State v. Marland
2017 Ohio 4353
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Oct. 18, 2015: Marland involved in a motor-vehicle crash with a motorcyclist; a passerby (VanBuskirk) called 911 shortly after midnight and emergency responders were dispatched.
- Troopers arrived, observed signs of intoxication, performed field sobriety tests, arrested Marland, read implied-consent warnings, and transported him to a hospital.
- At the hospital, Marland ultimately consented to a blood draw (taken at 2:50 a.m.); earlier he had initially refused and spoke with his fiancée before consenting.
- Grand jury indicted Marland on three OVI counts (misdemeanors) and one count of aggravated vehicular homicide (felony); he pled no contest to the amended indictment.
- Trial court denied Marland’s motion to suppress blood evidence (found blood drawn within three hours and that consent was given); sentenced him to concurrent terms (six years total), but treated the three OVI counts as merged while still sentencing on each.
- On appeal, the court affirmed denial of suppression (timeliness and consent), overruled challenge to scope of cross-examination, but reversed the OVI convictions/sentences for improper merger procedure and remanded for correction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Marland) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness under R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) | Dispatch and eyewitness testimony place crash time ~12:17–12:19 a.m.; blood drawn at 2:50 a.m. is within three hours | Eyewitness testimony (VanBuskirk) didn’t fix crash time; travel to hospital took 13 minutes so three-hour window may be exceeded | Court: Evidence (dispatch time, scene condition, officer testimony) is competent and credible; blood was drawn within three hours — held for State |
| Voluntariness/legality of blood draw (Fourth Amendment / statutory consent) | Officers obtained voluntary consent at hospital after Marland spoke with fiancée; consent valid despite threat to seek a warrant | Consent coerced or ineffective; warrant requirement or exigent-circumstances not met; statutory limits (R.C. 4511.19/4511.192) bar the procedure | Court: Consent was voluntary under totality of circumstances; telling suspect a warrant would be sought did not render consent involuntary — held for State |
| Scope of cross-examination at suppression hearing | Trial court limited marginally relevant questioning (e.g., tube additives) as within discretion | Limitation violated due process and right to challenge evidence | Court: Limitation was a proper exercise of discretion to exclude marginally relevant / repetitive inquiry — held for State |
| Merger and sentencing under R.C. 2941.25 | Court treated OVI counts as merged but nevertheless sentenced on each allied offense | Marland argued allied-offense merger should prevent multiple convictions/sentences | Court: State must elect one allied offense for sentencing; trial court’s procedure was improper — OVI convictions/sentences reversed and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (taking of blood is a search)
- Schenckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (consent to search analyzed under totality of circumstances)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (search-incident-to-arrest does not permit warrantless blood draws)
- State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 (standard of review for suppression: factual findings deferential, legal conclusions de novo)
- State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319 (R.C. 2941.25 requires election/merger to prevent multiple punishments)
- State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234 (Ohio Constitution search-and-seizure protection parallels Fourth Amendment)
- State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71 (consent must be voluntary)
- State v. King, 2003-Ohio-1541 (reported at 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-010778) (appellate precedent finding credible testimony of hospital/nurse and officer establishing consent)