State v. SantosState v. Santos
Affirming relator‘s conviction and sentence for possession of heroin in violation of
The concern of the trial court and the court of appeal for the impact relator‘s lack of legal training might have had on the fairness of the proceeding reflects longstanding misgivings about the probable consequences of self-representation. Even as it recognized the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to waive the assistance of counsel and to represent himself or herself at trial, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]here can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the grain of this Court‘s decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to the assistance of counsel.... For it is surely true that the basic thesis of those decisions is that the help of a lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair trial.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2540, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (citations and footnote omitted). These concerns have not diminished over the years. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152, 164, 120 S.Ct. 684, 692, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (While “judges closer to the firing line have sometimes expressed dismay about the practical consequences of [Faretta‘s] holding.... I have found no empirical research ... that might help determine whether, in general, the right to represent oneself furthers, or inhibits, the Constitution‘s basic guarantee of fairness.“).
In the present case, the trial court and court of appeal therefore erred in assessing relator‘s competence to waive counsel according to a standard appropriate for measuring the competence of counsel against professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffective-ness must be whether counsel‘s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.“). By written motion and personally in open court, relator made an unequivocal request to discharge his court-appointed counsel and to represent himself. Relator explained to the court that he feared “the Indigent Defender Board is working with the police of St. Bernard Parish to keep me here.” He thereby voiced a concern at the heart of the right to self-representation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 826, 95 S.Ct. at 2537 (“When the Colonies were first settled, the lawyer was synonymous with the cringing Attorneys-General and Solicitors-General of the Crown and the arbitrary Justices of the King‘s Court, all bent on the conviction of those who opposed the King‘s prerogatives, and twisting the law to secure convictions.“) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Relator made his request over a month before trial. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162, 120 S.Ct. at 691 (“[M]ost courts require [a defendant] to [make the request] in a timely manner.“) (footnote omitted); State v. Hegwood, 345 So.2d 1179, 1182 (La.1977) (“[A] criminal defendant who has acquiesced in the representation of counsel, who for the first time requests to represent himself the morning of trial under circumstances which indicate that the request was a delaying tactic, and who makes no showing at all of any particular reason for his delay in asserting that right has impliedly waived his right to self-representation.“). Relator maintained the request despite questioning by the trial judge meant to impress upon him “the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2541. In turn, relator impressed upon the trial judge his competence to make the decision by stating that he had enjoyed an “A” average during two years of college and that he had no mental or physical problems that might interfere with his understanding of the proceedings, an assertion fully borne out by his colloquy with the court.
In the present case, as in Faretta, the record thus affirmatively shows that relator was competent to waive counsel and that, even after the court impressed upon
The trial court therefore erred in denying relator his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and the error is not subject to harmless-error analysis. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 177, n. 8, 104 S.Ct. at 950 (“Since the right of self-representation is a right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to `harmless error’ analysis. The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.“).
Accordingly, relator‘s conviction and sentence are reversed and this case is remanded to the district court for all proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE REVERSED; CASE REMANDED.