Background - In 2009 Rettig and an accomplice entered Kay Mortensen’s home, restrained occupants, and Mortensen was killed; Rettig pled guilty to aggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping pursuant to a plea agreement. - Six weeks after pleading guilty Rettig (while represented) sent a pro se letter seeking to withdraw his plea; his original counsel withdrew and new counsel later withdrew Rettig’s pro se motion before sentencing. - Rettig was sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 years-to-life (murder) and 15 years-to-life (kidnapping) and appealed claiming his plea was involuntary and alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. - Utah’s Plea Withdrawal Statute requires a motion to withdraw a plea before sentence is announced and directs untimely challenges to the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). - Rettig challenged the statute as unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution’s right-to-appeal provision (art. I, § 12) and as exceeding the legislature’s power under article VIII, § 4. - The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the statute constitutional on its face and as applied: it is a preservation rule that may operate as a jurisdictional bar (precluding plain-error review) and subsection (2)(c) is within the legislature’s authority. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---:|---:|---| | Whether the Plea Withdrawal Statute violates Utah’s constitutional right to appeal | Rettig: timing and PCRA-direction foreclose meaningful direct appeal rights | State: statute is a preservation rule that narrows issues on appeal, not a bar to appeal | Court: Statute does not infringe right to appeal; it is a preservation rule that can operate as a jurisdictional bar to unpreserved claims | | Whether failure to move before sentencing allows appellate review for plain error or ineffective assistance | Rettig: exceptions (plain error, ineffective assistance) should permit direct-review of unpreserved plea-withdrawal claims | State: statute’s language and precedent preclude plain-error review on direct appeal; PCRA is the proper forum | Court: statute’s deadline + §77-13-6(2)(c) forecloses plain-error/ineffective-assistance review on direct appeal; those claims must go to PCRA | | Whether subsection 77-13-6(2)(c) exceeds legislative power under Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4 (court’s rulemaking authority) | Rettig: directing untimely challenges to PCRA is procedural and thus a court-rule matter, not legislative | State: (and majority) subsection (2)(c) creates/points to a substantive remedy and is within legislative authority | Court: (majority) subsection (2)(c) is a substantive allocation of remedy and constitutional; the legislature acted within its powers | | Whether plea affidavit here established sufficient factual basis for accomplice liability (merits) | Rettig: plea affidavit lacked facts establishing intent/accomplice liability | State: plea and counsel representations suffice; procedural bar prevents review | Court: did not reach merits—appellate jurisdiction lacking because Rettig failed to timely preserve plea-withdrawal claim | ### Key Cases Cited Gailey v. State, 379 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2016) (held Plea Withdrawal Statute does not facially violate right to appeal; analyzed preservation/jurisdictional interplay) State v. Reyes, 40 P.3d 630 (Utah 2002) (concluded amended plea-withdrawal deadline extinguishes right to direct-appeal review of unpreserved plea challenges) State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) (addressed plea-withdrawal motions under earlier statute without a time limit) State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313 (Utah 1998) (permitted appellate consideration of plea-withdrawal claims under earlier statute when plain error or exceptional circumstances existed) State v. Drej, 233 P.3d 476 (Utah 2010) (discussed substance vs. procedure and when procedural provisions are inextricably intertwined with substantive rights) Brown v. Cox, 387 P.3d 1040 (Utah 2017) (addressed separation of powers and limits on legislative encroachment into court rulemaking) * Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (U.S. 1985) (recognized right to effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal)