State v. Salary
301 Kan. 586
| Kan. | 2015Background
- Mark Salary shot and killed his uncle Valray Estell in Estell’s living room; police recovered Salary’s 9mm pistol, multiple casings, and evidence of an intentionally set fire.
- Salary turned himself in, gave an unrecorded pre-interview confession, then agreed to a recorded statement after a second Miranda advisal.
- At trial Salary claimed self-defense (and imperfect self-defense for voluntary manslaughter); he also admitted setting the fire and testified about believing Estell was armed and wearing a vest.
- A jury convicted Salary of first‑degree premeditated murder and arson; the district court imposed a "hard 50" life sentence (50 years before parole eligibility).
- On appeal Salary challenged (1) the denial of self‑defense jury instruction, (2) denial of voluntary‑manslaughter (imperfect self‑defense) instruction, (3) admission of his recorded confession after he said “I do want a lawyer,” and (4) constitutionality of the hard‑50 sentencing procedure.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Salary) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of self‑defense instruction | Court correctly denied instruction; facts show Salary was initial aggressor | Salary argued evidence (his testimony) supported self‑defense and court misapplied "totality" and credibility rules | Denial affirmed — Salary provoked/returned with a gun; under K.S.A. 21‑3214(3) he was ineligible for self‑defense instruction |
| Denial of voluntary manslaughter (imperfect self‑defense) instruction | If error, harmless because strong evidence of premeditation makes verdict unlikely affected | Salary argued his defensive belief supported the lesser instruction | Assuming error, it was harmless (nonconstitutional) — overwhelming circumstantial evidence of premeditation made no reasonable probability of different outcome |
| Admission of recorded confession after invocation of counsel | If ambiguous request then interrogation may continue; pre‑interview waiver and prior statements justified admission | Salary argued his statement “I do want a lawyer” was an unambiguous invocation requiring cessation of questioning | Court held Salary unambiguously invoked right to counsel and admission was error, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the pre‑interview confession conveyed the same information |
| Constitutionality of hard‑50 sentencing | State upheld scheme under judge‑found aggravators by preponderance | Salary argued Alleyne requires jury find facts increasing mandatory minimum beyond reasonable doubt | Sentence vacated and remanded — K.S.A. 21‑4635 hard‑50 procedure violates Sixth Amendment under Alleyne and this court’s Soto decision |
Key Cases Cited
- Plummer v. State, 295 Kan. 156 (lays out stair‑step standards for appellate review of jury instruction issues)
- Ward v. State, 292 Kan. 541 (harmless‑error standards for constitutional and nonconstitutional errors)
- Soto v. State, 299 Kan. 102 (applies Alleyne to Kansas hard‑50 sentencing)
- Qualls v. State, 297 Kan. 61 (voluntary manslaughter as lesser‑included; analysis of sufficiency for instruction)
- Roeder v. State, 300 Kan. 901 (harmlessness and instruction issues; use of circumstantial evidence for premeditation)
- Jackson v. State, 262 Kan. 119 (self‑defense instruction and initial aggressor doctrine)
- Cook v. State, 286 Kan. 1098 (denial of self‑defense instruction where defendant returned with a gun)
- Kettler v. State, 299 Kan. 448 (factors for inferring premeditation from circumstantial evidence)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda rights and right to counsel)
- McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (invocation of right to counsel must be clear to stop interrogation)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (clarifies clarity standard for invocation of counsel)