State v. Loyuk
289 Neb. 967
Neb.2015Background
- Loyuk, a corporal employed by Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (DCS) at a transitional facility, had a post-release consensual sexual relationship with R.S., a former inmate on parole.
- The relationship began after R.S.’s parole; Loyuk had no parole-supervisory authority over her and did not coerce her.
- Loyuk admitted to having sex with R.S. roughly 15 times; he was later interviewed by Nebraska State Patrol and arrested.
- The State charged Loyuk with first-degree sexual abuse of an inmate or parolee under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-322.02; statute criminalizes any person who "subjects an inmate or parolee to sexual penetration."
- At trial, Loyuk argued the statute required proof he had control over R.S., and raised constitutional challenges (overbreadth, vagueness, equal protection) and jury-instruction errors; the jury convicted and the court sentenced him to probation.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: it construed the statute, rejected the constitutional and instruction challenges, and held the evidence sufficient.
Issues
| Issue | Loyuk's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency — whether statute requires proof DCS employee had control over inmate/parolee | Statute’s last clause (control) applies to all “persons”; Loyuk lacked control so statute doesn’t reach him | "Person" separately covers DCS employees (control clause applies only to nonemployees/noncontractors) | Court: proof of control not required for DCS employees; evidence sufficient because Loyuk, a DCS employee, caused sexual penetration |
| Meaning of "subject" (whether implies coercion) | "Subject" requires coercion/force; consensual sex cannot satisfy element | "Subject" means "cause to undergo" and covers voluntary sexual penetration by a DCS employee of a parolee | Court: "subject" means "to cause to undergo"; consent is no defense under statute |
| Overbreadth / intimate-association right | Statute impermissibly burdens fundamental right to intimate association | Even if some constitutional dimension exists, statute does not "directly and substantially" interfere; rational basis applies | Court: no direct and substantial interference; rational basis review applies and statute is rationally related to protecting inmates/parolees |
| Vagueness — definition of "person" in § 28-322(2)(a) | Ambiguity whether control requirement applies to employees makes statute void for vagueness | Plain language includes employees; Loyuk (an employee) engaged in clearly prohibited conduct, so no standing to raise vagueness | Court: statute unambiguous that employees are covered; Loyuk lacks standing to challenge vagueness because his conduct plainly proscribed |
| Equal protection — marital-status/classification | Statute treats married differently; infringes fundamental liberty | No fundamental right implicated; married persons not similarly situated to parolees; rational basis suffices | Court: no equal protection violation; Loyuk not deprived of a fundamental right and is not similarly situated to married persons |
| Jury instructions / electronic-recording inference | Jury should have been instructed that "person" requires control, definition of "subject," and allowed adverse inference for lack of recording | Proposed instructions were legally incorrect; interview was noncustodial so no recording inference under § 29-4504 | Court: instructions taken as whole were correct; interview noncustodial so no § 29-4504 instruction required |
Key Cases Cited
- Rodgers v. Nebraska State Fair, 288 Neb. 92 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- State v. Ely, 287 Neb. 147 (statutory and constitutional issues treated as questions of law)
- Banks v. Heineman, 286 Neb. 390 (presumption of statute constitutionality)
- State v. Robbins, 253 Neb. 146 (statutory construction principles; use of "including")
- Coffey v. Planet Group, 287 Neb. 834 (interpretation of statutory modifiers)
- Anderson v. City of LaVergne, 371 F.3d 879 (policy restricting intra-department relationships did not directly and substantially interfere with intimate association)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (custodial interrogation/Miranda warning standards)