State v. Lane, 355 P.3d 914

Lane pleaded no contest to four counts of first-degree encouraging child sex abuse, each count involving a different victim; presumptive prison term on each count was 16–18 months, but the trial court imposed 60 months of probation on each count (concurrent).
Defendant admitted a single probation violation (drinking alcohol); the State sought revocation and consecutive prison terms based on the multiple victims.
Sentencing Guidelines (OAR 213-012-0040(2)(a)) require that incarceration sanctions imposed for a single probation violation when multiple probation terms are revoked be served concurrently.
Trial court concluded Article I, section 44(1)(b) of the Oregon Constitution (no law shall limit a court’s authority to sentence consecutively for crimes against different victims) overrides the Guidelines and imposed consecutive prison terms totaling 36 months.
Court of Appeals reversed, holding the constitutional provision applies only to "sentencing for crimes" (not to sanctions for probation violations); Oregon Supreme Court granted review.

Issue	State's Argument	Lane's Argument	Held
Whether Article I, §44(1)(b) applies to incarceration imposed as a sanction for probation revocation	Revocation sanctions are sentencing "for crimes" because the length of incarceration depends on the underlying crime and criminal history; §44(1)(b) therefore invalidates Guideline limitation	Probation revocation sanctions are distinct consequences for violating probation conditions, not "sentencing for crimes," so §44(1)(b) does not apply	Held: §44(1)(b) applies; imposition of incarceration on probation revocation is "sentencing for crimes," so the guideline provision is invalid to the extent it limits consecutive sentences

State v. Nix, 356 Or 768 (discussing Oregon sentencing guidelines framework)
State v. Ludwig, 218 Or 483 (probation as conditional release and methods of suspension)
State v. Stevens, 253 Or 563 (ways a trial court can impose probation)
State v. Langdon, 330 Or 72 (status of guidelines as administrative rules)
State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68 (interpretive note that redundancy can reflect legislative intent)
State v. Sagdal, 356 Or 639 (use of historical context in constitutional interpretation)
Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551 (consideration of voters’ understanding in referred measures)
State v. Davis, 350 Or 440 (applying underlying principles from historical meaning to modern text)
Wright v. Turner, 354 Or 815 (ordinary meaning of undefined constitutional terms)
Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or 101 (limits on using legislative statements in enactment history)
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (probation revocation does not violate double jeopardy)
State v. Barrett, 350 Or 390 (discussing DiFrancesco and double jeopardy in revocation context)
State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160 (weight to accord legislative history)
State v. Fugate, 332 Or 195 (context re: victims’ rights measures)
Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250 (legal background on Measure 40)
Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201 (offender-triggered sanctions and double jeopardy rationale)