State v. SilvaState v. Silva
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Vertefeuille
Opinion
The defendant, Madalena Silva, appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of interfering with an officer in violation of
The Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found. “At about 5 p.m. on June 22, 2003, the defendant’s brother was involved in an automobile collision on North Avenue in Bridgeport. All three vehicles involved in the collision had to be towed from the scene because of major damage, and the defendant’s brother complained of neck and back pain. Officers Jason Fern and Todd Sherback of the Bridgeport police department, who were on routine motor patrol, went to the accident scene to help the investigating officer, Officer Mark Gudauskas, complete necessary paperwork. To avoid obstructing the heavy rush hour traffic, Ferri and Sher-back parked their police cruiser in a nearby private parking lot.
“As the defendant drove by the scene, Fern and Sher-back observed her stop abruptly on the street, back up, execute a three point turn and back quickly into the parking lot where they had parked their police cruiser, nearly causing a collision. They also saw that her vehicle did not have a required front license plate. The officers told the defendant that they were going to issue an infraction ticket for unsafe backing and no front license plate. At that time, the officers asked the defendant for her driver’s license, automobile registration and insurance card. She asked to be let alone. To the officers’ . . . request, she replied, ‘You Bridgeport cops are all
“Fern and Sherback decided to arrest the defendant for breach of the peace and interfering with an officer after her belligerent responses to their requests. The defendant’s mother, who [also] was present [at the scene] with the defendant’s father, [interrupted] the officers’ investigation by stating that her daughter had done nothing wrong. Because of this [interruption], the defendant was not [immediately] arrested. At that time, as the officers tried to talk to the defendant’s mother, the defendant immediately ran into the street, entered a vehicle and drove away, leaving her automobile in the parking lot. Ferri had told the defendant not to leave the scene and then asked the defendant’s mother to use her cellular telephone to call the defendant. The defendant’s mother explained to the officer that the defendant was bringing her brother to a hospital. After speaking with the defendant [on the cellular telephone], her mother told the officers that the defendant would return after she went to the hospital.
“The officers waited for one-half hour and conferred with their supervisor, Sergeant Stephen Lougal, whom they called to explain that they intended to arrest the defendant. They also wanted Lougal to speak to the defendant’s mother about the mother’s complaint that her son had not received medical assistance. The officers then went to the nearer of the two hospitals in Bridgeport. They located the defendant at the emergency room and arrested her for breach of the peace and interfering with an officer. 4 When the officers approached her, the defendant stated to them, ‘Not you assholes again,’ and told her friend the officers were coming for her.” State v. Silva, supra, 93 Conn. App. 352-54.
“The state charged the defendant in an amended information with two counts of interfering with a[n] . . . officer and two counts of breach of the peace [in the second degree]. The first count of interfere[ing] with a[n] . . . officer charged that the defendant did so ‘by saying to [the officer] when requested to produce [her] license, registration and insurance information during a motor vehicle stop, “F_k you. I ain’t giving you s_t, asshole . . . .” ’ The second count charged the defendant with interfering with an officer ‘by running from [the officer] and fleeing on foot across North Avenue and entering the driver’s side of an unidentified green vehicle which left the scene at a high rate of speed, after being instructed by [the officer] not to leave the scene ....’” Id., 351.
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions of both counts of interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a. The Appellate
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. “In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ... In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The trier may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . . This does not require that each subordinate conclusion established by or inferred from the evidence, or even from other inferences, be
“[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the trier, would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury’s verdict of guilty. . . . Furthermore, [i]n [our] process of review, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. ... It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . Indeed, direct evidence of the accused’s state of mind is rarely available. . . . Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct . . . and from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom. . . . [A]ny such inference cannot be based on possibilities, surmise or conjecture. ... It is axiomatic, therefore, that [a]ny [inference] drawn must be rational and founded upon the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aloi, 280 Conn. 824, 842-43, 911 A.2d 1086 (2007).
The state first claims that, pursuant to Aloi, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of the first count of interfering with an officer for refusing to provide her identification and motor vehicle documents. We agree with the state, and conclude that Aloi controls our disposition of the first count in the present case.
In
State
v.
Aloi,
supra, 280 Conn. 826, the defendant was convicted of interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a for refusing to provide his identification to a police officer who was investigating possible criminal activity pursuant to
Terry
v.
Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). In examining the language of the statute, we acknowledged that, Ҥ 53a-167a defines interfering to
include
obstruction, resistance, hindrance or endangerment. . . . Those words . . . have a broad scope. By using those words it is apparent that the legislature intended to prohibit any act which would amount to meddling in or hampering the activities of the police in the performance of their duties. . . . Because a refusal to provide identification in connection with a
Terry
stop may hamper or impede a police investigation into apparent criminal activity, we see no reason why such conduct would be categorically excluded under the expansive language of § 53a-167a.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State
v.
Aloi,
supra, 832-33. We
further determined that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish that the defendant’s refusal to identify himself to the police hindered the police in their investigation of possible criminal activity, i.e., an alleged trespass. Specifically, the evidence established that the police had received a complaint of a specific named individual trespassing on private property and that when they responded to the complaint, the police observed two individuals at the scene. On the basis of that complaint, we found that “obtaining the identity of those individuals was a logical and necessary step in the police investigation of the complaint.” Id., 843.
In the present case, the evidence established that the officers informed the defendant that they were going to issue her an infraction ticket for unsafe backing and for driving without a front license plate. The officers then requested that the defendant provide her driver’s license, automobile registration and insurance information to enable them to issue the ticket. The defendant refused to do so. The officers repeated their request and the defendant refused again, swearing at the officers, stamping her feet and telling the officers that she was leaving to take her brother to the hospital. At that point, a crowd of twenty-five to thirty people had gathered in the area of the accident. State v. Silva, supra, 93 Conn. App. 352-53. Construing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict, and in light of our decision in State v. Aloi, supra, 280 Conn. 844, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant’s conduct impeded the officers in the performance of their duties. Accordingly, we further conclude that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a for refusing to provide her driver’s license and other motor vehicle documents to the officers.
The defendant claims that evidence demonstrating that she refused to provide her driver’s license and other motor vehicle documents to the officers is insufficient to support a conviction of interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a because such conduct is prohibited by
In
State
v.
Aloi,
86 Conn. App. 363, 370, 861 A.2d 1180 (2004), the Appellate Court had reversed the defendant’s conviction concluding that his failure to provide identification to a police officer was not sufficient to support a conviction of interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a. In doing so, the Appellate Court reasoned that because
The state also claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of the second count of interfering with an officer because the evidence established that she left the scene of the accident after being instructed to remain. In response, the defendant asserts that the Appellate Court properly determined that the defendant’s conduct was not sufficient to support her conviction of interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a because she did not have any knowledge that she was being arrested at the scene of the accident and that she fled to take her brother to the hospital and not to avoid discovery or apprehension. We agree with the state.
The following additional facts that the jury reasonably could have found are necessary to the resolution of this claim. The officers decided to arrest the defendant for breach of the peace and interfering with an officer for her refusal to provide her identification and motor vehicle information to the officers. See State v. Silva, supra, 93 Conn. App. 353. At that time, the defendant’s mother began telling the officers to leave her daughter alone and stating that her daughter had done nothing wrong. Id. While the officers were speaking to the defendant’s mother, the defendant ran into the street and drove away in another vehicle, leaving her vehicle in the parking lot. Id. Once the defendant left, the officers asked the defendant’s mother to call her and instruct her to come back. The mother did so, and informed the officers that the defendant had stated that she would not return until after she took her brother to the hospital. Id. The defendant did not return to the scene within thirty minutes, at which point the officers went to the hospital, where they found the defendant and arrested her. Id., 353-54. As the officers approached her, the defendant began swearing at them and told her friend that the officers were coming for her. Id., 354.
On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded that “the defendant’s conduct in openly going to a hospital and leaving her mother and her automobile behind with the police are circumstances that render evidence of the defendant’s conduct insufficient to support a reasonable finding that the defendant intentionally sought to delay the officer’s efforts to issue her an infraction ticket.” Id., 360. We disagree.
In examining the defendant’s claim, we are mindful that, “[i]n reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim . . . we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury’s verdict of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aloi, supra, 280 Conn. 842.
As we have explained previously in this opinion, Ҥ 53a-167a defines interfering to
include
obstruction, resistance, hindrance or endangerment. . . . Those words . . . have a broad scope. By using those words it is apparent that the legislature intended to prohibit
any act
It is well established that the question of intent is purely a question of fact. “Intent is generally proven by circumstantial evidence because direct evidence of the accused’s state of mind is rarely available. . . . Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct . . . and from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom. . . . Intent is a question of fact, the determination of which should stand unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is an unreasonable one.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Robertson, 254 Conn. 739, 784, 760 A.2d 82 (2000).
In the present case, the evidence established that the defendant was aware that the police were trying to issue her an infraction ticket and that she refused to provide her identification and other motor vehicle documents to the officers. Then, while the officers were still addressing the defendant, the defendant’s mother began telling the officers to leave her daughter alone and that she had done nothing wrong. As a result, the officers turned their attention to the defendant’s mother to explain the situation. While the officers did so, the defendant took this opportunity to flee the scene by running into the street, getting into a vehicle and driving away. As a result of the defendant’s conduct, therefore, the officers were unable to effect her arrest for breach of the peace and interfering with an officer at the scene. The evidence further established that the officers specifically had instructed the defendant to remain at the scene, an instruction that she ignored. On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have determined that the defendant intended to hinder and obstruct the police in the performance of their duties by leaving the accident scene and violating the officers’ direction to remain.
The defendant seems to claim that the jury reasonably could not have found that she had the requisite intent to violate § 53a-167a when she left the scene to bring her brother to the hospital. We find this claim unavailing. “Intent is a question of fact [for the jury], the determination of which should stand unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is an unreasonable one.” State v. Robertson, supra, 254 Conn. 784. “When [a] conclusion is one that is dependent on the resolution of conflicting evidence, it should ordinarily be left to the jury for its judgment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 45, 761 A.2d 1268 (2000). In the present case, there was a conflict between the defendant’s testimony and other evidence presented regarding her intent. After hearing this evidence, the jury determined that the plaintiff had the requisite intent to support a violation of § 53a-167a. Keeping in mind that we must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict; State v. Aloi, supra, 280 Conn. 842; the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant had the requisite intent to violate § 53a-167a.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
“(b) Interfering with an officer is a class A misdemeanor.”
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant also claimed that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to consciousness of guilt. See State v. Silva, 93 Conn. App. 349, 351, 889 A.2d 834 (2006). Because the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case with direction to render judgment of not guilty, the Appellate Court did not reach the jury instruction claim. Id., 361 n.9. The defendant did not brief this issue on appeal to this court. Accordingly, we remand this case to the Appellate Court with direction to consider the defendant’s claim regarding the jury instruction.
Judge Dranginis dissented from the majority opinion of the Appellate Court. State v. Silva, supra, 93 Conn. App. 361. Noting that “intent is a question to be determined by the trier of fact”; id., 363 (Dranginis, J., dissenting); she concluded that “[a] jury reasonably could have found that the defendant’s behavior in failing to provide identification to the officers at the scene and leaving the scene when instructed not to leave hindered the officers’ performance of their duties under the motor vehicle laws of this state.” Id., 365. Accordingly, Judge Dranginis would have affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., 362.
At trial, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on both counts of breach of the peace at the close of the state’s case, which motion the trial court granted as to the charge pertaining to the defendant’s conduct at the hospital. Thereafter, the jury acquitted the defendant on the other count of breach of the peace, which arose out of her conduct at the scene of her brother’s accident.
Judge Dranginis dissented from the majority opinion of the Appellate Court. See footnote 3 of this opinion; see also State v. Silva, supra, 93 Conn. App. 361.
See footnote 2 of this opinion.