857 N.W.2d 597
S.D.2014Background
- On June 8, 2013, Douglas Myers was stopped after a trooper radar-recorded him driving 112 mph; he was intoxicated (.131% BAC) and had three small children in the vehicle. No physical injuries occurred to the children.
- Myers stipulated to the underlying facts (including alcohol and marijuana positive tests) but the State agreed no actual "abuse, torture, torments or cruel punishments" occurred.
- A Meade County grand jury indicted Myers on three counts under SDCL 26-10-1 (abuse of a minor), among other charges; Myers pleaded guilty to a third-offense DUI as part of a plea agreement and submitted to a bench trial on one child-abuse count on stipulated facts.
- The circuit court convicted Myers under SDCL 26-10-1 on the theory he had "exposed" the children to needless risk and sentenced him to five years (to run concurrent with DUI sentence).
- Myers appealed, arguing SDCL 26-10-1 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define "expose," and that vagueness allows arbitrary enforcement. The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SDCL 26-10-1 is unconstitutionally vague for failing to define "expose" | Statute affords adequate notice; words carry ordinary meaning and courts may rely on that meaning | Myers: "Expose" is undefined, so ordinary people cannot know what conduct is prohibited; statute invites arbitrary enforcement | Statute is not unconstitutionally vague; "expose" conveys ordinary meaning (subjecting a child to needless risk) and gives adequate notice |
| Whether vagueness permits arbitrary/prosecutorial discretion | State: ordinary meaning limits application; hypothetical benign acts (e.g., taking child to a violent movie) do not qualify as needless risk | Myers: vagueness gives police/prosecutors unfettered discretion to criminalize broad conduct | Court rejected the claim; context and ordinary meaning prevent unfettered discretion; statute establishes minimal guidelines |
| Whether statute is vague as-applied to Myers's conduct (driving 112 mph while intoxicated with children) | State: on these facts, children were subjected to needless risk—statute valid as applied | Myers: lack of physical injury undermines meaning of "expose" and supports vagueness | As-applied challenge fails; Myers's conduct clearly falls within "expose" (needless risk) and is constitutionally prosecutable |
Key Cases Cited
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (statute vagueness standard: notice and prevention of arbitrary enforcement)
- Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (vagueness and limits on discretionary enforcement)
- City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (invalidating vague loitering ordinance where statute failed to delineate covered conduct)
- State v. Asmussen, 668 N.W.2d 725 (S.D. 2003) (review standard for constitutional challenges to statutes)
- State v. Hoffman, 430 N.W.2d 910 (S.D. 1988) (upholding SDCL 26-10-1 against vagueness challenge)
- State v. Biays, 402 N.W.2d 697 (S.D. 1987) (double jeopardy discussion; distinguished on relevance to vagueness)
- State v. Dale, 439 N.W.2d 98 (S.D. 1989) (criminal statutes need not define every word; ordinary meaning applies)
- State v. Outka, 844 N.W.2d 598 (S.D. 2014) (as-applied vagueness review focuses on case-specific facts rather than facial invalidation)
