On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. During the events underlying this appeal, the defendant was a longtime employee of Dooney and Bourke, a company that designs and manufactures handbags and small leather
New products, which left the manufacturing facility daily, were tagged with unique serial numbers. After these products were scanned, they were sealed in boxes containing other new products. A contents label that identified the products in each box was affixed to the outside of each box. Later, skids holding multiple boxes of new products were shrink-wrapped together and,
Skids holding boxes that contained returned and repaired products left the manufacturing facility for delivery to the distribution center along with skids holding boxes that contained new products, but this occurred at irregular intervals, usually two or three times per month. At the manufacturing facility, returned and repaired handbags were placed in boxes along with similar products for shipment to the distribution facility. However, unlike the situation with new products, there was no procedure in place by which to inventory each returned and repaired handbag at either the manufacturing facility or the distribution center. Instead, boxes containing these handbags were sealed when full, and the number of handbags in each box was inscribed in marker on the outside of the box. Affixed to each box was a document that included the date, number of products in each box, and the destination for each box. Smaller-sized returned and repaired products were packaged and shipped in a similar manner. Prior to their transport and delivery to the distribution center, boxes containing returned and repaired products were stacked on skids with other boxes containing returned and repaired products. Personnel at the manufacturing facility typically did not notify the distribution center to alert it to incoming skids of returned and repaired products. Basic company policy required that, once loaded on the truck for shipment, boxes were not to be opened during transit.
The defendant's charges arose from two separate incidents, one that occurred on December 8, 2011, and the other that occurred on October 12, 2012. The December 8, 2011 incident occurred during the company's annual "tent sale," a several-day event that took place in the parking lot of the manufacturing facility beginning on
In the afternoon of December 7, 2011, Arle Cruz, an employee working in the packaging area of the manufacturing facility, observed the defendant and two other
The next day, Lourdes C. Lawson, a company employee who worked in the shipping department at the manufacturing facility, observed Morel and Guillen pass by his work station with carts thаt contained open, untapped, and unlabeled "size 46" boxes of sample handbags. Morel and Guillen were leaving an area in which such handbags were stored and were heading in the direction of the loading dock.
Lawson alerted Anthony Luna, a company employee. Luna's duties included operating the surveillance system in the manufacturing facility. Luna observed the defendant, Morel, and Guillen closing either baby trucker or size 46 boxes in the loading dock area and loading thirteen of these boxes into the company's delivery van. A video recording of these events was captured on company surveillance cameras and introduced in evidence. It was readily apparent to Luna that the boxes
Several weeks later, the defendant asked Luna if he knew whether the company had installed Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment on the company truck. Luna replied, "no." The defendant told Luna that he believed that Luna had, in fact, installed the equipment. Then, the defendant stated that "we all have families and I also have a family, and anybody can go crazy." The defendant gestured to Luna by holding his fingers in the shape of a gun, pointing to his head, and stating: "Boom." Also, the defendant told Luna "not to say anything, to shut up." Luna understood this threat to refer to what he might have learned about the defendant's activities by use of the video cameras. Thereafter, Luna and another coworker, Albert Richard, reported the incident to Philip Kinsley, the company's vice president of finance.
The second incident underlying this case occurred on October 12, 2012. By this point in time, Kinsley had become concerned about the theft of products from the manufacturing facility. In June, 2012, Kinsley cautioned
GPS information reflected that the defendant left the manufacturing facility in Norwalk at 8:02 a.m. The defendant did not proceed directly to the distribution center in Orange. Among several stops that the defendant made was one during which he exited Interstate 95 northbound and proceeded along local roads to an underpass under Interstate 95. The truck remained at this location for nineteen minutes, between 9:03 a.m. and 9:22 a.m. When the defendant arrived at the distribution center, the company truck contained the two skids holding new product, but the third skid, holding the returned and repaired products, was not in the truck. After delivering the skids containing new produсts, the
When the defendant was arrested in this case, he made a threatening statement to one of the arresting police officers, William Matson. The defendant was under the mistaken belief that Matson's mother was one of his coworkers at the company. He asked Matson if his mother worked at the company. When Matson replied that he did not
I
First, the defendant claims that the evidence did not support the jury's finding that he was guilty of larceny in the first degree and conspiracy to commit larceny in the first degree as a result of his activities with Morel and Guillen оn December 8, 2011, at the time of the tent sale. We disagree.
The defendant's arguments may be summarized as follows. He argues that the state failed to demonstrate that he possessed the requisite intent to commit larceny. He argues that the evidence reasonably demonstrated that he, Morel, and Guillen placed sample products in the company van on December 8, 2011. He argues that although there was evidence that certain of his activities with respect to handling and moving the sample products violated company policy, such breaches of policy did not reasonably support a finding that he intended to deprive the company of the products. Instead, in light of evidence that salespersons who did not customarily
Moreover, the defendant argues that the state failed to demonstrate that a wrongful taking occurred. He argues that "[t]here was no evidence offered to prove that the sample bags were actually missing or even the actual number of sample bags that were missing. No documentation was offered that itemized the sample product that was allegedly stolen. No testimony by the sales force, or any other person that could definitively say or prove that sample bags intended for the tent sale went missing or even how many actually went missing." Addressing thе evidence that the company van appeared to be absent from its customary location in the back of the facility for approximately forty-five minutes, the defendant argues that there was no evidence with respect to the van's whereabouts during this period and that "[n]o one testified that the van went anywhere other than to the tent," which was located in a parking lot on the premises. The defendant argues that because it is speculative to conclude that the van was driven beyond company property, a finding that the defendant deprived the company of ownership of the sample products is unsupported by the evidence. The defendant claims that the evidence did not support a finding that
"The standard of review employed in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well settled. [W]e apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable tо sustaining the verdict.
"While the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.... If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Millan ,
Section 53a-122 provides in relevant part: "(a) A person is guilty of larceny in the first degree when he commits larceny, as defined in section 53a-119, and ... (2) the value of the property or service exceeds twenty thousand dollars ...." General Statutes § 53a-119 provides in relevant part: "A person commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner...." "Connecticut courts have interpreted the essential elements of larceny as (1) the
Essentially, the defendant argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a wrongful taking occurred because the state was unable to demonstrate precisely what happened to the boxes that were loaded into the company van on December 8, 2011. The defendant's argument fails, however, because in the present case there was ample circumstаntial evidence that permitted the jury to infer that the defendant wrongfully took possession of the items, thereby depriving the company of ownership and control of them. The evidence permitted a finding that the defendant was a seasoned employee who knew or should have been aware of company policies governing the handling and transport of products, including the policies governing
In violation of those policies, the defendant removed sample bags from coffin boxes. He put them into garbage bags. Later, in contravention of company policies,
The defendant urges us to conclude that it was irrational for a finder of fact to draw negative inferences from these subordinate facts, to infer that a taking had occurred, or that the defendant conspired with Morel and Guillen to engage in a wrongful taking. The defendant argues that his mere breach of company policies did not foreclose lawful explanations for his conduct. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, however, we do not examine the record to determine whether an innocent view of the evidence may have existed. Instead, we look to the finder of fact's guilty verdict and ask whether there is any rational view of the evidence that supports it. See State v. Millan , supra,
Here, the jury reasonably could have found that the sample bags loaded into the van on December 8, 2011,
Moreover, there was ample evidence that the defendant and his coconspirators knew that their conduct was wrongful and that they took steps to discourage their coworkers from reporting it. Specifically, we refer to the threatening statements made by Morel to Cruz, as well as the threatening statements made to Luna by the defendant. It was well within the fact-finding province of the jury to interpret these statements as being highly incriminatory, as efforts by the defendant, Morel, and Cruz to silence their coworkers because they knew that they were engaged in wrongdoing and wished to evade detection. It would not have been unreasоnable for the jury to have evaluated the evidence in light of these comments, thereby rejecting innocuous explanations of the conduct of the defendant and his coconspirators in favor of a finding of guilt. The defendant's threatening statement to Officer Matson, as well, belied an innocuous view of the defendant, but
In light of all of this evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the sample products that the defendant and his coconspirators removed from the facility and loaded into the company van were not delivered to the tent sale, but that they were removed from company property altogether, thus depriving the company of ownership of them. There was ample testimony concerning the estimated quantity and nature of the products loaded into the van, and it does not relieve the defendant
The defendant argues that there was "[n]o testimony by the sales force, or any other person that could definitively say or prove that sample bags intended for the tent sale went missing or even how many actually went missing." Consistent with the evidence that the defendant and his coconspirators acted in violation of many company policies-many of which were related to safeguarding products in the facility-and that they acted in a manner that suggested that they were aware that they were engaged in wrongdoing, attempted to conceal their activities, and attempted to evade detection by company superiors, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the products loaded into the van were not delivered to the tent sale, but that they were wrongfully taken. Such an inferential leap was supported by the evidence, viewed in its entirety, and it does not relieve the defendant of criminal liability that the state was unable to present more definite evidence with respect to the final destination of the fruits of the defendant's larcenous activity. Cf. State v. Adams ,
II
Next, in challenging his conviction of larceny in the first degree arising out of his conduct on October 12, 2012, the defendant claims that the court improperly permitted the state to present uncharged misconduct evidence. We disagree.
We already have discussed the facts related to the incident on October 12, 2012, for which the defendant was convicted of larceny in the first degree under count three of the state's information. Prior to trial, the state filed a motion seeking the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence. Relevant to this claim, the state sought to present evidence with respect to the defendant's activities on September 27, 2012, and October 19, 2012, for the purpose of demonstrating that he had a larcenous intent on October 12, 2012. The court held a hearing related to the motion, during which it heard testimony from several witnesses.
Consistent with the testimony it heard at the hearing, the court permitted the state to present evidence at trial that, in August, 2012, Kinsley became suspicious of the length of time it was taking for deliveries to be made and believed that one or more employees were engaging in theft. Kinsley contacted William Ramos, the vice president of loss prevention for the Zellman
On September 27, 2012, in violation of company policy, the defеndant was observed making multiple stops during his round trip from the manufacturing facility to the distribution center. On this date, however, the defendant was not transporting returned or repaired products.
On October 19, 2012, a day on which the defendant was transporting returned and repaired products from the manufacturing facility to the distribution center in the company truck, Ramos and Levine surveilled the defendant in separate vehicles. On this occasion, the defendant was observed exiting the highway on his way to the distribution center, parking the company truck in between two large trucks at a highway rest area, opening the rear cargo door of the truck, entering the back of the truck, lowering the cargo door so that there was only a small gap between the door and the floor of the truck, and moving boxes in the back of the truck. Thereafter, the defendant parked his truck at a secluded underpass beneath Interstate 95. GPS data introduced into evidence reflected that this was not a random location, but that the defendant stopped at this underpass during his delivery from the manufacturing facility to the distribution center on October 12, 2012, as well. A pickup truck approached, but the driver of the pickup truck likely observed Ramos and, thus, became aware that he and the defendant were under surveillance. The driver exited his truck, approached the defendant in the company truck, and spoke with the defendant briefly. Soon after this conversation, the defendant left the scene and proceeded to the distribution center.
Scott Gavitt, a company employee, observed the delivery at the distribution center after the defendant unloaded the delivery. It was apparent to Gavitt that,
The state also presented evidence that, after October 19, 2012, when the defendant became aware that he was under surveillance, there was a change in his delivery driving habits. Specifically, there was evidence that, after the events of October 19, 2012, the defendant's average driving time for a round trip from the manufacturing facility to the distribution center decreased by roughly 50 percent, unauthorized stops ceased, and he acted like "a model employee."
The defendant objected to this evidence on the ground that the evidence was not relevant to prove his intent on October 12, 2012, and, even if it was relevant, its probative value was outweighed by its likely prejudicial effect upon the jury. The court stated that it had considеred the admissibility of the proffered evidence under the appropriate balancing test. The court stated that the evidence was "material and relevant" with respect to the issue of intent. The court went on to state that it had carefully considered whether the evidence, though relevant, should be excluded due to a risk of unfair prejudice, surprise, confusion
After the evidence at issue was presented to the jury, the court delivered the following limiting instruction: "[Y]ou've heard testimony regarding conduct that took place on the 27th of September and October 19.
"That was offered for a limited purpose in this matter. One element of larceny is the intent. The specific intent to deprive the owner of property on a permanent basis.
"The dates in which the testimony regarding Mr. Levine and Mr. Ramos and others who may testify regarding the surveillance and activities on October 19 and September 27 are offered only, if you so find, on the element of intent, nothing else.
"Whether or not that element of intent can be proven, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the limited nature of the evidence of the testimony, if you so find the evidence to be that, on September 27 and October 19, only to be used in determining whether the state has satisfied the element of intent, based upon all of the evidence that has been presented. And no other purpose." Consistent with this instruction, the court provided an additional limiting instruction to the jury during its charge, limiting the jury's consideration of the evidence to the larceny charge arising from the defendant's conduct on October 12, 2012. The court stated that the evidence was not admitted to prove the defendant's bad character or his tendency to commit criminal acts. Also, the court stated: "You may not consider such evidence as establishing a predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit any of the crimes charged or to demonstrate a criminal propensity." The court reiterated that if the jury determined that the evidence was not persuasive with respect to the sole issue for which it may be considered, intent, then the jury may not consider it for any
As he did at trial, the defendant challenges the court's ruling to admit the uncharged misconduct evidence on the grounds that it was not relevant and that, if it was relevant, it was unduly prejudicial. "The standard of review regarding uncharged misconduct evidence is well established. Evidence of a defendant's uncharged misconduct is inadmissible to prove that the defendant committed the charged crime or to show the predisposition of the defendant to commit the charged crime.... Exceptions to this rule have been recognized, however, to render misconduct evidence admissible if, for example, the evidence is offered to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, a system of criminal activity or the elements of a crime.... To determine whether evidence of prior misconduct falls within an exception to the general rule prohibiting its admission, we have adopted a two-pronged
Here, the court found that the evidence at issue was probative with respect to the defendant's intent on
We reject the defendant's arguments because they are the product of his drawing only those inferences that are favorable to him from the uncharged misconduct evidence. The jury reasonably could have inferred from the uncharged misconduct evidence, viewed in the light of other evidence presented at trial, that it demonstrated a failed attempt by the defendant to steal company products on October 19, 2012, an attempt that was thwarted when the defendant became aware that he was under surveillance. Such an inference was made more reasonable by the evidence that, after October 19, 2012, the defendant's habits during deliveries changed such that he became much more efficient in terms of making his deliveries to the distribution center. The conduct of September 27, 2012, in violation of company policy, was relevant to distinguish between the defendant's conduct when he was transporting returned and repaired products, and when he was transporting new
Moreover, the evidence at issue tended to demonstrate that he had a larcenous intent on October 12, 2012, when he was transporting returned and repaired product. "It is well established that the question of intent is purely a question of fact. Intent is generally proven by circumstantial evidence because direct evidence of the accused's state of mind is rarely available.... Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct ... and from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom.... Intent is a question of fact, the determination of which should stand unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is an unreasonable one." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Silva ,
The defendant proceeds to argue that, if relevant, the evidence nonetheless was unduly prejudicial because it created a complicated and distractive side issue; "[t]he evidence was complex in that there were multiple dates for both the misconduct as well as the crimes charged"; and, given the nature of the evidence, it would have been very difficult for the jury not to engage in the type of "once a thief, always a thief" reasoning that the law forbids.
The law does not furnish an easy to apply formula for determining whether the introduction of uncharged misconduct evidence is complicated or whether it creates
Finally, to the extent that the defendant urges us to conclude that the introduction of the evidence was unduly prejudicial because the jury would have considered it for an improper purpose, we are mindful that such a danger exits whenever uncharged misconduct
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
With respect to each of the three offenses of which the defendant was found guilty, the court imposed a sentence of ten years of incarceration, suspended after four years, followed by five years of probation. The sentences were concurrent in nature. Thus, the court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years of incarceration, suspended after four years, followed by five years of probation.
There was evidence that Luna did not immediately report what he had observed because he fеared that the coworkers involved would retaliate against him.
There was evidence that, if the stolen products consisted of the company's lowest priced handbags and small leather goods, its value would be $26,977.
Section 4-5 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, titled "Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Generally Inadmissible," provides in relevant part: "(a) ... Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is inadmissible to prove the bad character, propensity, or criminal tendencies of that person except as provided in subsection (b).
"(b) ... Evidence of other sexual misconduct is admissible in a criminal case to establish that the defendant had a tendency or a propensity to engage in aberrant and compulsive sexual misconduct if: (1) the case involves aberrant and compulsive sexual misconduct; (2) the trial court finds that the evidence is relevant to a charged offense in that the other sexual misconduct is not too remote in time, was allegedly committed upon a person similar to the alleged victim, and was otherwise similar in nature and circumstances to the aberrant and compulsive sexual misconduct at issue in the case; and (3) the trial court finds that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.
"(c) ... Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is admissible for purposes other than those specified in subsection (a), such as to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, common plan or scheme, absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, a system of criminal activity, or an element of the crime, or to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony.
"(d) ... In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person in relation to a charge, claim or defense is in issue, proof shall be made by evidence of specific instances of the person's conduct."
We note that although § 4-5 was amended, effective January 1, 2012, that amendment is not relevant to this appeal. For convenience, we refer to the current revision of § 4-5.