State v. McIntosh, 2022 Ohio 3771

Defendant Jerronn McIntosh was tried by jury and convicted of two counts of rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) for sexual acts with his then-16-year-old cousin, T.M.; sentenced to concurrent 6–9 year terms plus five years postrelease control and Tier III classification.
T.M. testified McIntosh performed cunnilingus and penile-vaginal intercourse while she was unable to resist; she reported the assault to her mother and was examined by a SANE nurse.
Forensic testing: vaginal/anal swabs showed mixed male/T.M. DNA but were not suitable for identification; pubic combings contained a male profile consistent with McIntosh (frequency reported as 1 in 300 billion).
The State presented multiple witnesses about T.M.’s developmental delays and functioning well below her age (mother, treating therapist, SANE nurse, detective); therapist testified T.M. functions at an 8–9 year-old level and has lasting cognitive delays.
McIntosh testified he did not engage in oral or vaginal sex with T.M., described her as chatty and capable of babysitting, and denied knowledge of any substantial impairment or of her IEP/therapy.
On appeal McIntosh raised two assignments of error: (1) R.C. 2907.02 is void for vagueness because it does not define “mental condition”; (2) the State presented insufficient evidence that sexual conduct occurred, that T.M. was substantially impaired, or that McIntosh knew of any impairment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) is void for vagueness for failing to define “mental condition”	The statute is understandable in its plain meaning; courts may apply common usage and prior case law; expert proof not required	The phrase is undefined and broad; allows lay testimony about impairment and risks jury confusion or unfair application	Statute not unconstitutionally vague; “mental condition” can be reasonably construed as a defective state relating to the mind and must cause substantial impairment to consent/resist
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove sexual conduct, that T.M. was substantially impaired, and that McIntosh knew or should have known of that impairment	Victim’s testimony alone establishes sexual conduct; corroborating witnesses (mother, therapist, SANE, detective) showed T.M. functioned at an ~8–9 year-old level and was easily influenced; pubic combings matched McIntosh’s DNA	DNA did not identify contributor from vaginal/anal swabs; T.M. babysat children and lived semi-independently at times, undermining claim of substantial impairment; McIntosh denied awareness of any diagnosis	Viewing evidence in prosecution’s favor, a rational juror could find sexual conduct occurred, T.M. was substantially impaired by a mental condition, and McIntosh knew or had reasonable cause to know; sufficiency challenge denied

State v. Zeh, 31 Ohio St.3d 99 (Ohio 1987) (interpreting “substantial impairment” as a present reduction in the victim’s ability to appraise or control conduct)
State v. Horn, 159 Ohio St.3d 539 (Ohio 2020) (construing “condition” by reference to dictionary definitions in rape statute context)
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (Ohio 1997) (legal standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210 (Ohio 2006) (corroboration of victim testimony in rape cases is not required)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1972) (void-for-vagueness principles)
State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1 (Ohio 1984) (due-process vagueness standard)