185 Conn. App. 287
Conn. App. Ct.2018Background
- Defendant Cody Meadows appeared with the victim at a juvenile court hearing while subject to a standing criminal protective order that prohibited any contact and specifically barred threatening or harassing the protected person; contact was permitted only for court‑directed visitation.
- During the hearing the defendant attempted small talk, said he loved the victim, then told her “you’re going to have problems when I get home, bitch” and mouthed he would “f---ing kill [her],” which the victim reasonably perceived as real threats.
- After the hearing the defendant told a courthouse social worker he would hurt the victim, would "beat the f---ing shit out of her," and suggested he would "make her another Tracey Morton."
- The state charged four counts: two counts of criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order (one for contact; one for threatening/harassing) and two counts of threatening in the second degree under § 53a-62(a)(2) and (a)(3).
- A jury convicted the defendant on all counts; on appeal he challenged (1) double jeopardy as to the two protective‑order convictions, (2) the jury instruction defining "harassing," and (3) the constitutionality of § 53a‑62(a)(3) under the First Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Meadows) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Double jeopardy from two § 53a‑223a convictions | Two charged violations arose from separable acts (contact; then threatening/harassing) and may be punished separately | Both counts arose from one continuous conversation; punishment twice for same offense violates double jeopardy | Aff'd — acts were separable; convictions for two distinct violations do not violate double jeopardy |
| Jury instruction for "harassing" element in § 53a‑223a | Trial court’s definition ("trouble, worry, or torment") adequately captures the element | Court should have used higher formulation (annoy persistently / dictionary definition from Larsen) | Aff'd — definition used was sufficiently equivalent and commonly applied; no constitutional error |
| Constitutionality of § 53a‑62(a)(3) (threatening — recklessness mens rea) under First Amendment | Objective true‑threat standard is valid; statute constitutional as applied | Elonis/Black require subjective intent for true threats, so a recklessness mens rea is unconstitutional | Aff'd — Elonis did not alter true‑threat elements; Black did not mandate abandoning the objective standard; objective test remains valid and statute constitutional |
| Whether Elonis altered First Amendment true‑threat standard | Elonis concerned statutory mens rea for a federal statute and declined to address First Amendment true‑threat doctrine | Elonis signals adoption of subjective intent for true threats and undermines objective standard applied in Connecticut | Held: Elonis does not disturb the objective true‑threat standard; it addressed statutory mens rea, not the constitutional true‑threat test |
Key Cases Cited
- Rowe v. Superior Court, 289 Conn. 649 (contempt refusals may be a single continuous act in narrow circumstances)
- State v. Nixon, 92 Conn. App. 586 (single continuous assault may not be divisible into separate punishable acts)
- State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93 (separate omissions or acts causing distinct harms can be separately punished)
- State v. James E., 154 Conn. App. 795 (successive discrete acts—two shootings—were separate offenses)
- State v. Larsen, 117 Conn. App. 202 (discussion of dictionary definition of "harass" in evaluating protective‑order violation)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (cross‑burning decision discussing intent and true threats; plurality struck prima facie presumption)
- Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (construed federal statute to require mens rea beyond mere objective perception; did not decide First Amendment true‑threat elements)
- State v. Krijger, 313 Conn. 434 (applied objective true‑threat standard under Connecticut law)