371 F.3d 879 | 6th Cir. | 2004
File Name: 04a0180p.06 Before: COLE and COOK, Circuit Judges; SPIEGEL,
Senior District Judge. [*] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________ FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COUNSEL _________________ ARGUED: James L. Harris, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. David Randall Mantooth, LEITNER,
M ICHAEL A NDERSON , (cid:88) WILLIAMS, DOOLEY & NAPOLITAN, Nashville, (cid:45) Plaintiff-Appellant/ Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James L. Harris, (cid:45) Cross-Appellee, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. David Randall (cid:45) Nos. 02-6094/6248 Mantooth, LEITNER, WILLIAMS, DOOLEY & (cid:45) > NAPOLITAN, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. v. (cid:44) (cid:45)
_________________ C ITY OF L A V ERGNE , (cid:45) Defendant-Appellee/ (cid:45) OPINION (cid:45) Cross-Appellant, _________________ (cid:45) (cid:45) COOK, Circuit Judge. Michael Anderson and the City of
H OWARD M ORRIS , (cid:45) LaVergne cross-appeal from the district court’s grant of Individually and in his official (cid:45) summary judgment in favor of Anderson, and a jury’s award capacity as Chief of Police of (cid:45) of damages, on Anderson’s claims brought under 42 U.S.C. (cid:45) § 1983 alleging the deprivation of his constitutionally the City of LaVergne, (cid:45) protected right of intimate association. Because reasonable Defendant. (cid:45) jurors could conclude only that the City’s policy forbidding (cid:78) Anderson from dating a higher-ranking colleague rationally
furthered a legitimate governmental interest, we conclude that Appeal from the United States District Court the district court should have granted summary judgment for for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. the City rather than Anderson. No. 00-00313—Aleta A. Trauger, District Judge. I Argued: April 28, 2004 In 1999, Anderson, a police officer for the City of Decided and Filed: June 16, 2004 LaVergne, began a romantic relationship with Lisa Lewis, an believed that intra-office dating between employees of
II
different ranks (Lewis outranked Anderson) might lead to sexual harassment claims against the department.
In granting summary judgment for Anderson, the district court misapplied cases involving expressive speech claims to Despite Morris’s order, Anderson and Lewis continued Anderson’s intimate association claim. Moreover, the district their relationship. When Lewis eventually told Anderson she court erroneously concluded that the police department’s wanted to end the relationship, a disturbance of some sort policy lacked a rational relationship to a legitimate involving Anderson occurred at Lewis’s apartment. The government interest. Thus, even though the district court Davidson County police investigated but did not file any articulated the correct standard—rational basis—for charges. After the LaVergne Police Department’s Internal reviewing the police department’s policy, it erred in its Affairs Division completed its own investigation, Morris
application of that standard. We first explain why rational terminated Anderson for failing to follow Morris’s order to basis review applies to Anderson’s intimate association claim, stop seeing Lewis outside of the office. Morris immediately and then discuss why the police department’s prohibition reconsidered, however, and offered Anderson the option of against intra-office dating satisfies the rational basis test. resigning without the department placing any negative information about the incident at Lewis’s apartment in his
A. Intimate Association employment record. Anderson accepted this offer, resigning on July 29, 1999.
The Constitution protects two distinct types of association: (1) freedom of expressive association, protected by the First In April 2000, Anderson filed this suit against the City of Amendment, and (2) freedom of intimate association, a LaVergne and Morris (individually and in his official privacy interest derived from the Due Process Clause of the capacity), alleging that Morris’s order violated Anderson’s Fourteenth Amendment but also related to the First First and Fourteenth Amendment right of intimate Amendment. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees , 468 U.S. association, and seeking damages under § 1983. Defendants 609, 617-18 (1984); Akers v. McGinnis , 352 F.3d 1030, 1035 moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the (6th Cir. 2003); Corrigan v. City of Newaygo , 55 F.3d 1211, motion with respect to the claims against Morris in his 1214–15 (6th Cir. 1995). With respect to expressive individual capacity but sua sponte granted summary judgment association, the Supreme Court “has recognized a right to in favor of Anderson on his claims against the City and associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities Morris in his official capacity (the court later dismissed this protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, claim against Morris as redundant with the claim against the petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of City). The district court ruled that the policy prohibiting religion.” Roberts , 468 U.S. at 618. Concerning intimate intra-office dating was not rationally related to a legitimate association, the Supreme Court “has concluded that choices government interest because the interest the policy to enter into and maintain certain intimate human advanced—avoiding sexual harassment claims—was not a relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the “police interest.” A jury awarded Anderson $10,283.86 in Nos. 02-6094/6248 Anderson v. LaVergne, et al. 5 6 Anderson v. LaVergne, et al. Nos. 02-6094/6248 State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding most favorable to Anderson, he and Lewis lived together at the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional some point, were romantically and sexually involved, and scheme.” Id. at 617–18. Anderson was monogamous in the relationship. The
relationship therefore involved an attachment to an individual The personal relationship at issue in this case does not with whom Anderson shared the “distinctly personal aspects involve constitutionally protected expressive activity, and of [his] life.” Roberts , 468 U.S. at 620. Anderson does not assert that the City denied his right to expressive association. Instead, this case involves the City’s But the relationship’s status as an “intimate association” alleged intrusion into Anderson’s personal relationship with does not end our inquiry. We must next consider whether the Lewis in violation of his right of intimate association. City’s policy prohibiting intra-office dating constituted a
“direct and substantial interference” with Anderson’s intimate The Supreme Court has explained that the right to intimate associations. Akers , 352 F.3d at 1040. A “direct and association “receives protection as a fundamental element of substantial interference” with intimate associations is subject personal liberty.” Id. at 618. The kinds of personal to strict scrutiny, while lesser interferences are subject to associations entitled to constitutional protection are rational basis review. Id. As explained in Akers , this court characterized by “relative smallness, a high degree of
has developed a general rule that we will find “direct and selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, substantial” burdens on intimate associations “only where a and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the large portion of those affected by the rule are absolutely or relationship.” Id. at 620. In Board of Directors of Rotary largely prevented from [forming intimate associations], or International v. Rotary Club of Duarte , the Court emphasized where those affected by the rule are absolutely or largely that although the “precise boundaries” of the intimate prevented from [forming intimate associations] with a large association right were unclear, constitutional protection was portion of the otherwise eligible population of [people with not restricted to relationships among family members. 481 whom they could form intimate associations].” Id. Because U.S. 537, 545 (1987). Instead, the Constitution “protects
Anderson continued to enjoy the ability to form intimate those relationships . . . that presuppose ‘deep attachments and associations with anyone other than fellow police department commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with employees of differing rank, the department’s policy is whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, subject to rational basis review. experiences, and beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects of one’s life.’” Id. (quoting Roberts , 468 U.S. at 619–20). B. Rational Basis Review Therefore, in addition to marriage, courts have recognized Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the City’s policy both personal friendships and non-marital romantic is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The relationships as the types of “highly personal relationships” City barred dating relationships between police department within the ambit of intimate associations contemplated by
employees of different ranks to promote its interest in Roberts . See, e.g., Akers , 352 F.3d 1039–40 (“Personal avoiding sexual harassment suits. Such preventive policies friendship is protected as an intimate association.”). are common among government employers. For example, Given these precedents, we find, at least for summary this court has upheld policies prohibiting marriage among judgment purposes, that Anderson’s relationship with Lewis municipal employees, Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys. , was an “intimate association.” Construing the facts in a light 269 F.3d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 2001), and requiring the transfer Nos. 02-6094/6248 Anderson v. LaVergne, et al. 7 of one spouse if two employees of the same school marry, Montgomery v. Carr , 101 F.3d 1117, 1130–31 (6th Cir. 1996).
Moreover, the district court’s proposition that the City’s rational interest could only be one relating to the substance of police work (such as security or investigation) lacks legal support. The case law clearly recognizes that to be rational, the basis for an employment policy need not relate to the specific, substantive purpose of the organization but may concern general employment practices, because such practices are critical to the organization’s overall functioning. See, e.g., Wright v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr. , 58 F.3d 1130, 1137–38 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding policy requiring transfer of one spouse as rationally related to legitimate government interests of avoiding potential conflicts in the workplace and preventing deterioration of workplace morale); Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Georgia , 43 F.3d 609, 615 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding policy requiring resignation of one spouse as means of “avoiding conflicts of interests between work- related and family-related obligations; reducing favoritism or even the appearance of favoritism; preventing family conflicts from affecting the workplace; and, by limiting inter-office dating, decreasing the likelihood of sexual harassment in the workplace”). Thus, the district court erred in concluding that the police department’s policy was not reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. Because its policy satisfies the rational basis standard, the City did not violate Anderson’s constitutional rights. The City therefore was entitled to summary judgment on Anderson’s claims under § 1983.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Anderson, vacate the damages and attorney’s fee awards, and remand with instructions to enter judgment for the City on all claims.
NOTES
[*] The Honorab le S. Arthur Spiegel, Senior United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. 1 Nos. 02-6094/6248 Anderson v. LaVergne, et al. 3 4 Anderson v. LaVergne, et al. Nos. 02-6094/6248 administrative assistant for the police department. Three back pay and $5,500 in intangible damages. Both parties months later, Chief of Police Howard Morris ordered appeal—the City seeking a reversal of the district court’s Anderson and Lewis to “cease all contact with each other” denial of its motion for summary judgment, and Anderson outside of the workplace. Morris issued this order because he seeking a new trial on the amount of damages.
