State v. McCoy, 331 Conn. 561

Background

Kenneth Lee McCoy was convicted of murder; he filed a timely motion for a new trial under Practice Book § 42-54 before sentencing.
The trial court began the motion hearing, determined a transcript was needed, continued the hearing with consent of both parties, and scheduled the consideration to occur after briefing.
To avoid inconveniencing the victim’s family present that day, the court proceeded to sentence McCoy; the parties later realized the court might have lost jurisdiction by sentencing before ruling.
The trial court, the Appellate Court, and the majority agreed the court had lost jurisdiction upon execution of sentence and therefore could not rule on the timely motion for a new trial.
Justice D’Auria (joined by two justices) concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing exceptions (Wilson/Myers four‑month rule, civil mutual‑mistake doctrine, or a common‑law exception) allowed or required the trial court to retain jurisdiction; alternatively, the failure to decide the motion before sentencing was plain error warranting remand.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (McCoy)	Held
Whether a trial court loses jurisdiction to decide a timely‑filed motion for a new trial upon sentencing and commencement of the sentence	The court loses jurisdiction at sentencing; a post‑sentence decision on a timely motion is impermissible absent statutory or constitutional grant	The court retained jurisdiction because the motion was filed before sentencing; prior cases (Wilson/Myers) and equitable doctrines permit ruling after sentencing	Majority: sentencing/commencement of sentence ends court’s jurisdiction over the case so it could not decide the motion; D’Auria, J.: disagrees—exceptions apply and/or plain error requires remand
Whether Wilson’s four‑month common‑law rule permits post‑sentence relief on a timely pre‑sentence motion	Wilson’s four‑month rule does not save jurisdiction here; Luzietti controls	Wilson and Myers allow the court to retain jurisdiction to rule within four months (or under Myers more broadly)	Majority treats Luzietti as controlling; D’Auria: Wilson/Myers govern and preserve jurisdiction here
Whether civil mutual‑mistake doctrine or common‑law exceptions should permit reopening a judgment in criminal cases when the parties and court mutually erred	Finality and administration concerns counsel against exceptions; stay mechanism is available	Mutual mistake and common‑law powers to open judgments apply in criminal cases; equity and liberty interests favor allowing an exception	Majority rejects creating such an exception; D’Auria: the mutual‑mistake/common‑law exception should apply (or be adopted)
Whether the court’s failure to rule before sentencing was plain error requiring reversal/remand	Any error was not sufficiently obvious or harmful to constitute plain error; appellate resolution of the claims on their merits negates manifest injustice	The failure was clear and harmful; denial of trial‑court consideration of a colorable motion affected fairness and integrity and warrants remand	Majority: no plain‑error relief; D’Auria: plain error exists and would remand for the trial court to rule

Key Cases Cited

State v. Wilson, 199 Conn. 417 (explains four‑month common‑law rule for modifying criminal judgments)
State v. Luzietti, 230 Conn. 427 (holds trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify judgment once sentence execution begins absent statutory/constitutional grant)
State v. Myers, 242 Conn. 125 (recognizes trial court retained jurisdiction to decide a timely new‑trial motion filed before sentencing and decided after sentencing)
State v. Dayton, 176 Conn. App. 858 (App. Ct.) (discusses mutual‑mistake exception in civil context and its applicability commentary to criminal cases)
In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263 (confirms courts’ intrinsic power to open judgments for fraud or mutual mistake despite finality concerns)
State v. McClain, 324 Conn. 802 (articulates the plain‑error standard requiring clear and harmful error)