State v. Taupier
193 A.3d 1
Conn.2018Background
- Edward Taupier, representing himself in a contentious divorce, emailed a group of acquaintances highly detailed statements implying he could shoot Judge Elizabeth Bozzuto at her home; recipients included participants in a family‑court reform group.
- Recipients found the message disturbing; one (Verraneault) forwarded it to an attorney who alerted law enforcement and Judge Bozzuto. Judge Bozzuto and her family took security precautions.
- Police executed a risk warrant about a week later and seized multiple firearms from Taupier's residence; Taupier had retrieved some weapons days after sending the email.
- Taupier was charged with threatening in the first degree (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‑61aa(a)(3)), threatening in the second degree (§ 53a‑62(a)(3)), two counts of disorderly conduct (§ 53a‑182(a)(2)), and breach of the peace (§ 53a‑181(a)(3)).
- At trial the court applied the statutory recklessness mens rea (aware of and consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk) and found Taupier guilty; he appealed, arguing constitutional error, evidentiary error, and insufficiency of evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Taupier) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the First Amendment requires specific intent to terrorize for true‑threat prosecutions | The state argued Connecticut may criminalize true threats proven under an objective or statutory recklessness standard; § 53a‑61aa(a)(3) (which imports recklessness) is constitutional. | Taupier argued federal and state free‑speech guarantees require proof of specific subjective intent to terrorize (not merely recklessness). | Court held specific intent is not required under the First Amendment or Connecticut Constitution; the statutory recklessness standard is constitutional as applied to private individuals and public officials. |
| Whether Connecticut constitution affords greater protection (requires specific intent) | State: Connecticut provisions do not demand a higher mens rea than the federal baseline for true threats. | Taupier: State constitution gives broader speech rights and requires specific intent to terrorize. | Court held state constitution does not require a higher standard; recklessness suffices. |
| Whether events after the email (seizure of firearms; second email) were improperly considered | State: Both types of evidence were relevant—firearms as circumstantial support for defendant’s capacity; second email as evidence of defendant’s state of mind. | Taupier: Post‑email firearm seizure and the later email were irrelevant to whether the original email was a true threat when sent. | Court found the firearm evidence improperly admitted (recipient/target were unaware of possession) but harmless given overwhelming other evidence; the second email was admissible to show Taupier’s state of mind. |
| Sufficiency of evidence to prove threatening in first degree and disorderly conduct | State: Language, context, recipients’ reactions, history with judge, and Taupier’s follow‑up email established recklessness and foreseeability that the threat would reach and terrorize Judge Bozzuto. | Taupier: Evidence was insufficient because he did not directly send the email to Judge Bozzuto and the state failed to prove subjective intent. | Court held evidence sufficient: jury reasonably inferred recklessness and that Taupier foresaw a substantial risk the message would be communicated to and terrorize the judge; disorderly conduct conviction against Verraneault also supported. |
Key Cases Cited
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (U.S. 2003) (defines "true threats" and discusses intent to intimidate; invalidates prima facie presumption in cross‑burning statute)
- Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (U.S. 2015) (addresses mens rea in federal threats prosecution and jury instruction issues)
- State v. Krijger, 313 Conn. 434 (Conn. 2014) (articulates objective foreseeability test for true threats under Connecticut law)
- State v. DeLoreto, 265 Conn. 145 (Conn. 2003) (applies objective standard for determining what constitutes a threat under the First Amendment)
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (U.S. 1969) (distinguishes political hyperbole from true threats)