167 Conn. App. 406
Conn. App. Ct.2016Background
- On June 16, 2013, New London police officers responded to a harassment call at 57 Jay Street; defendant Devonte West engaged officers from a vestibule, shouted obscenities, and refused to let them enter.
- During the arrest of another occupant and the defendant’s mother, the defendant continued to yell, allegedly spat toward Officer Knott, retreated into the vestibule, shut the interior door, and resisted arrest when officers forced entry; officers used a Taser and subdued him.
- Defendant was charged with two counts of assault on a public safety officer, interfering with an officer, and breach of the peace; a jury convicted him on three counts and acquitted on one assault charge.
- At trial defense cross-examination and an expert attacked the adequacy of the police investigation and advanced a theory that Taser deployment, not intent, caused the flailing/kicking; defendant admitted spitting.
- Trial court declined a defense-requested jury instruction expressly permitting the jury to consider the quality of the police investigation when determining reasonable doubt, but instructed generally on witness credibility and the state’s burden beyond a reasonable doubt.
- At sentencing the court criticized the defendant’s attitude and lack of remorse; defendant contended the court’s remarks suggested he was penalized for exercising his right to trial.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | West's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court erred by refusing a charge that the jury may consider the quality of the police investigation in assessing guilt | The court need only instruct on reasonable doubt and witness credibility; no special charge on investigation quality is required | The alleged investigative deficiencies could create reasonable doubt and therefore required a specific jury instruction | No error; reasonable doubt is a standard for proof, not a separate defense, and existing reasonable-doubt and credibility instructions were sufficient (affirmed) |
| Whether the sentencing judge impermissibly penalized the defendant for choosing to stand trial | The judge’s comments addressed defendant’s attitude, lack of remorse, and courtroom conduct—not the exercise of trial rights | The judge’s remarks created an appearance that the sentence punished West for refusing to plead guilty and for asserting innocence at trial | No error; judge legitimately considered demeanor, lack of remorse, and conduct at trial—permissible sentencing factors; no indication sentence was augmented for electing trial (affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Wright, 149 Conn. App. 758 (Conn. App. 2014) (reasonable doubt is a proof standard, not a separate legal defense)
- State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726 (Conn. 2014) (trial courts must avoid suggesting a harsher sentence for electing trial; but may consider lack of remorse and trial conduct)
- State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23 (Conn. 2001) (augmentation of sentence based on decision to stand trial is improper)
- State v. Coleman, 242 Conn. 523 (Conn. 1997) (sentencing court may consider evidence adduced at trial, presentence report, and defendant’s courtroom conduct)
- State v. Cales, 95 Conn. App. 533 (Conn. App. 2006) (jury charge must fairly present the law and issues so injustice is avoided)
