State v. Maurice M., 303 Conn. 18

Maurice M. challenged a probation-revocation ruling based on a finding he violated § 53-21(a)(1) by leaving his two-year-old in the exclusive care of an eight-year-old.
The revocation rested on evidence that the two-year-old exited the home through an unsecured back door while Maurice M. was home but not supervising inside.
The trial court found Maurice M. aware of probation conditions and revoked probation, transferring the remainder to imprisonment.
The Appellate Court affirmed, holding sufficient evidence of risk-of-injury conduct to support probation violation.
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding the evidence was insufficient to prove a violation under § 53-21(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the state prove a probation violation under § 53-21(a)(1)?	Maurice M. argues the record lacks foreseeability and fault elements.	Maurice M. contends the back-door-accessibility and supervision factors do not establish recklessness.	No; evidence insufficient under preponderance standard.
Was the back door’s accessibility properly established as a dangerous condition?	Maurice M. contends the record lacks clear proof of door accessibility.	State asserts door openness and lack of safety devices created a dangerous condition.	Insufficient proof of door accessibility; error to rely on lack of evidence for a lock.
May the trial court rely on mitigation factors (age, presence of eight-year-old, lack of prior incidents) to sustain a violation?	State argues mitigating factors do not defeat foreseeability.	Maurice M. asserts mitigating factors should reduce foreseeability and risk.	Mitigating factors negate finding; no recklessness proven.

State v. Preston, 286 Conn. 367 (2008) (two-phase probation revocation with evidentiary and dispositional aspects)
State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174 (2004) (standard of review for factual findings in probation context)
State v. Benjamin, 299 Conn. 223 (2010) (probation-revocation standard predicated on preponderance; criminal standards differ)
State v. Hill, 256 Conn. 412 (2001) (standard for clearly erroneous factual review; give deference to trial court)
State v. Scruggs, 279 Conn. 698 (2006) (foreseeability element; factors in § 53-21(a)(1) cases; danger in home environment)
State v. Na’im B., 288 Conn. 290 (2008) (statutory interpretation of risk to child; foreseeability standard)
State v. Cutro, 37 Conn. App. 534 (1995) (reckless disregard element; conduct need not be intentional)
State v. Branham, 56 Conn. App. 395 (2000) (distinguishable risk-of-injury context; caretaker proximity and supervision factors)
State v. George, 37 Conn. App. 388 (1995) (supervision of a young child in the home context)
State v. Fields, 302 Conn. 236 (2011) (vagueness considerations; context of child-endangerment cases)