2017 UT 24
Utah2017Background
- Defendant John Marcus Lowther was charged with multiple sexual-assault offenses arising from four separate alleged incidents (K.S., A.P., C.H., C.R.); the State tried the K.S. rape charge first and sought to admit testimony of the other three women under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) via the "doctrine of chances."
- At an evidentiary hearing the district court admitted the other-witness testimony as non‑propensity evidence under the doctrine of chances and applied the Shickles factors in performing the Rule 403 balancing, concluding probative value outweighed prejudice.
- Lowther entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the 404(b)/403 ruling; the court of appeals affirmed admissibility under 404(b) but held the district court erred in its Rule 403 analysis and applied Verde’s foundational requirements to Rule 403, excluding A.P.’s testimony and remanding C.H. and C.R.
- The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Verde’s four foundational requirements control both 404(b) and Rule 403 balancing when doctrine‑of‑chances evidence is at issue.
- The Supreme Court held: (1) the doctrine of chances is not limited to rebutting fabrication claims and was properly invoked here; (2) Verde’s four foundational requirements operate within the Rule 404(b) inquiry but do not displace Rule 403’s text or require mechanical application in Rule 403 balancing; (3) the district court abused its discretion by mechanically applying Shickles rather than the text of Rule 403, so the evidentiary ruling must be reconsidered under Rule 403.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Lowther's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the doctrine of chances is limited to rebutting fabrication | Doctrine of chances is a theory of logical relevance usable to prove non‑consent/intent and is applicable here | Doctrine of chances applies only to rebut fabrication; premature otherwise | Not limited to fabrication; may be used where consent or mens rea are in bona fide dispute (doctrine applicable) |
| Whether Verde’s four foundational requirements must control Rule 403 balancing | Verde informs Rule 404(b) relevance but does not supplant Rule 403; Rule 403 is governed by its text and any appropriate factors | Verde’s requirements should govern Rule 403 when doctrine of chances is invoked | Verde’s requirements are requirements for Rule 404(b) admissibility but do not displace Rule 403; courts must follow Rule 403 text and may consider Verde facts but are not bound to them |
| Whether the district court abused discretion by using Shickles factors for Rule 403 | Shickles factors can inform Rule 403 but must not replace Rule 403’s text | Shickles should not be applied rigidly; Verde/Verde factors required for 403 | District court abused discretion by mechanically applying Shickles; court of appeals correctly reversed on that basis but erred in requiring Verde for Rule 403 |
| Remedy and procedural effect | Remand to district court to reassess admissibility under Rule 403; if Lowther prevails he may withdraw plea | Lowther sought exclusion and withdrawal of plea | Lowther may withdraw guilty plea; district court must re-evaluate A.P., C.H., C.R. testimony under Rule 403 text |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Verde, 296 P.3d 673 (Utah 2012) (articulates doctrine of chances with four foundational requirements: materiality, similarity, independence, frequency)
- State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) (identified multi‑factor framework courts historically used to guide Rule 403 balancing)
- State v. Lucero, 328 P.3d 841 (Utah 2014) (clarified that courts must follow Rule 403’s text and need not mechanically apply Shickles factors)
- State v. Cuttler, 367 P.3d 981 (Utah 2015) (disavowed use of the "overmastering hostility" Shickles gloss and reinforced Rule 403 textual approach)