276 P.3d 617
Haw.2012Background
- Nesmith and Yamamoto were charged with OVUII under HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3).
- Nesmith's complaint alleged operation of a vehicle while intoxicated or BAC ≥ .08; Yamamoto's did similarly with per se BAC language.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of mens rea in the complaints; trial court denied; stipulated fact trials proceeded.
- ICA upheld that § 291E-61(a)(3) is absolute liability and mens rea need not be alleged or proven; it also allowed inference of mens rea for § 291E-61(a)(1).
- Supreme Court granted certiorari to consolidate Nesmith and Yamamoto and address five questions about sufficiency, fair notice, essential facts, and mens rea requirements.
- Court holds (1) § 291E-61(a)(1) requires a culpable state of mind be pled; (2) § 291E-61(a)(3) remains an absolute liability offense; (3) the ICA erred by extending HRS § 806-28 to district courts; (4) Kalama abrogates the general vs. specific intent distinction for purposes of mens rea inference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of OVUII charges | Nesmith & Yamamoto argue charges lack required mens rea. | State contends mens rea not required for (a)(3) and can be inferred for (a)(1). | Charge deficient for (a)(1); sufficient for (a)(3). |
| Definition of offense and fair notice | Omission of mens rea defeats fair notice and fails Wheeler standard. | Language of statute suffices; common understanding covers offense. | Omission of mens rea for (a)(1) violates fair notice; (a)(3) remains absolute. |
| Whether (a)(1) is general or specific intent | Nesmith relied on general intent reasoning to infer mens rea from allegations. | ICA properly treated (a)(1) as non-general-intent, allowing inference. | Kalama rejects general/specific intent distinction; cannot infer mens rea for (a)(1) from charge. |
| Application of HRS § 806-28 to district courts | Nesmith majority extended HRS § 806-28 to district courts. | Statutory language limits application to circuit courts. | Extending HRS § 806-28 to district courts was error. |
| Absolutist treatment of § 291E-61(a)(3) | BAC-based offense reflects legislative intent for absolute liability. | No explicit language or clear history showing absolute liability for (a)(3). | § 291E-61(a)(3) remains an absolute liability offense; no mens rea needed. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Wheeler, 121 Haw. 383 (Haw. 2009) (OC defines 'operate' as attendant element in OVUII)
- State v. Kalama, 94 Haw. 60 (Haw. 2000) (abandoned general vs. specific intent distinction)
- Eastman, 81 Haw. 131 (Haw. 1996) (limits to strict liability where plainly appears)
- Rushing, 62 Haw. 102 (Haw. 1980) (limits strict liability interpretation)
- Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279 (Haw. 1977) (essential element includes state of mind for jurisdiction)
- Israel, 78 Haw. 66 (Haw. 1995) (due process requires clear offense definition)
- Elliott, 77 Haw. 309 (Haw. 1994) (omission of requisite state of mind renders charge defective)
- Mezurashi, 77 Haw. 94 (Haw. 1994) (per se DUI interpretation discussed in ICA)
- State v. Christie, 7 Haw. App. 368 (Haw. App. 1998) (per se DUI under BAC; reliance cited in later opinions)