State v. Ploof
162 N.H. 609
| N.H. | 2011Background
- Defendant William Ploof pleaded guilty in 1998 to aggravated felonious sexual assault and sexual assault, receiving concurrent prison terms of 4–10 years and 12 months in confinement.
- As his release approached in 2007, Hillsborough County initiated RSA 135-E proceedings for involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator.
- A multidisciplinary team conducted an evaluation and found Ploof to be a sexually violent predator, prompting a petition for commitment.
- Ploof unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the petition and to challenge RSA 135-E:10 and related provisions as unconstitutional, and the trial court denied those motions.
- After a seven-day trial, the jury unanimously found Ploof to be a sexually violent predator, and the court ordered commitment for five years.
- Ploof appealed, challenging procedural protections and the statute's constitutionality; the court affirmed the commitment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facial challenge to RSA 135-E under due process and state Constitution | Ploof contends RSA 135-E violates due process and equal protection | State argues statute is constitutional with safeguards | Statute facially constitutional |
| Due process: admissibility framework under RSA 135-E:10 | RSA 135-E:10 abolishes rules of evidence without substitutes | Statute provides trustworthiness/relevance safeguards | Adequate due process safeguards; admissibility framework satisfactory |
| Burden of proof for commitment (RSA 135-E:11) | State need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt | Clear and convincing standard appropriate per Addington and Sanborn | Clear and convincing standard complies with due process |
| Separation of powers (RSA 135-E:10) | Eliminating evidence rules usurps the judiciary | Statute creates exception under Rule of Evidence 1101(b); non-conflicting | No separation-of-powers violation |
| Equal protection (RSA chapter 135-E vs. 135-C/171-B) | Different procedures denied to comparable civilly committed individuals | Rational basis; sexually violent predators are not similarly situated; safeguards justify difference | Constitutional under equal protection (rational basis) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Furgal, 161 N.H. 206 (2010) (facial challenge standard; heavy burden to show no valid application)
- State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226 (1983) (principles for constitutional challenges in NH)
- In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678 (1993) (due process in non-criminal proceedings requires notice, hearing, counsel, trustworthiness)
- In re Sanborn, 130 N.H. 430 (1988) (due process considerations in commitment context; amendments impact burden of proof)
- State v. Hynes, 159 N.H. 187 (2009) (statutory interpretation and constitutional alignment)
- Bd. of Trustees, N.H. Judicial Ret. Plan v. Sec’y of State, 161 N.H. 49 (2010) (issues of constitutional presumptions in statutory interpretation)
- Martin v. Reinstein, 987 P.2d 779 ((Ariz. Ct. App.)) (rational basis handling in equal protection challenges (cited for approach))
- Grindle v. Miller, 119 N.H. 214 (1979) (distinguishing prior Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act; limited relevance)
