State v. Tscheiner, 2017 Ohio 7641

On March 15, 2016, Fairborn officers stopped Angela Tscheiner after dispatch reported a black vehicle leaving the scene of a hit‑and‑run; officer observed a knocked‑over speed‑limit sign near the scene.
Officer McGuire activated lights, stopped the black sedan, and asked Tscheiner about the crash; she admitted hitting the sign and initially said she had three drinks that day.
After Tscheiner exited the vehicle, officer detected a moderate odor of alcohol and observed unsteady gait and swaying; she consented to field sobriety testing.
McGuire administered HGN (six of six clues) and the walk‑and‑turn (five of nine clues); one‑leg stand was not done due to claimed knee problems; based on observations and admission, McGuire arrested her for OVI.
At the jail Tscheiner initially refused a breath test, then changed her mind minutes later but was not allowed to take it because she had already refused; officers later discovered two prior OVI convictions after inventorying the vehicle.
After a jury trial Tscheiner was convicted of OVI (R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (A)(2)) and improper starting/backing; she appealed, raising suppression, jury‑instruction, and manifest‑weight claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the stop/ detention and subsequent evidence should have been suppressed	Stop and tests were justified by reasonable suspicion based on damaged sign and observed conduct	Tscheiner argued the stop/arrest flowed from an unlawful seizure (relying on charge later dismissed) and evidence should be suppressed	Court would not review suppression claim because appellant failed to file the suppression‑hearing transcript; otherwise trial court found reasonable suspicion (affirmed)
Whether trial court erred by refusing a jury instruction treating police testimony like any other witness	State: general credibility instruction suffices	Tscheiner requested specific instruction stating police testimony not entitled to greater weight; argued juror deference to officers required curative instruction	Refusal not error: Ohio law prohibits singling out a witness group; general credibility instructions were adequate (affirmed)
Whether convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence	State: officer observations, admissions, field tests, and prior convictions supported verdicts	Tscheiner: testimony conflicted, knee/medical issues explained poor performance, officers had motive to fabricate (forfeiture)	Not against manifest weight: jury credibility determinations supported by evidence (HGN, walk‑and‑turn, odor, admissions); no evidence officers fabricated results (affirmed)

Burnside v. State, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 (2003) (appellate review of suppression: trial court findings of fact owed deference; legal conclusions reviewed de novo)
Mays v. State, 119 Ohio St.3d 406 (2008) (traffic stop valid if officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion; consider totality of circumstances)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officer may briefly detain on reasonable suspicion; scope must be reasonably related to justification)
Brignoni‑Ponce v. United States, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (limits on investigative stops: scope must match justification)
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (reasonable suspicion can be based on reasonable mistakes of law as well as fact)
Group v. State, 98 Ohio St.3d 248 (2002) (trial court may not single out particular witnesses or groups when instructing on credibility)
Scott v. State, 26 Ohio St.3d 92 (1986) (prejudicial error to refuse a requested jury charge that is pertinent, correct, and not covered by general charge)
Thompkins v. State, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997) (standard for manifest‑weight review: reversal only in exceptional cases where evidence heavily weighs against verdict)
Andrews v. State, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991) (circumstances viewed through eyes of reasonable officer at scene)
Santiago v. State, 195 Ohio App.3d 649 (2011) (administration of field sobriety tests requires reasonable, articulable suspicion specific to DUI)