335 Conn. 720
Conn.2020Background
- In March 2015 tow truck driver Stephen Chase, authorized to tow vehicles from Coachlight Condominiums, attempted to tow Rivera’s car for parking in a fire lane; Rivera struck the tow truck with a pipe, Chase sprayed Mace, Rivera produced a knife, and Chase drove away and called police.
- Rivera was tried and convicted of breach of the peace (2d degree), criminal mischief (3d degree), and threatening (2d degree); he claimed self-defense and defense of property (that Chase was attempting to steal the car).
- At trial Rivera was allowed to ask Chase whether he had prior larceny convictions, but the trial court excluded inquiry into the underlying facts of those larcenies (police reports showing Chase stole cell phones to finance a drug habit) as well as the underlying facts of a prior breach of the peace (where Chase pleaded guilty but maintained he acted in self-defense).
- Rivera argued the excluded underlying facts were admissible to (a) impeach Chase’s veracity, and (b) show motive/intent/interest (that Chase would steal the car to finance drugs and lie about using Mace); he claimed the exclusions violated his Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and to present a defense.
- The Appellate Court affirmed; the Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification on whether exclusion of the specific-fact inquiry was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Rivera) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court erred in excluding underlying facts of Chase’s prior larceny convictions when used to impeach veracity | Exclusion was proper: larceny convictions themselves were admitted and the underlying facts (drug-motivated thefts two years earlier) were too remote, prejudicial, and not probative of truthfulness | The underlying facts (cell-phone thefts to finance a drug habit) would show Chase’s propensity to lie and his motive to steal Rivera’s car and then lie about using Mace | Held: No error — trial court did not abuse discretion; larceny convictions admitted, but underlying facts of past drug-motivated thefts were too remote and drug use is not directly probative of veracity; potential prejudice outweighed probative value |
| Whether trial court erred in excluding underlying facts of Chase’s prior breach of the peace (guilty plea) to show he previously lied about using pepper spray/self-defense | Exclusion was proper: plea transcript showed Chase continued to claim self-defense; a guilty plea does not reliably prove prior falsehood and the plea was not inconsistent with his prior statements | Rivera argued the guilty plea was an admission that Chase lied about self-defense, showing a pattern/motive to falsely claim self-defense and to lie at trial | Held: No error — trial court reasonably found the plea was not an admission that Chase lied about self-defense; exclusion did not violate confrontation or right to present a defense |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hedge, 297 Conn. 621 (2010) (prior misconduct may be admissible under narrow circumstances to show third-party culpability; limited exception to evidence rules)
- State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231 (1993) (evidence of a witness’s ongoing drug habit can be relevant to motive and credibility when a sufficient foundation shows continued habit at the relevant time)
- State v. Dobson, 221 Conn. 128 (1992) (narcotics convictions are not directly probative of veracity)
- State v. Stenner, 281 Conn. 742 (2007) (general rule excluding propensity evidence; balancing probative value against prejudice)
- State v. Nunes, 260 Conn. 649 (2002) (prior misconduct is relevant to intent only if it permits a reasonable inference of similar intentional conduct under similar circumstances)
- State v. Askew, 245 Conn. 351 (1998) (larcenous crimes can imply a disposition toward dishonesty for credibility purposes)
- Barnes v. State (State v. Barnes), 232 Conn. 740 (1995) (confrontation clause does not permit unrestricted cross-examination; trial court has discretion to limit inquiry)
- Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (concurring recognition that addiction alone is not probative of other propensities)
- State v. Tony M., 332 Conn. 810 (2019) (guilty plea is not necessarily an open-and-visible admission of the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the offense)