, 2015, homeowner Howard Hammons called deputies requesting they “raid” his house because people were allegedly smoking crack; he told officers he owned the home and gave permission to enter.
- Drug task force officers entered the house without a warrant but with Hammons’ consent, went upstairs, and observed drug paraphernalia and crack; Amanda Wooten made incriminating statements and produced crack pipes.
- Wooten was indicted for possession of cocaine (felony); she moved to suppress evidence seized during the warrantless entry.
- At the suppression hearing, testimony conflicted about whether the upstairs was rented and whether Hammons had access: Hammons acknowledged storing items upstairs and occasional access to a closet; Wooten and a visitor testified the upstairs area had a lock and was used as a separate rented living area.
- The trial court denied the motion to suppress, Wooten pled no contest, was convicted and sentenced to community control; she appealed the denial of suppression.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State/Hammons) | Defendant's Argument (Wooten) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether warrantless entry was lawful based on third-party consent | Hammons (homeowner) had actual authority to consent to entry into common areas and invited officers to enter; officers observed drugs in plain view upstairs | Wooten argued the upstairs was a rented private area; Hammons lacked authority to consent to search of her rented rooms | Court held Hammons had actual authority to allow officers into common areas (stairs/landing); open doorway/plain view justified discovery of contraband and officers’ actions |
| Whether officer safety justified approach and pat-down that led to discovery | Officers reasonably approached; visible hand movement created safety concern justifying order to turn and pat-down viewpoint | Wooten implied her movement was mere concealment in private space; argued lack of consent/expectation of privacy | Court held officer safety concern legitimate; seeing Wooten through open door and her removal of pipes placed evidence in plain view |
| Whether evidence should be suppressed because consent was invalid or only apparent | State argued consent was valid; Hammons identified himself as owner and did not say upstairs was rented | Wooten argued consent was invalid because she was a tenant and had exclusive possession upstairs; officers should have inquired further | Court found competent evidence supporting owner’s authority and did not base decision on good-faith exception; denied suppression |
| Whether officers were required to obtain a warrant once they learned circumstances | N/A (State relied on consent/plain view) | Wooten (and dissent) argued officers should have asked whether occupants were tenants and gotten a warrant before entering rented space | Majority held facts supported entry into common area and plain view discovery; dissent argued officers were negligent and should have sought a warrant |
Key Cases Cited
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrantless entry into a home is presumptively unreasonable)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent is an exception to the warrant requirement)
- United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (third-party common authority can justify consent to search)
- Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (landlord does not have authority to consent to search of tenant's private quarters)
- Burnside, State v., 100 Ohio St.3d 152 (2003) (standard of appellate review of factual findings on suppression)
- Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (apparent authority evaluated by objective reasonable-person standard)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officer safety justification for limited protective searches)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (discussion of deterrent purpose of exclusionary rule)