908 N.W.2d 334
Minn.2018Background
- Lopez, a paying guest at a Willmar motel/hotel, was seen checking room doors and entered Z.D.’s unlocked room and stole a cell phone and wallet.
- Lopez was charged with first-degree burglary and theft; he waived a jury and was convicted in a bench trial.
- Lopez appealed, arguing the State failed to prove he entered a building without consent because, as a hotel guest, he had consent to be in the hotel building.
- The State argued either that each hotel room qualifies as a separate “building” under the statute or, alternatively, that precedent (State v. McDonald) holds that exceeding the scope of consent by entering a nonpublic area constitutes burglary.
- The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed: it assumed (for purposes of decision) the room might not be a separate building but held McDonald controls—entering a nonconsensual portion of a building and committing a crime is burglary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lopez entered a building "without consent" for burglary | Lopez: As a paying guest he had consent to be in the hotel building, so cannot be guilty of burglary for entering another guest’s room | State: Either each hotel room is a separate building, or under McDonald exceeding scope of consent by entering a nonpublic area constitutes burglary | Court: Affirmed conviction; relying on McDonald, entering another guest’s room without consent and committing a crime satisfies "enter[ing] a building without consent" |
| Whether the statutory definition of "building" required treating hotel rooms as separate buildings | Lopez: A hotel room is not a separate building under the current statute’s wording | State: A room can be a structure afforded shelter or McDonald controls regardless of definition | Court: Did not resolve statutory definition; assumed Lopez’s view for argument but held McDonald makes the difference—exceeding consent suffices |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. McDonald, 346 N.W.2d 351 (Minn. 1984) (holding burglary completed when defendant exceeded scope of consent by entering a nonpublic portion of a store with intent to commit a crime)
- State v. Vredenberg, 264 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1978) (legislative streamlining of a statutory definition does not necessarily exclude previously covered structures)
- State v. Nelson, 842 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. 2014) (different words in same context are presumed to have different meanings)