172 Conn. App. 202
Conn. App. Ct.2017Background
- Defendant Tomas Morel, longtime Dooney & Bourke driver, convicted by jury of two counts of first‑degree larceny and one count of conspiracy to commit first‑degree larceny; appeal challenges sufficiency of evidence (Dec. 8, 2011 incident) and admission of uncharged misconduct (Sept. 27 and Oct. 19, 2012) related to the Oct. 12, 2012 incident.
- Company procedures: new products strictly inventoried and scanned; returned/repaired and sample products were less rigorously inventoried and shipped in boxes marked by count; sample products used for tent sale were stored and transported in distinct "coffin boxes."
- Dec. 7–8, 2011 (tent‑sale events): defendant and two coworkers removed sample items from coffin boxes, placed them in garbage/baby trucker boxes (not normally used for samples), moved them to the loading dock, loaded them into the company van, made a roughly 45‑minute absence, and later returned the van empty; coworkers observed threats by defendant and others to discourage reporting.
- Oct. 12, 2012 incident: defendant loaded one skid of returned/repaired merchandise (high value) and two skids of new product; GPS data showed an unexplained stop at an underpass during delivery and the skid of returned goods was missing on arrival at the distribution center.
- Pretrial surveillance and GPS evidence: security installed GPS; on Sept. 27 and Oct. 19, 2012 surveillance showed unauthorized stops and, on Oct. 19, opening/handling of boxes and a meeting with a pickup truck at the same underpass; after Oct. 19 defendant’s driving habits changed (fewer stops, faster deliveries). Trial court admitted the Sept. 27/Oct. 19 evidence for the limited purpose of proving intent as to Oct. 12, 2012 larceny; limiting instructions were given.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for Dec. 8, 2011 larceny and conspiracy | State: circumstantial evidence (policy breaches, packaging, loading, van absence, threats) supports inference of wrongful taking and conspiracy | Morel: actions consistent with benign explanations (moving goods for tent sale), no proof items went missing or left premises, no direct evidence of intent to steal | Court: Affirmed — cumulative circumstantial evidence and threats permitted reasonable inference of wrongful taking and conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt |
| Admissibility of uncharged misconduct (Sept. 27 & Oct. 19, 2012) to prove intent for Oct. 12 offense | State: prior similar conduct (stops, opening boxes, meeting at underpass) is relevant to show larcenous intent and pattern; probative value outweighs prejudice | Morel: evidence not probative of intent, risks undue prejudice and "once a thief" inference; complex side issue | Court: Affirmed — trial court acted within discretion; evidence relevant to intent, probative value outweighed prejudice, limiting instructions reduced risk of misuse |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816 (Conn. 2009) (standard for sufficiency review; evaluate evidence in light most favorable to sustaining verdict)
- State v. Flowers, 161 Conn. App. 747 (Conn. App. 2015) (elements of larceny and specific intent requirement)
- State v. Adams, 164 Conn. App. 25 (Conn. App. 2016) (limits on inferring theft from ordinary conduct)
- State v. Baker, 182 Conn. 52 (Conn. 1980) (conviction may stand even when stolen items not recovered)
- State v. Browne, 84 Conn. App. 351 (Conn. App. 2004) (value testimony from complaining witness can suffice)
- State v. Saez, 115 Conn. App. 295 (Conn. App. 2009) (circumstantial acts supporting inference of intent to steal)
- State v. Silva, 285 Conn. 447 (Conn. 2008) (intent proven by circumstantial evidence; intent is a fact question)
- State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171 (Conn. 2003) (high probative value may overcome concerns of prejudice)
- State v. Tocco, 120 Conn. App. 768 (Conn. App. 2010) (admission of prejudicial evidence justified when probative value is high)
- State v. Franklin, 162 Conn. App. 78 (Conn. App. 2015) (standard for admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence)
