Background - In 2009 Benjamin Rettig and an accomplice entered Kay Mortensen’s home, restrained occupants, and Mortensen was killed; Rettig pled guilty to aggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping as part of a plea deal. - Rettig, while still represented, sent a pro se letter three days before sentencing seeking withdrawal of his plea; original counsel later withdrew and new counsel reviewed facts, concluded the motion misunderstood law, and withdrew Rettig’s pro se motion at sentencing. - District court sentenced Rettig to concurrent terms (20+ years to life and 15+ years to life). - On direct appeal Rettig sought to withdraw his plea, arguing (1) his plea affidavit failed to establish accomplice intent, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel pre- and post-plea, and (3) that Utah’s Plea Withdrawal Statute, Utah Code § 77-13-6, is unconstitutional because it (a) infringes the state constitutional right to appeal (Utah Const. art. I, § 12) and (b) unlawfully forces defendants into the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) for untimely challenges. - The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed, holding it lacked appellate jurisdiction to reach the merits because Rettig failed to make a timely pre-sentencing motion and the Plea Withdrawal Statute validly operates as a preservation rule with a jurisdictional waiver sanction; the court also upheld § 77-13-6(2)(c) as within legislative authority. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rettig) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held | |---|---:|---|---| | Whether the court has appellate jurisdiction to review Rettig’s challenges to his plea when he failed to move to withdraw before sentencing | Plea withdrawal timeliness requirement infringes Utah Const. art. I § 12 right to appeal; statute effectively forecloses direct appellate review | Statute is a preservation rule that narrows issues on appeal and imposes waiver for untimely motions; it does not abolish the right to appeal | Court held no appellate jurisdiction to reach merits because Rettig failed to comply with the pre-sentencing motion requirement; statute is constitutional as a preservation rule that carries a jurisdictional waiver sanction | | Whether Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(c) unconstitutionally compels defendants into the PCRA and exceeds the legislature’s authority under art. VIII § 4 (court rulemaking power) | Legislature cannot force defendants into PCRA for all untimely plea challenges; procedural rulemaking belongs to the Court | Subsection (2)(c) creates a new remedy pathway (substantive allocation) and is within legislative power; (2)(b) timing is procedural but not challenged here | Court held (2)(c) constitutional: the legislature acted within authority to establish the PCRA route for untimely plea challenges (a substantive remedial choice) | | Whether the Plea Withdrawal Statute facially violates the state right to appeal | Statute forecloses effective appellate review and associated rights (effective/appointed counsel on direct appeal) | Preservation rules that narrow appellate issues have long been upheld and do not per se violate the right to appeal | Court affirmed Gailey: statute does not facially violate the right to appeal; preservation/waiver rules are permissible so long as they do not eliminate any meaningful avenue for review | | Whether claims of ineffective assistance or plain error can be reviewed on direct appeal despite untimely plea-withdrawal motion | Ineffective-assistance claims that could not be preserved pre-sentencing should be allowed on direct appeal; otherwise defendants lose paid-counsel and effective-assistance protections | The statute’s timing and §77-13-6(2)(c) bar make post-sentencing direct review unavailable; such challenges belong in PCRA | Court held the statute precludes direct appellate plain-error or ineffective-assistance review when a defendant fails to move before sentencing; those claims must be pursued under PCRA ### Key Cases Cited Gailey v. State, 379 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2016) (held plea-withdrawal timing statute does not facially violate right to appeal; discussed preservation vs. jurisdiction) State v. Reyes, 40 P.3d 630 (Utah 2002) (interpreted earlier amended plea-withdrawal statute as jurisdictional bar to untimely direct appeals) State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) (addressed plea withdrawal before later statutory amendments) State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313 (Utah 1998) (recognized plain-error/exceptional-circumstances review under prior statutory regime) Brown v. Cox, 387 P.3d 1040 (Utah 2017) (discussed separation of powers and limits on legislative intrusion into court procedural rulemaking) State v. Drej, 233 P.3d 476 (Utah 2010) (articulated substance–procedure framework for constitutional article VIII § 4 analysis) Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (U.S. 1985) (recognized right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal) Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (addressed ineffective assistance in plea context)