State v. Mathieu, 2011 La. LEXIS 1580

Mathieu was convicted by jury of second degree kidnapping after confronting his ex-wife at a Gretna Walgreens, forcing her into a car with a handgun, then driving to Mississippi and back before she escaped.
During trial, Mathieu conducted portions of his defense personally, including cross-examining witnesses and delivering the defense closing argument; his court-appointed counsel handled jury selection and other trial portions.
The trial court allowed a hybrid representation arrangement where counsel assisted but Mathieu argued he was conducting core defense functions himself.
Fifth Circuit mandated evidentiary hearings to determine whether Mathieu clearly requested self-representation and whether the court adequately inquired about competency to waive counsel.
After multiple remands and hearings, the Fifth Circuit found no clear motion by Mathieu requesting self-representation or valid waiver; the conviction was reversed for new trial.
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding Mathieu knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and reinstating the conviction and sentence, remanding for execution.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Mathieu's waiver of counsel knowing and voluntary?	Mathieu	Mathieu	Waiver found knowing and voluntary
Did the trial court adequately address Faretta-like hybrid representation?	State	Mathieu	Record supports hybrid representation with safeguards
Did Mathieu have the capacity to represent himself?	State	Mathieu	Yes, capacity established by record

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (right to self-representation; need for knowing waiver)
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (U.S. 1984) (standby counsel as permissible aid under Faretta)
United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 1996) (discretion to grant hybrid representation)
United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004) (hybrid representation not prohibited but must avoid Faretta pitfalls)
Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221 (Ky. 2004) (need for Faretta-like proceedings in hybrid representations)
Ex parte Arthur, 711 So. 2d 1097 (Ala. 1997) (waiver understanding can be implicit without formal colloquy)
People v. Jones, 811 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1991) (cocounsel dynamics; defendant's control over defense)
State v. Santos, 770 So.2d 319 (La. 2000) (competence vs. waiver standards in Faretta context)
Bell v. State, 53 So.3d 448 (La. 2010) (required inquiry for knowing and voluntary waiver)
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (U.S. 1938) (defining competent waiver of counsel)