2019 Ohio 1292
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Christopher L. Scott (appellant) was indicted on multiple sexual offenses against his then-stepdaughter, including three counts of first-degree rape; he admitted repeated abuse beginning when the victim was six.
- Scott pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated agreement to one count of rape, one count of sexual battery, two counts of gross sexual imposition, and one count of importuning; more serious counts and sexual predator specifications were dismissed; agreed concurrent sentences were imposed.
- At plea/sentencing the trial court orally told Scott he would be subject to a mandatory five-year postrelease-control term if ever released; the written sentencing entry inconsistently described postrelease control as "mandatory… up to a maximum of five years."
- Scott did not file a direct appeal; years later he filed postconviction petitions and a Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his guilty plea claiming plea/sentencing defects, ineffective assistance, and improper advisals about appellate rights, sex-offender registration, and postrelease control.
- The trial court denied the motion as barred by res judicata and on the merits (no manifest injustice); the court of appeals affirms denial of plea withdrawal and ineffective-assistance claims but reverses in part to remand for a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the postrelease-control language to reflect a mandatory five-year term.
Issues
| Issue | Scott's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Crim.R. 32.1 post-sentence motion to withdraw plea was barred by res judicata or required relief because the sentence was void for failure to advise of appellate rights | The failure to advise of appellate rights rendered the sentence void so res judicata did not bar relief | Court: Failure to advise of appellate rights does not render sentence void; Scott previously raised the issue; res judicata bars the motion | Res judicata applies; Scott’s claim barred and lacks merit |
| Whether plea was involuntary because of incorrect advisals about mandatory postrelease control | Scott: Trial court misinformed him about postrelease control (argues it’s not mandatory) | State: R.C. 2967.28(B)(1) and Ohio precedent require a mandatory five-year postrelease control for first-degree rape | Held that the oral advisement was correct; statutory and Supreme Court precedent make five-year postrelease control mandatory |
| Whether the written sentencing entry’s language "up to a maximum of five years" voided the sentence or plea | Scott: The "up to" language created an improper (void) sentencing entry requiring vacatur | State: The written entry was imperfect but correctable; oral advisement was accurate | The court found the entry ambiguous/void as to that phrase but not the plea; remanded to issue a nunc pro tunc entry correcting postrelease-control language to mandatory five years |
| Whether Scott received ineffective assistance of counsel warranting plea withdrawal | Scott: Counsel ignorant of law, coerced plea, told him he had no right to appeal | State: Claim could have been raised on direct appeal (res judicata); record shows counsel secured a favorable plea and advised appropriately | Claim barred by res judicata; record does not demonstrate Strickland prejudice or deficient performance |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick, 126 Ohio St.3d 124 (2010) (statute requires five-year postrelease control for first-degree felonies and felony sex offenses)
- State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 (2010) (sentencing entry errors regarding postrelease control may render part of entry void)
- State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344 (2011) (R.C. Chapter 2950 is punitive following S.B. 10)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)