State v. Shine
2017 Ohio 4240
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In December 2013, Sergeant Gary Riggins (plainclothes but wearing a police vest and badge) approached Ezara Shine Jr. walking near a reportedly vacant house; officers pulled an unmarked car into Shine's path and engaged him on the sidewalk.
- Shine voluntarily showed a plastic bag containing a pair of pants and answered questions about the house; Riggins asked to perform a pat-down and Shine responded, "Go ahead," by throwing his hands up.
- During the pat-down, Shine turned away, knocked the officer's hands off, and attempted to flee; officers tackled and subdued him after a brief struggle and found crack cocaine in his shirt pocket.
- Shine moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the initial stop and subsequent search/arrest lacked constitutional basis; the trial court orally denied suppression and Shine was convicted of possession of cocaine.
- This court remanded for written findings; the trial court issued findings concluding the encounter and pat-down were consensual, Shine then engaged in unprovoked flight giving rise to reasonable suspicion/probable cause, so suppression was properly denied.
- On appeal after remand, the Eleventh District affirmed the trial court; a dissenting judge argued the state still failed to meet its Fourth Amendment burden.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the initial encounter a consensual encounter (no seizure)? | Officers merely approached on public sidewalk and asked questions; Shine appeared free to leave. | The car blocking Shine's path and officers' aggressive approach made the encounter coercive. | Held consensual: officers' approach and conversation did not amount to a seizure. |
| Did Shine voluntarily consent to a pat-down search? | Shine threw his hands up and said "Go ahead," demonstrating voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances. | Any apparent consent was coerced because Shine did not feel free to refuse. | Held consent was voluntary and objectively reasonable. |
| Did Shine effectively withdraw consent or otherwise create reasonable suspicion/probable cause during the encounter? | After consenting, Shine physically resisted and fled—unequivocal conduct amounting to flight that justified investigatory detention. | Resistance/turning away was defensive conduct, not unprovoked flight; state lacked sufficient facts for reasonable suspicion. | Held flight plus high-crime location provided reasonable suspicion; officers' actions produced probable cause after contraband observed/recovered. |
| Was the evidence (cocaine) properly admissible following the stop/search? | Cocaine was discovered during a lawful investigatory stop/search following consensual encounter, consent, and then flight—so admissible. | Evidence should be suppressed because the initial stop/search/arrest lacked constitutional justification. | Held evidence admissible; suppression denial affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (defines Fourth Amendment search/seizure principles)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (establishes investigatory stop/Frisk standard)
- Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (consensual encounters vs. seizures analysis)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (flight in high-crime area supports reasonable suspicion)
- Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (exclusionary rule origin)
- Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (application of exclusionary rule to states)
- Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (probable cause definition)
- State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 (Ohio standard for appellate review of suppression findings)