State v. Taveras
89 N.E.3d 6
Ohio Ct. App.2017Background
- Fermin Taveras, a lawful permanent resident who entered the U.S. as a child, pled guilty in 2011 to failure to comply with police (felony) and one OVI (misdemeanor) in a plea that included a signed Change of Plea form incorrectly stating "I am a citizen of the United States."
- At sentencing the court learned Taveras was not a U.S. citizen, advised him per R.C. 2943.031 that his convictions "may" have immigration consequences, offered time to withdraw his plea or continue, and Taveras elected to be sentenced to community control.
- Taveras violated community control multiple times and in March 2015 was sentenced to two years in prison; DHS then initiated removal proceedings alleging his conviction was an aggravated felony (crime of violence).
- More than a year after sentencing and after deportation proceedings began, Taveras moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to advise him of immigration consequences; he testified he never discussed immigration consequences with counsel.
- The trial court denied the motion, finding no Strickland prejudice given the court’s advisement at sentencing, the delay in seeking withdrawal, the beneficial plea terms, and the weak likelihood of a favorable trial outcome; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Taveras) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise Taveras of immigration consequences | Counsel was not deficient because the trial court gave the R.C. 2943.031 advisement at sentencing and counsel did not know citizenship status at plea | Counsel failed to advise after citizenship became known at sentencing and thus was constitutionally deficient under Padilla | Court: Counsel was deficient after sentencing once noncitizen status was known, because counsel had independent duty to advise (deficiency prong satisfied) |
| Whether Taveras established Strickland prejudice from counsel’s failure to advise about deportation | No prejudice: Taveras was advised by the court at sentencing, plea was beneficial, delay in seeking withdrawal, and trial success was unlikely | Had he been properly advised he would have rejected the plea; conviction mandates deportation as aggravated felony | Court: Prejudice not shown — defendant failed the Padilla/Strickland "rational decision" test given the delay, plea benefits, court advisement, and uncertain mandatory deportation status |
| Whether the plea withdrawal motion was timely and whether manifest injustice was shown | Motion was untimely (filed years later, after removal proceedings) and fails to show manifest injustice | Motion timely enough and uncontroverted evidence of counsel's lack of advice merits withdrawal | Court: Motion untimely and did not demonstrate manifest injustice given circumstances; denial not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether the conviction mandatorily triggers deportation as an "aggravated felony" crime of violence | DHS argued conviction was aggravated felony mandating removal | Taveras argued classification was uncertain and recent Sixth Circuit authority undermined mandatory deportation | Court: Immigration consequence was not "truly clear"; subsequent Sixth Circuit decision (Shuti) undermined mandatory deportation, so deportation was not a sure prejudice factor |
Key Cases Cited
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (Sup. Ct.) (counsel must advise noncitizen clients about immigration consequences of plea; clarity of consequence determines extent of duty)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Sup. Ct.) (two‑prong ineffective assistance test: deficiency and prejudice)
- Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440 (6th Cir.) (held residual "crime of violence" definition void for vagueness, affecting aggravated felony deportation analysis)
- Gonzalez-Longoria v. Sessions, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir.) (contrasting circuit authority on vagueness of §16(b) in aggravated‑felony analysis)