State v. Reed
169 A.3d 326
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Defendant Doraine Reed, in a billing dispute with her former law firm, called the firm on March 6, 2013 and referenced Adam Lanza/Sandy Hook, saying someone (possibly herself) might "do something similar" unless the firm treated clients better.
- Legal secretary Brittany Mancini was frightened by the call; firm staff called police and Reed was later arrested and charged with threatening in the second degree and harassment in the second degree (§ 53a-183(a)(3)).
- Jury acquitted on the threatening charge but convicted Reed of harassment in the second degree; she was sentenced to 60 days and appealed.
- Central legal questions: (1) whether the verbal content of the call could substantively support a § 53a-183(a)(3) conviction given timing of State v. Moulton, and (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to give a limiting jury instruction about considering speech evidence.
- Appellate court held Moulton (decided after the call) was an unforeseeable expansion of law, so the speech content could not be the substantive basis for conviction; nevertheless, the evidence (circumstances + language) was sufficient to sustain a conviction based on intent and manner of the call. The court ordered a new trial because the court failed to give the requested limiting instruction and that error was not harmless.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Reed's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of State v. Moulton (whether speech may substantively support § 53a-183(a)(3) conviction) | Moulton was pending and its approach to statutory construction should have forewarned Reed; true-threat speech can be the basis for conviction. | Moulton was released after the call; pre-Moulton law limited § 53a-183(a)(3) to conduct, so Reed lacked fair warning that speech could be criminalized. | Moulton announced an unforeseeable expansion; speech content cannot be the substantive basis for Reed’s conviction. |
| Sufficiency — intent element (did Reed intend to harass, annoy, or alarm?) | The call’s language (invoking Sandy Hook, threatening tone) shows intent to harass/alarms staff. | Reed intended only to press a billing complaint; no specific intent to harass/ alarm. | Sufficient evidence of specific intent could be inferred from language, prior conduct, and victim reaction; jury reasonably could find intent beyond reasonable doubt. |
| Sufficiency — manner/likelihood element (can a single business-hours call be "likely to cause annoyance or alarm") | The content, timing, frequency of prior contacts, and victim reaction made even a single call likely to cause alarm. | A single daytime call to an attorney’s office cannot qualify as § 53a-183(a)(3) harassment. | Statute punishes a single call made in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; jury reasonably could find the call met that standard. |
| Jury instruction — limiting consideration of speech (requested limiting charge re: focusing only on act of calling) | Error acknowledged but argued harmless because evidence was sufficient. | Trial court erred by refusing requested limiting instruction; omission risked convicting Reed based on speech content that could not substantively support the charge pre-Moulton. | Trial court erred in omitting the limiting instruction; error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given prosecution’s focus on speech — new trial ordered. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Moulton, 310 Conn. 337 (Conn. 2013) (Supreme Court held § 53a-183(a)(3) can reach unprotected harassing speech but required jury instruction distinguishing protected vs. unprotected speech; court characterized that holding as an unforeseeable expansion when applied retroactively)
- State v. Marsala, 93 Conn. App. 582 (Conn. App. 2006) (statute punishes each telephone call made with requisite intent; single-call liability explained)
- State v. Lewtan, 5 Conn. App. 79 (Conn. App. 1985) (language used in calls is relevant to prove intent and likelihood of causing annoyance or alarm)
- State v. Murphy, 254 Conn. 561 (Conn. 2000) (factfinder may consider communication language when assessing intent and likelihood of alarm under harassment statute)
- State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795 (Conn. 1994) (interpretation of intent-language in disorderly conduct statute to mean causing disturbance, vexation, or anxiety)
- State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688 (Conn. 2016) (intent is typically proved by circumstantial evidence; state must prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt)
- State v. LaFontaine, 128 Conn. App. 546 (Conn. App. 2011) (discussed limits on relying solely on speech and requested jury instruction to examine only the act of calling)
- State v. Book, 155 Conn. App. 560 (Conn. App. 2016) (noting defendant lacked notice of Moulton’s change where trial occurred before Moulton)