190 Conn. App. 1
Conn. App. Ct.2019Background
- In 2006 Ackeem Riley (then 17) participated in a drive‑by shooting that killed one teenager and seriously injured others; a jury convicted him of murder and related charges and the trial court imposed an effective 100‑year sentence (functionally life without parole at the time).
- Riley argued his sentence violated Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment principles announced in Miller v. Alabama; Connecticut appellate courts ultimately reversed and remanded for resentencing consistent with Miller.
- Before resentencing, the legislature enacted P.A. 15‑84 amending § 54‑125a and § 54‑91g to (1) make juveniles sentenced to more than 10 years eligible for parole and (2) require sentencing courts to consider age/hallmark features and related scientific evidence when sentencing juveniles for serious felonies.
- Riley moved to recuse the original trial judge (who also presided over resentencing) under General Statutes § 51‑183c, Practice Book § 1‑22, the Code of Judicial Conduct (rule 2.11), and due process doctrines, claiming bias and an “anchoring effect.”
- At resentencing the court expressly applied Miller factors and § 54‑91g materials, considered new evidence (including other violent incidents Riley was involved in), and imposed a 70‑year sentence with parole eligibility under P.A. 15‑84; Riley appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Riley) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 51‑183c or Practice Book § 1‑22 required recusal of the original sentencing judge on remand | § 51‑183c / § 1‑22 require disqualification because the judge previously tried the matter and the sentence (judgment) was reversed | § 51‑183c previously interpreted not to apply to sentencing; Practice Book § 1‑22 implements that statute and cannot expand rights | Recusal not required: Miranda controls—§ 51‑183c does not apply to sentencing proceedings and Practice Book § 1‑22 does not independently mandate recusal here |
| Whether Code of Judicial Conduct rule 2.11 (and due process) required recusal based on alleged bias/anchoring | The judge was biased toward justifying his original 100‑year sentence; anchoring would prevent an open‑minded application of Miller factors | Alleged anchoring is speculative; law presumes judges act impartially; record shows court committed to applying Miller factors | Denial of recusal was not an abuse of discretion; objective appearance/due process standards not met |
| Whether the resentencing court had to find the juvenile "incorrigible/irretrievably depraved" to impose a term that is functionally life | Riley: Riley contends Riley/Riley’s reading of Miller created a presumption against life (without parole) that can be overcome only by an explicit finding of permanent incorrigibility | State: Riley’s remand and Miller require consideration of youth factors, but do not mandate a specific incorrigibility finding; P.A. 15‑84 changed the landscape by providing parole eligibility | No such explicit finding was required here: Riley’s earlier presumption against life‑without‑parole addressed life without parole; P.A. 15‑84 restored parole possibility, so Riley’s proposed incorrigibility‑finding rule did not apply |
| Whether the court improperly relied on P.A. 15‑84 parole eligibility (§ 54‑125a) and failed to apply Miller/§ 54‑91g when crafting the new sentence | Riley: The court relied on future parole availability to justify imposing a long, disproportionate sentence and therefore did not meaningfully weigh youth mitigation | State: The court was required by § 54‑91g(c) to inform of parole eligibility; the record shows full consideration of Miller factors and § 54‑91g materials | Court properly complied: record shows explicit application of Miller factors and § 54‑91g; noting parole eligibility did not substitute for mitigation analysis and was statutorily required |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637 (Supreme Court of Conn.) (remanding for resentencing consistent with Miller)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (Eighth Amendment requires consideration of juvenile age/hallmark features before life‑without‑parole)
- State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93 (Conn. 2002) (statutory § 51‑183c does not apply to sentencing proceedings)
- State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801 (Conn. 2016) (after P.A. 15‑84, Miller/Riley do not require resentencing where sentence includes parole possibility)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (U.S. 2016) (Miller retroactivity principles and state remedies via parole eligibility)
- Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, 166 Conn. App. 408 (Conn. App.) (Practice Book § 1‑22 implements § 51‑183c; rules give effect to statute)
- State v. Milner, 325 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2017) (standards for reviewing recusal motions and judicial impartiality)
- State v. Solis‑Diaz, 187 Wn.2d 535 (Wash. 2017) (example of disqualification where trial judge’s comments suggested unwillingness to reconsider prior sentence)