State v. Petersen, 196 Conn.App. 646

Background

Defendant released on a nonsurety appearance bond for felony charges and ordered to appear for jury selection on October 3, 2017 at 10:00 a.m.
At 10:25 a.m. the judge ordered the defendant’s bond forfeited and a rearrest after the defendant was not in the courtroom.
Defendant entered the courthouse at 10:34 a.m., contacted his attorney (Watson), reentered with Watson, was told a courtroom would be opened so jury selection could proceed, but left the courthouse and never appeared before a judge that day.
Surveillance and witness testimony showed he departed after being informed the court might proceed and that his bond could be addressed; he did not surrender for about a month.
Charged with failure to appear in the first degree (§ 53a-172(a)(1)); tried by jury, convicted, and sentenced. This appeal raises sufficiency, evidentiary, witness-compelling-need, and jury-instruction claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Petersen)	Held
Sufficiency of evidence as to willfulness	Conduct before and after 10:00 (late arrival, leaving courthouse, month-long failure to surrender) supports inference of intentional avoidance of trial.	Pre-forfeiture facts alone do not establish willfulness; comparable to Khadijah (inadvertent lateness). Post-forfeiture conduct is irrelevant.	Affirmed. Viewing all trial evidence, jury reasonably inferred willfulness from choices to not arrive on time, flight from courthouse despite opportunity to proceed, and delay in surrender.
Admissibility of post-arrival conduct (relevance)	Post-arrival movements, conversations with counsel, flight and delay in surrender are circumstantial evidence of state of mind and consciousness of guilt.	Once bond was forfeited at 10:25 a.m., defendant was no longer legally required to appear, so subsequent conduct was irrelevant.	Evidence was admissible. Even if forfeiture occurred, later conduct was probative of whether defendant ever intended to appear; no abuse of discretion.
Calling former defense counsel (Watson) — compelling-need test	Watson’s testimony was necessary about what he told defendant and his impressions; other witnesses could not fully supply that testimony.	State failed to show a compelling need; alternative witnesses could testify about movements.	Court applied Ullmann test and did not abuse discretion; Watson was uniquely positioned to testify (privileged communications excluded).
Jury instruction wording (“as required” vs statutory language)	Instruction tracked statutory language and model charge; "as required" referenced the bond requirement and the court’s conditional conduct.	Phrase "as required" was too broad and allowed conviction for conduct after bond forfeiture.	Instruction proper. Court quoted statute, "as required" read in context referenced "when legally called according to the terms of [the] bail bond," and the court’s conduct effectively kept the bond obligation alive that day.

Key Cases Cited

Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698 (Conn. 1994) (adopted "compelling need" test for calling a party’s counsel as a witness)
State v. Khadijah, 98 Conn. App. 409 (Conn. App. 2006) (inadvertent lateness on work schedule can negate willfulness)
State v. Bonilla, 317 Conn. 758 (Conn. 2015) (state of mind often proven circumstantially by conduct before, during, and after)
State v. Morelli, 293 Conn. 147 (Conn. 2009) (sufficiency review considers all evidence introduced at trial)
State v. Oliveras, 210 Conn. 751 (Conn. 1989) (flight and evasive conduct can support consciousness-of-guilt inferences)
State v. Turmon, 34 Conn. App. 191 (Conn. App. 1994) (defendant who attended courthouse but left without appearing may still be found to have failed to appear wilfully)
State v. Bereis, 114 Conn. App. 554 (Conn. App. 2009) (definition and analysis of "wilful" in failure-to-appear context)
State v. Pauling, 102 Conn. App. 556 (Conn. App. 2007) (elements: legally ordered to appear, failure, and willfulness)