State v. Willan
136 Ohio St. 3d 222
Ohio2013Background
- Willan was convicted in December 2008 of 68 counts, including a first-degree felony for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.32, predicated on five false-registration securities counts (R.C. 1707.44(B)).
- The trial court imposed a 16-year aggregate term, interpreting R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) as mandating a ten-year term for corrupt activity when the most serious offense in the pattern is a first-degree felony.
- The Ninth District vacated the ten-year term, deeming 2929.14(D)(3)(a) ambiguous and limiting the ten-year term to enumerated offenses linked to drug or specific categories.
- The Supreme Court granted cross-jurisdiction to resolve whether the mandatory ten-year term applies when the most serious offense in the corrupt activity pattern is a first-degree felony not expressly enumerated.
- The majority holds the statute unambiguous: the four disjunctive categories each independently trigger the ten-year term, so Willan’s corrupt activity (based on securities violations) required the ten-year term, and the appellate judgment is reversed.
- The statute has since been amended to 2929.14(B)(3); all references here to former 2929.14(D)(3)(a) pertain to that version.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) unambiguous and applicable here? | State argues the four disjunctive clauses independently trigger a ten-year term. | Willan argues ambiguity and that the term should not apply to his case. | Unambiguous; ten-year term applies. |
| Does the ‘associated with’ interpretation limit the ten-year term to drug-offense predicates? | State maintains no such limiting interpretation is required. | Willan contends the term only applies to enumerated drug-related offenses. | Rejected; disjunctive clauses operate independently. |
| Should the rule of lenity govern construction due to ambiguity? | State argues statute should be read plainly if possible. | Willan argues ambiguity requires lenity in favor of the defendant. | Not controlling here; statute deemed unambiguous; lenity not invoked. |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355 (2004-Ohio-4960) (textual-reading rules of construction and context)
- State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308 (2004-Ohio-969) (plain and unambiguous language; statutory interpretation)
- State v. Carna v. Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 131 Ohio St.3d 478 (2012-Ohio-1484) (avoid constraining wording; give effect to all terms)
- State v. Elmore, 122 Ohio St.3d 472 (2009-Ohio-3478) (rule of lenity and ambiguity in criminal statutes)
- Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990) (lenity principle in construing ambiguity (federal))