328 Conn. 219
Conn.2018Background
- Defendant John Panek was charged in three informations under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-189a(a)(1) for secretly recording three women during sexual encounters without their knowledge or consent.
- The statute requires, as elements, that the recording be (A) without the other’s knowledge and consent, (B) while the other is “not in plain view,” and (C) under circumstances giving a reasonable expectation of privacy.
- Panek moved to dismiss arguing that “not in plain view” means not in the plain view of the person doing the recording (the defendant), and here each victim was in his immediate presence and thus in his plain view.
- The trial court dismissed the informations on that basis; the Appellate Court affirmed. The state appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certification.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded the phrase was ambiguous on its face, consulted legislative history, and held that “not in plain view” refers to the view of the general public (public view), not the recorder’s view; it reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Panek) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of “not in plain view” in § 53a-189a(a)(1)(B) | Refers to plain view of the general public; victims recorded inside a dwelling are not in public view, so element satisfied | Refers to plain view of the person recording; victims in his immediate presence are in his plain view, so element not satisfied and charges fail | Ambiguous on text; legislative history shows legislature intended public-view standard; court adopts public-view interpretation |
| Whether legislative-history ambiguity requires application of rule of lenity | Statutory tools (text, structure, history) resolve ambiguity; lenity not invoked | Ambiguity should be resolved in defendant’s favor under lenity | Lenity inapplicable because extratextual sources (legislative history) resolve ambiguity |
| Vagueness / Fair notice (facial and as-applied) | Statute gives fair warning of proscribed conduct; not unconstitutionally vague | Statute is vague if it does not unambiguously mean defendant’s plain view; denies fair notice | Statute not unconstitutionally vague; does not leave persons of common intelligence to guess its meaning |
| Interaction of “not in plain view” and “reasonable expectation of privacy” elements | Public-view element does not render privacy element superfluous; they are related but distinct | Public-view meaning would make reasonable-expectation element redundant | Court: elements are distinct; overlap acceptable and does not render statute redundant or invalid |
Key Cases Cited
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (use of thermal-imaging device by government may constitute a search)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (officer’s presence on porch with drug-detection dog constituted a Fourth Amendment search)
- State v. Jones, 320 Conn. 22 (2015) (discussion of plain-view doctrine in Connecticut Fourth Amendment jurisprudence)
- Lackman v. McAnulty, 324 Conn. 277 (2016) (ambiguity exists only if statutory language is susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation)
- State v. DeFrancesco, 235 Conn. 426 (1995) (due-process vagueness standard: penal statutes must give fair warning)
- State v. Victor O., 320 Conn. 239 (2016) (rule of lenity applies only after statutory construction and extratextual sources leave a reasonable doubt)
- In re Williams D., 284 Conn. 305 (2007) (statutory imprecision does not automatically favor defendant if broader legislative intent is clear)