332 Conn. 531
Conn.2019Background
- Defendant Kenneth Weatherspoon was convicted by a jury of sexual assault in a cohabiting relationship and third‑degree assault based on an alleged November 5, 2015 assault of his cohabitant. He was acquitted of second‑degree strangulation.
- The prosecution introduced the victim’s testimony, corroborating photographs, coworkers’ testimony, and videos from the defendant’s phone showing portions of the incident.
- Officer Jesse Comeau testified that the day after the incident the defendant told officers he had been drinking and did not recall details; officers asked if he had blacked out.
- At trial the defendant testified and denied telling officers he had no memory; he said he declined to give a statement out of fear police would misconstrue his words. Defense did not object to the prosecutor’s cross‑examination or closing remarks now challenged on appeal.
- In closing the prosecutor argued the jury should discredit the defendant as “self‑serving with the benefit of hearing all the testimony that came before” and urged the jury to evaluate the defendant’s credibility against Officer Comeau and the victim.
- The defendant appealed, arguing the prosecutor made an impermissible generic tailoring argument violating article first, § 8 of the Connecticut Constitution and that other prosecutorial remarks deprived him of a fair trial under Singh and due process principles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutor’s remark that defendant testified “with the benefit of hearing all the testimony that came before” was impermissible tailoring | State: remark attacked defendant’s credibility and tied to evidence (Comeau and victim), so permissible as specific tailoring | Weatherspoon: remark was a generic tailoring attack based solely on defendant’s presence at trial, violating state confrontation clause | Court: remark was a specific tailoring argument tied to record evidence (discrepancy re: memory) — state constitutional claim not reached |
| Whether the remark constituted prosecutorial impropriety or plain error requiring reversal | State: argument was evidence‑linked and not improper; tailoring is permissible under federal law | Weatherspoon: prosecutorial impropriety / plain error; request for supervisory rule banning generic tailoring | Court: not prosecutorial impropriety; not plain error; declined to adopt supervisory ban now (left open for future cases) |
| Whether prosecutor’s implication that acquittal would require finding officer lied violated due process (Singh) | State: defendant invited scrutiny by asserting police misrepresented his statements; remarks were limited and responsive | Weatherspoon: prosecutor improperly conveyed jury must find officer lied to acquit him, depriving him of fair trial | Court: assuming Singh violation, cumulative improprieties did not deprive defendant of fair trial — no reasonable likelihood of different verdict |
| Whether cumulative prosecutorial conduct warranted reversal | State: evidence and curative measures support verdict; jury instructions on credibility adequate | Weatherspoon: misconduct affected central credibility issues | Court: applying Williams factors (invited by defense, not frequent/severe, jury instructions, corroborating evidence, acquittal on strangulation) — no reversal |
Key Cases Cited
- Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000) (held generic tailoring arguments do not violate the federal constitution but left regulation to states)
- State v. Cassidy, 236 Conn. 112 (1996) (previously held generic tailoring unconstitutional under federal confrontation clause)
- State v. Alexander, 254 Conn. 290 (2000) (overruled Cassidy under Portuondo; permitted generic tailoring under federal law)
- State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693 (2002) (sets standards for prosecutorial impropriety and when it denies due process)
- State v. Ciullo, 314 Conn. 28 (2014) (framework for analyzing prosecutorial impropriety and prejudice)
- State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523 (1987) (factors used to assess whether prosecutorial remarks deprived defendant of fair trial)
