State v. Noling
136 Ohio St. 3d 163
| Ohio | 2013Background
- Noling, a death-row inmate, sought postconviction DNA testing in Portage County; this case concerns his second application under R.C. 2953.71 to 2953.81.
- The trial court denied the second application relying on R.C. 2953.72(A)(7) because a prior application had been rejected.
- Noling appealed, and this court initially held exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal under R.C. 2953.73(E)(1).
- The issues focus on (a) the constitutionality of R.C. 2953.73(E)(1) as to appellate scope in death cases, and (b) whether R.C. 2953.72(A)(7) bars subsequent applications given updated definitions of “definitive DNA test.”
- The court ultimately held R.C. 2953.73(E)(1) constitutional and that prior statutory changes require reassessment of the second application.
- The remand directs the trial court to apply the current definition of definitive DNA test and the criteria in R.C. 2953.74 to determine if further testing is warranted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is R.C. 2953.73(E)(1) constitutional for death-penalty cases? | Noling argues the statute enlarges this court’s constitutionally defined jurisdiction. | State contends the General Assembly may limit appellate review in death cases. | Constitutional; this court has exclusive direct-review jurisdiction in death cases. |
| Does R.C. 2953.72(A)(7) bar a second application after rejection under pre-SB 77 definitions? | Second application should be allowed under updated definitions of definitive DNA test. | Statute bars further applications after a prior rejection. | Statute requires reassessment; court must apply current definition and criteria before dismissal. |
| How to apply the current definition of definitive DNA test and SB 77 changes on remand? | New testing could be outcome-determinative given advances in DNA. | Previous testing may have been definitive under old standards. | Trial court must analyze under R.C. 2953.71(U) and 2953.74 to determine possibility of new material from perpetrator. |
| Does exclusive appellate review of DNA-test denials in death cases violate equal protection or due process? | R.C. 2953.73(E)(1) creates two classes of offenders. | No due process/equal protection violation; statutory framework is permissible. | Constitutional; no equal protection/due process violation found. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997) (constitutional amendments grant direct review in death cases; court has full jurisdiction over capital cases)
- State v. Davis, 131 Ohio St.3d 1 (2011) (limits of Supreme Court jurisdiction in death cases; directs appellate review remains with courts of appeals for postjudgment motions)
- State v. Lomax, 96 Ohio St.3d 318 (2002) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived; sua sponte)
- State v. Prade, 126 Ohio St.3d 27 (2010) (new DNA testing methods can reveal information not detectable at trial)
- State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266 (2010) (separation of powers; statutory amendments to DNA-testing statutes permissible)
- State v. Fisher, 35 Ohio St.3d 22 (1988) (state’s right to appeal criminal decisions limited to statute; no absolute right to appeal)
- State v. Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d 267 (1991) (constrains on appellate jurisdiction; statutory scope must accord with constitution)
- State v. Davis (duplicate entry), 131 Ohio St.3d 1 (2011) (see above)