State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormickState ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick
Lead Opinion
Facts
{¶ 1} Appellant, E’Yen Carnail, appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel appellee, Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Timothy McCormick, to conduct a new sentencing hearing pursuant to
{¶ 2} In November 1999, Judge McCormick convicted Carnail, upon his guilty plea, of two counts of rape in violation of
{¶ 3} Nine years later, in 2008, Carnail filed a motion in the common pleas court to correct the “illegal sentence.” Shortly thereаfter, Judge McCormick denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed Carnail’s appeal based on res judicata.
{¶ 4} In June 2009, Carnail filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge McCormick
{¶ 5} This cause is now before us upon Carnail’s appeal as of right.
Legal Analysis
{¶ 6} Carnail asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his mandamus complaint. “A court can dismiss a mandamus action under
{¶ 7} To be entitled to the writ, Carnail must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of Judge McCormick to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner,
Postrelease Control for Rape Convictions
{¶ 8} Carnail’s mandamus claim is predicated upon his contention that his sentence is void because it did not include postrelease control for his rape convictions.
{¶ 9} Judge McCormick initially claims on appeal, as he did in his motion to dismiss Carnail’s complaint in the proceedings below, that “because [Carnail] was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence for rape, which is an indefinite sentence, the trial court was not required to advise [him] of post-release control.” Although the court of appeals did not rely on this argument to dismiss Carnail’s mandamus complaint, “Reviewing courts are not authоrized to reverse a correct judgment on the basis that some or all of the lower court’s reasons are erroneous.” State ex rel. McGrath v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.,
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} “(B) Each sentence to a prison term for a felony of the first degree, for a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the third degree that is not a felony sex offense and in the commission of which the offender caused or threatened to cause physical harm to a person shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control imposed by the parole board after the offender’s release from imprisonment.
* * * Unless reduced by the parole board pursuant to division (D) of this section when authorized under that division, a period of post-releasе control required by this division for an offender shall be of one of the following periods:
{¶ 12} “(1) For a felony of the first degree or for a felony sex offense, five years.”
{¶ 13} In construing this statute, “our paramount concern is the legislative intent” in enacting it. State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey,103 Ohio St.3d 355 ,2004-Ohio-4960 ,815 N.E.2d 1107 , ¶ 21. To discern this intent, we must “read words and phrases in context according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes,103 Ohio St.3d 559 ,2004-Ohio-5718 ,817 N.E.2d 76 , ¶ 23.
{¶ 14} After applying the rules of grammar and common usage to
{¶ 15} In arguing against this result, Judge McCormick cites
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} “Any periоd of post-release control shall commence upon an offender’s actual release from prison. If an offender is serving an indefinite prison term or a life sentence in addition to a stated prison term, the offender shall serve the period of post-release control in the following manner:
{¶ 18} “(a) If a period of post-release control is imposed upon the offender and if the offender also is subject to a period of parole under a life sentence or an indefinite sentence, and if the period of post-release control ends prior to the period of parole, the offender shall be supervised on parole. The offender shall receive credit for post-release control supervision during the period of parole. The offender is not eligible for final release under section 2967.16 of the Revised Code until the post-release control period otherwise would have ended.
{¶ 19} “(b) If a period of post-release control is imposed upon the offender and if the offender also is subject to a period of parole under an indefinite sentence, and if the period of parole ends prior to the period of post-release control, the offender shall be supervised on post-release control. The requirements of parolesupervision shаll be satisfied during the post-release control period.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 20}R.C. 2967.28(F) is inapplicable to Carnail because it applies only to cases in which an indefinite prison term or life sentence is imposed in addition to a stated prison term. Carnail did not receive a stated prison term in addition to his concurrent life sentences for his rape convictions. Furthermore, underR.C. 2967.28(F) , the presence of an indefinite and a definite sentence does not eliminаte the postrelease-control requirement; it merely provides a procedural mechanism in which either supervision on parole or postrelease control is required to satisfy both sentences. Although it could be implied from this section that postrelease control is unnecessary for indefinite or life sentences, there is no specific language in either this or other provisions that modifies the express language inR.C. 2967.28(B)(1) requiring postrelease control. That is,R.C. 2967.28(B)(1) is not expressly limitеd to definite sentences; instead, it applies broadly to “[e]ach sentence to a prison term for a felony of the first degree * * * [or] for a felony sex offense.” BecauseR.C. 2967.28(B)(1) is phrased in broad, sweeping language, we must accord it broad, sweeping application. See State ex rel. Mager v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio,123 Ohio St.3d 195 ,2009-Ohio-4908 ,915 N.E.2d 320 , ¶ 16.
{¶ 21} Our decision in Clark,
{¶ 22} Insofar as Judge McCormick also cites decisions from one court of appeals that hold to the contrary, they are inapposite because they fail to apply the manifest language of
{¶ 23} In addition, these Eighth Appellate District cases emanate from that appellate court’s two-to-one decision in State v. Linen (Dec. 15, 2000), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 74070 and 74071,
{¶ 24} Upon the satisfaction of certain conditions, including the serving of the minimum sentence, the parole board’s termination of its control over the defendant’s sentence, and the trial court’s determination by clear and convincing evidence that the offender is unlikely to commit a sexually violent offense in the future, the court can terminate the indefinite sentence.
{¶ 25} As the dissenting opinion in Linen notes, the majority’s position in that case is untenable:
{¶ 26} “Pursuant to the express terms ofR.C. 2967.28(B)(1) , his sentence for gross sexual imposition wаs required to include a period of post-release control. * * * The majority simply sweeps these requirements away by asserting thatR.C. 2929.19 and 2967.28 are inapplicable and that Linen was sentenced pursuant to R.C. [Chapter] 2971. Such an approach ignores the obvious and bisects relevant sentencing provisions from a complete sentencing quilt into a patchwork of unrelated cloth; treating the sentencing structure of the Revised Code as if it were a smorgasbord where a trial court is at liberty to pick and choose among any sentencing division which is expressly applicable, and render those provisions which are problematic to be ‘inapplicable.’ Simply put, the trial court, in addition to the strictures contained within R.C. [Chapter] 2971, was statutorily bound toinclude post-release controls in Linen’s sentence on the felony sex offenses * * Linen, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 74070 and 74071, 2000 WL 1876409 , at *3 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
{¶ 27} Similarly, the Sixth District Court of Appeals has expressly held that rape convictions require postrelease control as part of the sentence, that postre-lease control applies to indefinite or life sentences, and that
{¶ 28} “Rape is a felony of the first degree. As a classified felony, offenders convicted of rape must be given postrelease control * * *.R.C. 2967.28(B)(1) requires a period of five years of postrelease control for a felony of the first degree or a felony sеx offense.
{¶ 29} “Hernandez points, however, toR.C. 2967.28(F) in support of his proposition that because he ‘faced no charges with a definite prison sentence’ postrelease control could not be imposed. This is not the case. That section specifically provides for the manner in which an offender serves postrelease control in addition to parole when the offender is serving ‘an indefinite prison term or a life sentence in addition to a stated prison term.’ (Emphаsis added.) Because rape is a felony of the first degree, postrelease control was required to be imposed pursuant toR.C. 2967.28(B) . Simply because Hernandez faced a possible indefinite term does not mean that only parole applies.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Hernandez, Williams App. No. WM-08-015,2009-Ohio-3915 ,2009 WL 2415300 , ¶ 42-43.
{¶ 30} In this regard, the Sixth District’s interpretation of the pertinent provisions is more consistent with their plain language than the Eighth District’s construction. This plain language requires no additional statutory interprеtation. See Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth (2000),
{¶ 31} Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Carnail’s sentence on his conviction for two rape charges was required to include a five-year term of postrelease control.
{¶ 32} Carnail claims that because his sentencing entry does not contain the mandatory tеrm of postrelease control, it is void and he is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel Judge McCormick to issue a sentencing entry that constitutes a final, appealable order. Although procedendo is the more appropriate remedy, “mandamus will lie when a trial court has refused to render, or unduly delayed rendering, a judgment.” State ex rel. Reynolds v. Basinger,
{¶ 33} We have consistently held that “ ‘[i]f the trial court refuses upon request or motion to journalize its decision, either party may compel the court to act by filing a writ of mandamus or a writ of procedendo’ ” because “[a]bsent journalization of the judgment, [a party] cannot appeal it.” (Emphasis deleted.) State ex rel. Grove v. Nadel (1998),
{¶ 34} In State ex rel. Culgan v. Medina Cty. Court of Common Pleas,
(¶ 35} Judge McCormick’s 1999 sentencing entry for Carnail failed to include the statutorily required five-year term of postrelease control.
{¶ 36} Ohio appellate courts have uniformly recognized that void judgments do not constitute final, appealable orders. See generally Brown v. Brown,
{¶ 37} Consistent with our holding in Culgan, once Judge McCormick denied Carnail’s motion to correct the 1999 sentence, Carnail was entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus to compel the judge to issue a new sentencing entry to comply with
{¶ 38} Consequently, the court of appeals erred in dismissing Carnail’s mandamus action.
Conclusion
{¶ 39} Therefore, in accordance with precedent, we reversе the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Carnail’s mandamus action and grant a writ of mandamus to compel Judge McCormick to issue a sentencing entry that complies with the postrelease-control provisions of
Judgment reversed and writ granted.
Notes
. Carnail’s complaint named the common pleas court as an additional respondent, but he later amended his complaint to specify that the court was not a party to the case.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 41} The majority is correct that rape in violation of
{¶ 42} Carnail’s prison term may be terminated or modified only by parole in accordance with
{If 43} I agree with the Eighth District’s reading of
{¶ 44} “(a) If a period of post-release control is imposed upon the offender and if the offender also is subject to a period of parole under a life sentence or an indefinite sentence, and if the period of post-release control ends prior to the period of parole, the offender shall be supervised on parole. The offender shall receive credit for post-release control supervision during the period of parole. The offender is not eligible for final release under section 2967.16 of the Revised Code until the post-release control period otherwise would have ended.
{¶ 45} “(b) If a period of post-release control is imposed upon the offender and if the offender also is subject to a period of parole under an indefinite sentence, and if the period of parole ends prior to the period of post-release control, the offender shall be supervised on post-release control. The requirements of parole supervision shall be satisfied during the post-release control period.”
{¶ 46} Carnail was sentenced to two concurrent life terms for rape, with parole eligibility after ten years. These are indefinite sentences, not sentences with a stated term. Therefore, a trial court may ultimately terminate Carnail’s prison term pursuant to
{¶ 47} Instead, after awarding
{¶ 48} Because I would hold that Carnail was not subject to mandatory postrelease control, I dissent from the majority’s opinion and would deny the writ of mandamus.