*1 RALSTON, WARDEN ROBINSON Arguеd No. 80-2049. October 1981 Decided December *2 Burger, J., Court, in which Marshall, opinion delivered the J., J., JJ., Powell, joined. C. and White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, J., Stevens, opinion filed concurring judgment, p. post, JJ., joined, O'Connor, dissenting opinion, filed a in which Brennan post, p. 223. argued pro peti- A. vice for David Strauss cause hac n
tioner. him on the briefs were Solicitor Lee, With General Attorney Deputy Jensen, Assistant General Solicitor Gen- Frey, eral and William G. Otis. Solovy, by appointment
Jerold the Court, S. 453 U. S. respondent. argued cause and for filed brief opinion delivered the of the Court. Justice Marshall granted (1981), We case, certiorari U. S. decide whether a offender who sentenced ato con- imprisonment serving secutive adult term of while a sentence imposed (YCA), under the Federal Youth Corrections Act §5005 seq., U. et S. C. must receive YCA Appeals remainder his sentence. The Courts are *3 in on conflict this issue.1 We concludethat the YCA does not require judge imposing subsequent such treatment the the adult sentence determines that the will not benefit during from further YCA treatment the remainder of his Accordingly, judgment sentence. we reverse the of Appeals. the Court of
I
respondent,
In
years
pleaded guilty
1974
who was 17
old,
charge
second-degree
to a
of
murder and was sentenced to a
10-year
5010(c).
imprisonment
term of
under the YCA,
sentencing judgе
placed
The
recommended that he
at
be
1
case,
In this
the United
Appeals
States Court of
for the Seventh Circuit
gave an
question presented.
affirmative answer to the
642 F. 2d
See
(1981). The
Appeals
United States
Thomp
Circuit,
Court of
the Third
for
Carlson,
son v.
624 F.
(1980),
answer,
2d
gave
negative
holding
a
that
judge’s
a
determination that
the offender
from
would not benefit
YCA
treatment warrants
treating him immediately as an adult. The United
States
of Appeals
Bell,
Circuit,
Court
Outing
Fourth
v.
632 F. 2d
(1980),
Smith,
Outing
denied sub nom.
cert.
(1981),
Kennedy Va.;W. that he not in Youth Center eighth-grade least an attained at he had until be released completed successfully a trade of had level of education participate choosing; intensive, indi- that he his own undergo complete psy- weekly therapy basis and on a vidual being commu- chological returned to the before reevaluation contemplated nity. sentences, sentence, like all The segregated respondent from adult offenders. be §5011. 18 U. S. C. See exemplary. subsequent
Respondent’s has not been conduct the Federal Correctional Insti- incarcerated at 1975,while (FCI) respondent guilty Ky., found was Ashland, tution assaulting weapon, dangerous use officer federal §§ C. 111and The United States Kentucky imposed violation of 18 U. S. District of Court for Eastern District 10-year commit- and stated its adult sentence additional that the defendant will ben- order: “The Court finds ment provisions [YCA] and de- further under thé efit receiving a to sentence under said act.” After clines presentence report, the sentence to 66 reduced consecutively to be served YCA sentence. months, transferred also recommended facility greater Kentucky providing “to a from institution security.”
Respondent placed in Correctional Insti- was the Federal *4 disciplinary problems Subsequent re- tution at Wis. Oxford, Lompoc, In 1977, in his sulted transfer to the FCI at Cal. guilty respondent pleaded while institution, confined that charge assaulting to another The United officer. federal States of California District Court District for Central 5010(d) sentenced him an adult sen- under 18 C. U. S. year day of one tence that the one and ordered that run consecutive to and with the sentence not concurrent respondent serving. was then of Prisons
After the
Bureau
second
sentence,
adult
Accordingly, at
respondent
classified
as an adult offender.
respondent
segregated
time,2
least
has
been
since
prisoners,
from
has
not been offered the
adult
YCA
initial trial
rehabilitative
court recom-
pursuant
mended. The Bureau of Prisons acted
to a written
respondent
policy
imple-
it
as an adult.
when
classified
menting
segregation requirements,
the YCA’streatment and
narrowly
“any
the Bureau
defines a “YCA Inmate” as
inmate
(e)
5010(b),(c),
or
sentenced under USC Section
who is not
or
also sentenced
a concurrent
consecutive adult term,
Policy
whether state or federal.” Bureau of Prisons
State-
(Dec.
1978)
added).
p.
(emphasis
5215.2,
ment No.
Respondent exhausted his administrative remedies and
petition
corpus May
Mag-
filed
on
habeas
1978. The
istrate recommended transfer to an institution in which re-
spondent
segregated
be
from
would
adults and would receive
YCA
The
treatment.
United States District Court for the
granting
Southern District of Illinois issued an order
by
Ap-
writ, which was affirmed
the United States Court of
(1981).
peals for the Seventh Circuit.
prisoners nor special received Although petitioner dis treatment. putes assertion, the record frequent credence transfers lends some respondent’s claim. case, Given our disposition we need not ad of this dress this issue. *5 (1974), this In Dorszynski U. S. States,
II United history, analyzed exhaustively and un- structure, the Court derlying analysis, policies From that and from of the YCA. principles emerge. language relevant YCA, the two of the discretionary power strongly the of endorses First, the YCA sentencing options. among Sec- available a to choose prescribes of basic conditions treat- certain the ond, YCA offenders. ment for YCA writing Dorszynski, for the Court, In Justice, The Chief purpose principal to of the YCA is rehabilitate
found that the unusually youth, persons their are vulner- of who, because danger the of recidivism: to able judges accomplish objective, federal district “To array given to alternatives to add the two new were options previously sentencing . . to them . : available eligible they commit an offender to first, were enabled to custody Attorney under General for treatment 5010(b) (c). §§ they Second, 18U. C. and the Act. S. they commitment, did not need believed offender place probation him on under the to were authorized 5010(a). § sentencing If court Act. 18 U. S. C. first offender would be alternative, chose the by program to the of treatment created committed Id., Act.” at 438.3 sentence,
If a court wishes to sentence a to an adult 5010(d). § Dorszynski, it is authorized do so under 5010(b) § 5017(c), § an of Under court authorized maxi years, to an if the adult fender indeterminate YCA term of six even 5010(c) 5017(d), if a mum sentence would a lesser term. Under benefit court finds that the able maximum offender not be to derive years, may YCA term impose from treatment within six it length authorized law for the which is convicted. crimes of the offender 10-year Respondent initially provisions was sentenced latter murder) term; (second-degree penalty maximum adult his crime imprisonment. was life *6 majority explicit held that a must make an this Court finding subsection, “no benefit” to invoke this but need not give justify reasons to statement of his decision. Both the majority concurring opinions emphasized and that the YCA traditionally was not disturb the intended to broad discretion judges among choosing appropriate available to federal S., sentences. 418 at 436-442;id., U. (Marshall, J., Douglas, joined, with whom Stewart, and Brennan, JJ., concurring judgment). significant We reiterated that trial courts retain control sentencing options over in Durst v. States, United 434 U. S. (1978), unanimously permits where we held that YCA impose require the court to a fine or restitution when it 5010(a). places youth probation opinion on In his explained underlying for the Court, Justice Brennan purposes of the Act: concept England’s “The core like that of YCA, System upon Borstal modeled, which it is is that reha- bilitative treatment should be substituted for retribution goal. sentencing System as a Both the Borstal and the incorporate thought YCA three features essential to the operation pro- of a successful rehabilitative treatment gram: flexibility choosing variety among of treat- settings programs ment tailored individual needs; separation youth offenders criminals; from hardened and careful and flexible control of the duration of com- supervised mitment and of Id., release.” at 545-546 (footnotes omitted). important
A empow- second feature of the is that it requires, prescribe ers, and indeed certain basic prescription conditions of YCA treatment. ensures This youth segregated treatable from adult offenders are they appropriate criminals, and that receive rehabilitative care. segregate youth
The need to criminals drew from adult special legislative history. Proponents attention in the “herding youth practice of with ma- criticized the statute impressionable sophisticate, the turity, the novice subjecting . . offenders to the and . hardened, with the teaching their of crimi- older criminals influences of evil Reр. Cong., techniques No. 81st 2d H. R. . . . nal (1950). Cong. (1950); Rec. 15036 This con- see 96 2-3 Sess., statutory requirement expressed that offend- in the cern was segregated receiving from adults. 18 sentences ers *7 generally, panoply §5011.4 “[t]he of treat- More C. U. S. options Act is but under the further evidence available ment sufficiently program intended to be com- was that the YCA ‘incorrigible’ youth.” prehensive all but the to deal with concurring Dorszynski, supra, in J., at 449 (Marshall, (footnote omitted). judgment) determining responsibility for essential The allocates way. in an unusual Under traditional treatment conditions sentencing prison exercise almost unlimited statutes, officials security imposing in and treatment conditions discretion By they appropriate. The YCA is different. that believe determining youth be sentenced that the offender should trial in decides two essential YCA, under the court effect comply of Prisons must conditions confinement:the Bureau segregation requirements both the and treatment 4 provides Section in full: undergo youth conditionally
“Committed shall offenders not released security, mini- treatment security, institutions of maximum medium farms, forestry security mum types, schools, hospitals, including training and varie- camps, agencies provide other and the essential other that will designate, ties of set treatment. The time to time Director shall from aside, Depart- adapt and of the agencies institutions and the control and ment of Justice institutions practical, for treatment. such Insofar as offenders, agencies youth only shall be used of committed offenders, and and such segregated offenders from other shall be according classes of to their segregated committed offenders shall needs for treatment.” §5011. Brown v. Carlson, S. See 431 F.
YCA. U. C. (WD 1977); Hearings Supp. on S. 1114 755, 765 Wis. and of the Senate S. 2609 a Subcommittee Committee on before (1949)(statement Judiciary, Cong., 43-44 81st 1st Sess., Parker) (hereinafter Hearings); Judge Report Senate to the Judicial Conference Committee on Punishment (1942). significant The Bureau retains for Crime 8-9 discre- determining confinement, tion the conditions of see infra, requirements. but its discretion limited these history passage of the YCA’s buttresses the conclusion that correctional authorities not exercise of the sen- tencing powers established the Act: legislative proposal,
“The initial an American Law Insti- power eligible tute model removed Act, to sentence judges altogether reposed from offenders the trial power authority. surpris- in a correctional Not ingly, proposal brought sharp swift criticism judges power sharply from the whose was to be cur- proposal, by tailed. The next Conference, Judicial *8 sentencing powers judges involved shared trial between and correctional authorities. It met similar with criti- proposal, finally cism. The 1949 which was enacted sentencing power judge.” into law, retained in the trial Dorszynski, 418 S., at 446-447 (Marshall, J., with U. Douglas, joined, whom JJ., and Stewart, Brennan, (footnotes omitted). concurring judgment) responsibility This unusual for treatment conditions de- sentencing judge thoroughly mands that the all understand available facts relevant to the offender’s treatment needs. provides opportu- Thus, the statute court the trial nity extremely comprehensive presentence obtain re- 5010(e). port, § Rep. 18 U. C.S. 81st See No. S. Cong., (1949); Hearings, Sess., 1st at 18-19 Senate (statement Judge Laws); Hearings of Chief H. R. 2139and on the House Commit- No. 3 of H. R. 2140 Before Subcommittee (1943) 63-64 Sess., 1st 78th Cong., Judiciary, tee on the Laws). in mind, this framework (statement With Judge statutory arguments. the parties’ we will review Respondent asserts of the YCA language that the express III terms of a YCA sen of the basic modification any prohibits first Respondent points expiration. tence before its to “sentence the of youth authorizes a court 5010(c), § which for treatment General Attorney to the custody fender pe to this further chapter supervision pursuant be authorized law for may by six [beyond years] riod States Parole] ... or until discharged [United offense §5011, also relies on which pro Respondent Commission.” . . . shall undergo offenders youth vides “[Committed . . . that will essential provide institutions and that as such treatment,” practical, “[i]nsofar varieties of shall be used for treatment of only and agencies institutions and such shall youth offenders, youth committed offenders be other committed segregated offenders, and classes of from to their needs segregated according offenders shall added). this re language, for treatment” From (emphasis that the essential and treatment segregation spondent argues modified of the initial YCA sentence cannot be requirements before sentence expires.
We are not Section persuaded by interpretation. a youth enables the court to determine whether sentencing If offender would benefit from the YCA. treatment under court that such treatment original sentencing determines would be it under beneficial, sentence the offender 5010(a), (b), (c), or it information additional may request 5010(e). has Once the court original sentencing *9 made this determination offender and has sentenced the §5011 YCA, under of Prisons the Bureau requires out the offend- carry mandate of the court with to the respect segregation er’s do and treatment needs. We not read that language requiring judge as to make an irrevocable deter- segregation precluding of or treatment or needs, mination as subsequent redetermining judge light а from those needs intervening of events. petitioner
At extreme, the other asserts that the YCA gives independent statutory authority the Bureau of Prisons to determine that a YCA offender will not benefit from YCA treatment. Petitioner believes that the Bureau can make any such time, a determination at whether or not an offender subsequent reject has committed a offense. We this ex- traordinarily interpretation, any interpretation broad and grant independent authority deny that would the Bureau segregation an offender the treatment and from adults that a sentencing court mandates. significant degree discretionary
Prison do officials have authority under the YCA relevant treatment responsible studying offenders. Bureau is the treat- ment needs of committed offenders, 18 U. S. C. confining affording and for offenders and treatment “under [the Bureau] such conditions as Director of the believes best designed protection public.” for the 18 U. S. C. 5015(a)(3). any ap- It commit or transfer offenders to 5015(a)(2) propriate agency §§ institution, 18 U. S. C. (b), may provide variety wide institu- settings. §5011. tional Moreover, U. S. C. it has au- thority to recommend conditional release and otherwise to consult with the United States Parole Commissionin the im- plementation 5015(a)(1), of the YCA. 18 U. C. §§5014, S. 5016, 5017. give
However, the statute does the Bureau discre modify tion to the basic im terms of treatment that a poses §§5010 imposes and When youth sentence under YCA, commits the the sentence *10 212 Attorney custody “for treatment
youth of General the to the chapter.” pursuant 18 C. supervision U. S. and (c). 5010(b) provides of §§ two elements 5011 Section and undergo youths must mandatory first, treatment: “provide will the essential appropriate institution in an “[ijnsofar practical, second, as such treatment”; varieties of only agencies be used for treatment of shall institutions and youth youth such offenders be shall offenders, committed of segregated offenders, and classes committed other from according segregated youth to their needs be shall offenders program elements of the are These two treatment.” lim statutorily of the Bureau is mandated, and the discretion discharge responsibilities of its within ited to the flexible two constraints.5 these broad only right to YCA Bureau the treat
Even if the asserted Policy Statement, with its as adults accordance offenders power swpra, is much broad. this assertion too 205, see policy an con- treat offender with adult The would 5 rejected argu Although consistently of Appeals the Courts have the 5011, may ignore obligations ment that Bureau of the the Prisons they agreed degree flexibility possesses have the the Bureau on from complying segregation requirement. This conflict arises requirement obligations discharged “[i]nsofar in 5011 that certain be supra. See, g., e. Hadden, 2d Watts practical.” as n. v. 651 F. See (CA10 (CA4 1981); Outing Bell, 1980), 1354 v. F. 2d 1144 cert. denied 632 Smith, sub nom. rel. Outing v. States ex (1981); United 1001 450 U. S. States, 144 (CA3 Dancy Arnold, v. United 1978); v. Harvin 572 F. 2d 107 (en denied, App. 404 943 banc), U. S. D. C. 445 U. S. F. 2d 675 cert. Carlson, (WD (1971); 1977); Brown v. Johnson Supp. 755 431 F. Wis. Bell, (ED 1980). Supp. F. Mich. exception scope We need not practicality address issue of in this ar- petitioner’s case because misplaced. reliance on it Petitioner is gues serving sen- youths may because some be “hardened” tences, sentencing it “impractical” segregate them from adults. courts, however, youths benefit that these would determined “hardened” from YCA segregated treatment and from adults consequently should integrated really questions with other offenders. Petitioner wisdom, not the practicality, of that determination. years secutive sentence as adult—even of his YCA only sentence remained and the adult sentence were for 1 year. It is unreasonable, callous, indeed to assume that such *11 any an offender not receive further could benefit from YCA example importance treatment. This underscores the of leaving such decisions to the sound discretion of a federal sen- tencing judge, prison rather than to officials. The fatal de- petitioner’s argument permits prison fect in is that it officials to make a determination —whethеr a YCA offender will bene- fit from YCA treatment —that the statute commits to the sentencing judge.
IV provision explicitly governs No of the YCA the issue be- sentencing fore us. options The statute describes the avail- judge able to a after conviction but does not elucidate what options would be available after the defendant has been con- serving victed of a second crime while his initial sentence. purposes of the statute, however, revealed in its struc- legislative history, compel ture and the conclusion that a youth court faced with a choice of sentences for a offender serving still deprived a option YCA term is not of find- ing no further benefit YCA treatment for the remainder of the term. §5010(d),
Under sentencing a court an offender who is serving a term finding make a “no benefit” then “sentence applicable offender under other penalty provision.” judge A impose is thus a authorized to consecutive adult judge term, as the second did this case. However, the court question also has before it the whether the offender will during benefit from YCA re- treatment 5010(d) mainder Although the YCA term. ex- does not pressly authorize a second to make a find- “no benefit” ing respect unexpired to the remainder of an YCA sentence, we implicitly believe that it authorizes a such determination, as well as thе determination that YCA treat- during benefi- would not be the consecutive ment prison assuredly to make not officials authorize It does cial. either determination. explicit history legislative reveals no dis- review of the
Our sentencing youth options in who the trial court’s cussion of ap- serving Congress sentence; commits crime while problem. specific But Con- parently did consider imposed original gress did understand protective sentencing might as as well fail, and justify lengthy might purposes confinement rehabilitative 5010(c). commenting section, on that the House sentencing Report opportunity for affords states: “This provisions this bill at the to avail itself of court public protection efforts at rehabili- time insure same Cong., Rep. Sess., R. No. 81st 2d tation fail.” H. *12 (1950).6 history above, structure of the YCA discussed Congress’
supra, that a demonstrate intent 206-210, may require prison a not offender court—but officials— as after serve the remainder of YCA sentence an adult to First, received a consecutive adult term. the offender has seg- prescribes of treatment, the YCA certain basic elements pro- regation from and individualized, adults rehabilitative part sponsors grams, Second, as of the of a YCA sentence. prevent youths repeatedly purpose that its to Act stated was becoming in- recidivists, from insulate them from thе to experienced Hous- sidious influenceof more adult criminals. incorrigible youths ing youths promise of who show purpose. Third, rehabilitation would not serve this explanation by The same was offered the Chair hearings at the Senate Hearings, at 62 man of Committee that drafted the bill. 1949 Senate id., (statement (statement Judge Phillips). Chief at 13 Chief See also (section Laws) Judge “if offender be used feels might calling convicted of an for a long existing offense term under statutes respond years might have treatment within 6 short a or that so term .”). an adverse effect on enforcement of the law . . employ unique decision whether to treatment methods of exclusively the YCA is committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge, prison segrega- rather than to officials. If particular youths tion of a class of from adults would be futile, by prison that is a decision to be made a court, not authorities.
Finally, light in we do above, not believe that when Congress prison withdrew from officialssome of their tradi- authority adjust tional the conditions of confinement over Congress authority. time, intended that no one exercise that requiring, many The result would be an inflexible rule only cases, continuation of futile YCA treatment. The Congress reposed authority reasonable conclusionis that explicitly court, the institution that the YCA invests original with the discretion to make the decision about basic treatment conditions. support
We find further for this conclusion from the fact permits youth that, several circumstances, the YCA of- initially fender sentenced under the YCA to be treated as an adult for what would otherwise be the remainder of the YCA example, permits sentence.7 For the statute a court to sen- tence a defendant to an adult term if he commits an adult of- receiving suspended probation fense after sentence and 5010(a).8 initially If had been sentenced 7In circumstances, other contemplates reevaluation of the ini *13 tial reduce the judge may sentence —a severity of the terms of commitment in light changed power circumstances. The “the YCA does not disturb any suspend court to imposition or execution of sentence and place a probation.” offender on § 18 5023. The YCA also U. S. C. permits a court to unconditionally probation prior to discharge a on expiration of the probationary period to a certificate to that issue effect. Carlson, 2d, § 18 U. S. Thompson C. 5021. at 421. See 624 F. 8By § 5023(a), virtue of § incorporates the YCA 18 C. 3653. Un U. S. der section, the latter if a suspended imposition court has of sentence placed an probation, court, offender on revoking probation, after may impose any might originally. sentence that imposed it have See 5010(a) subsequently and had been con- probation under to imposed could have the court assault, criminal victed of original for the or for crime, assault, adult sentence immediately. In begin fact, committed to both, hardly logical It seems incarcerated. while crime his second respondent’s prohibit modification of treat- an immediate to originally simply he because received the conditions ment incarceration. of YCA harsher sentence permits respondent concedes that the statute a Moreover, impose judge adult sentence on an offender concurrent to a serving an adult sentence would term.9 Such a YCA who is (1978)(§ 5023(a) States, “pre- 434 U. S. generally Durst v. United powers general probation under the sentencing judges their servéis] 5010(a)”). probation under sentencing youth offenders to statute when 5010(a) impose a sentence but authorizes the court to YCA also Section pro- a crime while on If such an offender commits suspend its execution. im- begin serving him sentence bation, may require the court may impose for the second crime. mediately, or the court an adult sentence sentencing judge could have modified have no doubt that the second We by imposing sentence. respondent’s YCA trеatment terms a concurrent not, however, option. judge did avail himself of that modify the permit sentence to It would be anomalous concurrent permit a consecutive terms of the remainder of a YCA sentence but not to traditionally im- effect, term to have that since a concurrent sentence is National posed as a less severe sentence. See sanction than a consecutive Advisory Goals, Sentencing Stand- Commission on Criminal Standards and (1978). Moreover, (1973); Campbell, Sentencing § ard 5.6 A. Law of may consecutive for an offense preferable sentence be the form of sentence Dept, of serving committed while U. S. prior a sentence for a offense. See Justice, Sentencing Uniform and Corrections Law Commissioners’ Model §3-107(c) (1979). Act tradi-
We see no relevant difference in the concurrent sentences fact that tionally imposing a take effect immediately. today, a As we hold during consecutive adult sentence find that continued YCA unexpired immedi- futile, finding may term would take effect and his finding ately. case, his either permits the YCA to effectuate Of respect to whether future would be beneficial. YCA treatment course, a shorter ulti- given concurrent result in a length sentence of a will judge wish- length; mate sentence than a consecutive of that but *14 imposed modify it was and would commence at the time that the offender would otherwise re- Finally, every his term. ceive for the remainder of offender conditionally released must be two sentenced under the YCA years prior of his sentence. 18 to the termination U. S. C. if violates the the offender terms of this However, by committing a crime, release conditional re- conditional may immediately and an adult sentence lease be revoked notwithstanding youth imposed, be the fact that the sentence yet expired. Respondent concedes as much, has not since he challenge of his does not the commencement adult term in January though years youth 1982, even two of his will still remain. judge therefore that a who
We conclude sentences a may require offender to a consecutive adult term that the of- fender also serve the remainder of his sentence as an Only interpretation give meaning adult. can to both the language underlying purposes “[W]e and the of the YCA. cannot, the absence of an unmistakable construe directive, goals the Act a manner which runs counter to the broad Congress which intended it to effectuate.” FTC v. Fred (1968). Meyer, Accordingly, Inc., U. S. we judge may modify hold that a the essential terms of treat- continuing ment of a YCA sentence he finds that such treatment would not benefit the offender further.10 ing impose longer may simply length ultimate sentence increase the the concurrent sentence accordingly.
10 The respondent’s unusual characteristics of a YCA sentence answer complaint that a second original cannot “revoke” the sentence. To sure, judge’s undisturbed, be traditionally sentence is even when left subsequent original unduly events indicate that lenient. sentence was e., i. “revoked,” Such a sentence cannot a second cannot increase length. hand, its On the other discretion tradition has vested wide prison security require officials to tailor conditions of confinement to the ments and treatment prison needs of the A official’s modifica offender. tion of such conditions not be because of an offender’s misconduct would
V in deter- should apply a district judge that The standards benefit any obtain will an offender whether mining further standards ap- from the different are no from treatment the course, Of originally. a sentence in imposing plied convicted has been the offender fact that the should consider factors, the court all relevant In of light another crime. of whether determining discretion its sound can exercise for the re- or adult youth receive offender should appropri simply It is initial sentence. of the a “revocation” considered that a changed circumstances. We think the offender’s recognition of ate For the same policy. a matter of different as is no judge’s modification judge’s modification of the condi second reasons, that the we do not think changed circumstances offender’s light of the sentence tions of the YCA discretionary judge’s decision. the first impermissible review of is an interpretation congressional that our dissenting opinion asserts The punishment al- rule that “‘a with the common-law inconsistent intent is ” Post, at 223. That common-law increased.’ ready partly be not suffered with the Congress provided has court apply when simply rule does not changed circumstances. For exam- light modify a sentence power to probation, may impose suspended ple, a court seq., §3651 et the YCA. 18 U. S. C. probation statute or under general may probation, the court violates the terms of his If the defendant initial sentence. by requiring him to serve the punishment “increase” sen- judge modify to the conditions of a YCA Here, permits a the statute crime and further subsequent convicted of a adult tence if the offender is in- case, sentencing In statute would be futile. each YCA treatment light the subse- power modify conditions in the court with the to vests quent offense. history but portions legislative reviews sеlective of the dissent invest the point. Congress critical When decided to
never addresses a deny such authority and to with unusual over treatment conditions court have officials, would authority prison it did not intend that no institution futile over authority modify treatment conditions which become rec- interpretation he candidly admits that the time. Justice Stevens offender.” purpose particular ommends not “serve useful shortsighted. Post, Congress so at 233-234. We do not believe that was grants to federal examining sentencing options In that the YCA rehabilita- eyes Congress’ unmistakable judges, we refuse to close our tive intent. adopt rigid The court need not rule of
mainder of his term. judg- type urged by petitioner. Rather, it should make purposes by both the rehabilitative ment informed circumstances of the offender. YCA and the realistic Applying principles us, to the facts before we con- these sentencing judge made a sufficient find- clude that the second ing respondent would not benefit from YCA treatment during of his term.11 The found the remainder “further” under the YCA, would benefit impose a sentence under that Act, and he declined to imposing a consecutive adult sentence.12 the fu- *16 instead judges interpretive expect we that will eliminate diffi- ture, by making explicit finding respect culties an “no benefit” to the sentence.13 remainder YCA Appeals pur
11 Apparently, the Court of believed that rehabilitative However, pose may given ease, any have existed here. the facts of this all, speculation. judge After the that re such belief is sheer second found spondent would not benefit “further” from treatment. In future YCA cases, emphasize, sentencing judge responsibility we the has the for deter mining any whether an offender would derive from rehabilitative benefit receiving prior serving continued YCA treatment to an adult sentence. 12 judge’s respondent recommendation that “to a facil be transferred ity security” providing greater judge is additional evidence that the did not respondent believe that would derive further treatment. benefit from YCA 13 may modify question We need not address the whether a the length basic treatment terms of a exceeds the maxi sentence whose by adult, penalty respondent’s mum authorized law for an YCA sen since 5010(b). imposed 5010(c), § § if recognize tence was under not that We 5010(b) § basic treatment elements of a YCA sentence under are modified youth effectively greater a time at such that serves an adult sentence of length receive, than an adult could whether there would be a serious issue and, so, such a sentence is authorized if whether it violates statute App. Equal States, Protection Clause. 113 S. Cf. Cartеr v. U. United (1962) 123, 125, D. F. (longer C. 2d under YCA constitu term tional, “essentially because such with incar equated confinement cannot be J.). ordinary prison”) (Burger, ceration that district We assume judges keep deciding will these considerations in whether mind when 5010(b). modify imposed terms of a sentence under Congress in- did not convinced are conclusion, we serving while person crimes serious who commits tend that automatically treatment that receive should a YCA Congress carefully de- proved hand, other futile. On has sentencing judge, require rather than signed statute whether the basic ele- evaluate Prisons, to Bureau of segregation adults and individual- from ments of treatment — appropriate programs and consistent with YCA ized —are comports interpretation with the policies time. Our over person [is] purpose legislative com- overriding that “once a of sen- Act, the execution for treatment mitted Dorszynski, person, [is] the crime.” tence to fit 434.14 S.,U. argument applies even to a sen- quid pro quo insists that the
The dissent “longer 5010(c), a sentence is than an adult because such tence under Post, respondent’s sentence at 231. Whether generally would receive.” speculation an adult is longer he would have received as was than —as might pleaded guilty not have had he suggestion unexpired term could be convertеd that the YCA conditions of his known the sec- he later to commit an adult crime and to adult conditions were if futile. find that further YCA treatment would be ond were to statutory segregation and 14 Respondent argues that a entitlement *17 con exists, of those judge’s subsequent and that a modification violation deprivation process equal protection of due and a ditions is a and jeopardy. to address of double Because the lower court had no occasion issues, 2d, 1079, 4, in the first these 642 P. at n. we will not them address instance. may dissenting opinion implies interpretation
The of the statute that our Although the Jeopardy Post, violate Double Clause. at n. 3. properly us, response. Con suggestion issue is not before deserves that, if gress possibility intended that a YCA sentence contain within it modify offense, the offender the YCA subsequent commits a the court punishment, hardly multiple treatment terms. Such scheme constitutes per has,' by actions, since the triggered offender his own the condition all, the appropriate mits After modification of the terms of confinement. imposition probation of confinement when his term of an offender violates jeopardy problem. has never been considered to raise a serious double (no (1980);id., DiFrancesco, 117, 137 See United States 449 U. S. judgment Appeals We reverse the оf the Court of and re- proceedings opinion. consistent mand the case for with this
It is so ordered. in the Powell, Justice concurring judgment. only question presented in this case is whether an of- respondent, serving
fender, the a sentence under the Federal (YCA), §5005 seq., Youth Corrections Act 18 U. S. C. et imprisonment thereafter sentenced to a consecutive term of separated as an must nevertheless be adult, from other adult offenders for the remainder of his sentence under that Act. agree question I with the Court the answer to this must negative. separately in I write because it seems to opinion, addressing broadly me that the Court’s in the au- (the thority of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons Direc- tor), may unnecessarily curtailing authority be read as his and discretion to act other cases. imposed
It was a District Court that the consecutive adult respondent, term on but it was the Director who made the respondent prisoner longer decision to treat as an adult no segregated agree entitled to be from adult I offenders. authority impose the Court as to the of the District Court to imprisonment. the consecutive adult term of I confine this authority concurrence to the issue of of the Director. Respondent pleaded guilty second-degree murder years custody 1974. The court him sentenced to 10 assaulting the YCA. In 1975 was convicted jeopardy problem double because defendant is on notice that the conditional, only and because results parole probation “revocation of or from change proba- subsequent grant parole circumstance to the tion”) (BREnnan, J., Stevens, White, Marshall, JJ., with whom (1874) joined, dissenting). parte Lange, also Ex See 18 Wall. (Double Jeopardy party Clause offers when a “complete protection of *18 facts, punishment second on the same proposed for the court, in the same offence”) added). statutory same (emphasis dangerous weapon. guard He federal with a was sentenced 10-year to a consecutive term. The District Court found [respondent] any “that the will not benefit further under the provisions decline[d] of the Youth Act and Offenders to sen- report tence under said act.” After it received a from the Bureau the court took Prisons, however, two additional ac- respondent’s tions. It reduced sentence to five and one-half years, it did not and recommended—but order—that re- spondent [the] “be transferred from Federal Youth Center facility greater providing security.” ... to a In 1977 re- spondent again assaulting guard. was convicted of a federal again given sentencing. He was consecutive adult Two respоndent incorrigi- courts thus certified that had shown an bility capacity for violencethat warrants adult treatment. my certainly view, under these circumstances, the authority Director had the to treat the as an adult youth offender. The YCA directs that offenders are to “undergo security, in institutions of maximum security, security types (cid:127)medium or minimum . . . .” 18 “ §5011. ‘[Treatment’ U. pre- S. C. means corrective and guidance training designed protect public ventive by correcting youth the antisocial tendencies of offend- 5006(f). § may ers . . . .” The Director, inter alia, “order youth the committed offender confined and afforded treat- ment designed under such conditions as he believes best protection 5015(a)(3) added). public.” (emphasis may any “The Director transfer at time a committed agency offender from agency one or institution to other 5015(b) added). (emphasis or institution.” as “Insofar practical,. . . segregated offenders shall be from other §5011 added). (emphasis . . offenders . .” express language Thus, of YCA vests broad discretion in mandatory Director. It contains no directions that youth segregation indefinitely must continue no matter how clearly appropriate statutory adult treatment be. The emphasis flexibility instead is on and individualized treat- *19 5014, 5016, 5017, 5018, and §§5005,
ment. See 18 U. S. C. youth sepa- require offenders to be The YCA does by qualified but this command is offenders, rаted from adult “[ijnsofar phrase practical.” as We need not this case thus conferred. consider the limits on discretion This is easy respondent’s as case view of convictions an adult findings offender and the of the federal courts. these cir- plainly authority the Director had the cumstances —indeed duty from the transfer Federal Youth —to “facility providing greater security.” prop- Center to a We erly judgment segrega- defer to the Director’s that continued longer “practical” tion from adult offenders is no under such subsequent felony circumstances. Even in the absence of convictions, when, there could be occasions because of a incorrigibility safety offender’s and threat to the highly impractical seg- it would be others, to continue his regation in a center. As we are not confronted with such a situation in this I case, would limit our decision to the day general
record before us and defer to another a discus- authority. sion of the Director’s
Justice Stevens, whom Justice Brennan and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting. during
At common law sentence could be amended imposed subject term in which it was to the limitation that “a punishment already partly suffered not increased.”1 be during may “The distinction that the court the same term mitigate punishment, amend sentence so as to but not so it,” as to increase Benz, 304, United States v. S.U. general practice, 1 ‘As a sentence, by court of imposed when record, power is within the it during court the session in which entered, may provided session, during amended at time such punishment already partly Wharton, be not increased." F. suffered 1889) (9th Pleading §913, Criminal p. (emphasis Practice ed. added) 307). Benz, United States (quoted in 282 U. S. over and over again.2 this Court recognized has been from in- judges rule prohibiting the well-settled Whether has become final is after it a sentence severity creasing the sort of it is mandated,3 unquestionably constitutionally without authori- express disregard that judges rule Congress.4 zation from
2 684, (Rehnquist, J., States, 445 U. S. 703 See, g., v. United e. Whalen Pearce, 711, (Douglas, J., U. 730-731 v. 395 S. dissenting); North Carolina concurring part dissenting (Harlan, J., and id., concurring); at 747 68; States, 1, 37, Roberts v. 320 Covert, n. United 354 U. S. part); Reid v. 264, U. S. 265-266. 3 England Amer jurisprudence in the anything settled “If there is lawfully punished for the same offence.” ica, can be twice it is that no man 163, Lange, 168. parte Ex 18 Wall. DiFrancesco, 117, purports 449 U. S. to con-
Although v. United States Benz, supra, specific their con- Lange States v. to parte fine Ex and United texts, S., 139, holding in DiFrancesco is limited at Court’s see U. Congress expressly authorized an increase of in which has to the situation appeal. direct It the initial sentence has been set aside on sentence after Congress expressly did not аuthorize the sec- is conceded in this case that sentencing judge severity unexpired of the YCA ond to increase the sentence. ante, noteworthy, opinion, perplexing,
It is but that the Court’s 220-221, Appeals un- n. leaves the Court of free on remand to declare Act. constitutional the Court’s construction of the Youth Corrections States, closely parallels supra. After This case Roberts v. United offense, pleading guilty pay to a federal to Roberts was sentenced $250 years authority prison. fine and to serve two to under the Pursuant statute, probation federal of the suspended District Court execution upon payment sentence conditioned re of the fine and ordered Roberts’ probation 5-year later, lease on for period. years the court after Four hearing probation, years, original revoked the set of two aside the sentence imposed years. Appeals a new sentence of af three The Court of petition certiorari, firmed. stat argued probation On Roberts imposition ute did not authorize revocation of an increased sentence after suspended original and, construed, of a the statute was not so granted statutory unconstitutional. The Court reversed on certiorari and grounds, reaching question. constitutional authority
“If thе
suspend
exists in
to increase a sen-
federal courts to
rejection
requires
argument
firm
That rule
that a
sentencing judge
power
unexpired
second
has
convert an
YCA sentence into an adult sentence. For there can be no
question
an adult
about the fact that
sentence is more severe
Congress
than a
sentence.5 Nor can we “assume
departure
have intended such a
from well-established doc-
expression
Dorszynski
trine without a clear
to disavow it.”
undisputed
It is
States,
v. United
418 U. S.
expression
Act contains no such clear
the Youth Corrections
congressional
opinion repeat-
Indeed,
intent.
the Court’s
edly
proposition.6
holding
confirms this
Court’s novel
judgment,
tence fixed
a valid
it must be derived from the Probation
government
Act. The
that federal
power
concedes
courts'had no such
parte
States,
Ex
United
prior
passage
27;
of that Act.
See
U. S.
Mayer,
Ex parte Lange,
United States v.
55;
163;
235 U. S.
18 Wall.
Benz,
S.,
United States
Thus, Roberts recognizes changing between a sen- critical distinction tence after it imposed postponing imposition has been of a sentence. ante, 217-218, today only ignores distinction, The Court not at see 10, 220-221, 14, n. but does not even cite Roberts. n. 5 deny given The Court does number of not that an of a adult sentence years years. is more severe than number of a YCA sentence for the same Justice, As The Chief States Judge, then a Circuit stated for the United Appeals Circuit, Court of for the District YCA “confinement of Columbia Carter cannot v. equated ordinary with prison.” in incarceration (1962). States, United 283, 123, 125, 113 U. 285 App. S. D. 306 F. 2d C. (CA9 1980); McDonald, See United States 1291, F. 1294-1295 611 2d Rogers (CA10 5011; States, v. United 1963); C. 326 F. 18 U. S. 2d 57 (1950). Rep. Sess., H. R. No. Cong., 81st 2d explicitly governs The Court provision admits that “[n]o of YCA us,” ante, “ftjhe issue 213; before the sentenc- at that statute describes from the inferences drawn than more nothing supported ante, at 214. See of the YCA.” and structure “history insufficient to justify judi- are inferences such Manifestly, as the described accurately “has been of what rewriting cial concerned with sentenc- statute federal comprehensive most supra, Dorszynski, at ing.” rests on the Con- premise first argument
The Court’s offenders be corrigible youth either that not intend did gress or that futile YCA offenders incorrigible with housed reasons that continued The Court be continued. such intent congressional derogation is YCA treatment sentence, his YCA offender, serving while a youth whenever serious to convince the sufficiently crime commits another will no benefit longer that the youth second sentencing judge Ante, 214-215. All of this from YCA treatment. does not elucidate what ing options to a after conviction but available has convicted of a sec- options be available after the defendant been would (d) ibid.; sentence,” “§ serving does not ond crime while his initial finding re- expressly second to make a ‘no benefit’ authorize a ibid.; sentence,” unexpired and that “the spect to the remainder of an YCA history options legislative explicit reveals no discussion of the trial court’s sentence; serving sentencing youth who commits a crime while a YCA ante, Congress apparently specific problem,” not at 214. did consider this agrees: Petitioner prob-
“Nothing language specifically in the directed to who, sentence, a crime serving lem of an offender while a YCA commits adult, acquir- thus imprisonment and receives a consecutive term of as an legis- ing a dual status as both an adult offender and a YCA offender. history ap- Congress, optimism lative reveals that in its about new proach, provide did consider or for the situation which underway.” offender would commit a serious crime was while rehabilitation *22 Brief for Petitioner 12-13.
Indeed, inter- petitioner urges the Bureau of Prisons’ Court to defer to the pretation Policy Act, of the Youth Corrections Bureau of Prisons State- see (Dec. 12, soundly rejects. 1978), argument ment No. 5215.2 the Court Ante, agree at 212-213. I Bureau of Prisons does with the Court that the power not have under the Act to terminate YCA Youth Corrections treatment.
well be but it does not follow that the second true, sentencing a consecutive adult sentence judge may and also con- impose fine the offender as an adult under the unexpired YCA sen- tence. A much less drastic solution will the ob- accomplish ascribed to The second jectives Congress. judge simply may a adult sentence and thereby concurrent end the of- impose even Moreover, if, fender’s YCA treatment.7 as this case, a the second consecutive rather sentencing judge imposes sentence, than a concurrent officials nonetheless prison can effectuate these their objectives by exercising authority terminate the YCA confinement and allow the consecutive adult sentence to commence. See 18 U. S. C. 5017. It is therefore clear that the Cоurt’s does not premise its support conclusion that must have intended that Congress the second the first sentence may modify sentencing judge by increasing its severity.8 objects because,
7 Petitioner to that alternative solution with consecutive sentences, impose Arg. can a harsher sentence. Tr. of See Oral confident, 14-15, however, I 48. am that the maximum sentences author (or crimes) sufficiently ized for high serious crimes even less serious are satisfy objection. 111, Title 18 U. S. C. under which years’ imprisonment, was eonvicted and sentenced to 5!4 authorizes as penalty $10,000 a imprisonment fine of not more than of not more than years, statutory inadequate, or both. Even these were as máximums response this Court stated in to a offender’s claim that his sentence “ harsh, remedy Congress, by was too ‘the must be afforded act of judicial legislation guise construction,’ [Blockburger under the v. United States, 299, 305], may U. S. since entertained re ‘[w]hatever views garding severity punishment. leg peculiarly questions . . are [t]hese policy.’ States, islative Dorszynski [Gore v. 393].” United 357 U. S. States, United 418 U. S. 8Indeed, practicality the Court point: concedes the “We see tra- no relevant difference in the sentences fact that concurrent ditionally immediately. today, judge imposing take effect As we hold during consecutive adult sentence find that continued YCA unexpired futile, term immedi- finding may would be and his take effect ately. case, finding In either his permits to effectuate respect Of to whether future beneficial. YCA treatment would be *23 is no better. The Court argument The Court’s second circumstances, the YCA a permits “in that, *24 intended that even a Congress any authority, court, in- may after crease the of a sentence that severity sentence has be- In in fact, points come final. as the Court out a footnote, the a authorization for only statutory judicial modification of a YCA sentence “a reduce permits judge [to] the severity of in the terms of commitment of light changed circumstances.” at n. 7 in Ante, original); see 18 (emphasis U. S. C. §§5021, 5023. in is, therefore,
There nothing text, history, struc- ture of the Youth Corrections Act that supports Court’s that a increase holding judge may of a severity YCA sen- tence after it has become final.10 Even from the apart con- stitutional with such a problem see n. holding, 3, supra, this absence of is fatal.11 statutory support Not only did Con-
10Writing Appeals, Judge for the Swygert Court of point made the in this way: “The Warden asks us to read into this Act which pur- has as its ultimate
pose rehabilitation, highly sentencing option permit unusual that would one judge’s reevaluate another impose YCA sentence and in its place a traditional adult sentence. There is ‘not а word’ the statute or legislative history its ‘about augmenting having sentences or about a sec- Carlson,] any way ond [Thompson change them.’ 624 F. 2d (3d 1980) 415, 426 (Adams, J., Cir. dissenting). contrary reading Such a is spirit to the letter and act, of provisions and the cited not do con- (CA7 1981). vince us otherwise.” 642 F. 2d 11The Court asserts that the common-law rule that a not sentence increased after it has “simply apply Congress become final does not when provided has a court with power modify light a sentence changed Here, judge modify circumstances. . . . permits the statute the conditions of a YCA sentence if the offender is convicted of a subse quent adult crime Ante, and if further futile.” YCA treatment would be 218, n. course, depart Of Congress expressed whether an intent to from the common-law peti rule is the The question. critical Court tioner concede history legislative neither the evinces statute nor the such an intent because Congress contemplate the situation. See did not 6, supra. n. Nor arguments sup do the Court’s historical and structural port the result the Court supra, at 226-228 and reaches. See discussion page. simply The Court imposes makes the most the result it thinks today, the Court there gress reached result intend the just Congress intended good to believe reason is opposite. Congress recog- enacting Act, Corrections the Yоuth given years qual- number of
nized that a YCA itatively length.12 equal an adult sentence than less severe 5010(b) impose court to a district authorizes Indeed, (up years) longer than would be author- to six YCA sentence as an adult. The federal sentenced were ized the offender 5010(b) upheld against unanimously constitu- have courts reasoning early expressed by challenges on the tional Judge quoted often a Circuit when Chief Justice thereafter: *25 theory
“[T]he and in a of that Act is rehabilitative basic regarded comprising be as this rehabilitation sense longer quid pro quo dif for a confinement but under than a defendant would un ferent conditions and terms ordinary prison. [T]he dergo in . . . Youth Correc youthful ‘provides offenders, tions Act for and affords judge, penalties not heavier and discretion punishment imposed upon offenders, than are adult but escape physical psycho opportunity from the logical upon serving shocks traumas attendant an or dinary penal obtaining sentence while the benefits of cor looking treatment, rective to rehabilitation and social redemption States, and restoration.’” Carter v. United (1962) App. 113U. S. D. F. 285 123, 125, 283, C. 306 2d (quoting Cunningham 467, v. 256 F. 2d States, United (CA5 1958)).13 472
sense. While such cir- lawmaking may appropriate interstitial some cumstances, surely it to follow is not warranted when the is bound Court Congress common-law rule intended absent that evidence affirmative depart from that rule. 12 supra. 5, See n. 13 (CA5 g., e. Accord, States, Abernathy v. 288, 290 United F. 2d 418 1969); (CA4 1967); Johnson v. States, United Brisco v. 966, 374 F. 2d 967 States, States, United (CA3 214, 368 F. 353 F. Kotz United 1966); 2d 215 v.
231
consequence
It is of no
that
was sentenced not
5010(b),
5010(c),
quid pro
for the
but under
same
quo theory
justifies longer
terms
than maximum
justifies
given
also
adult terms for a
offense
YCA terms
statutory
longer
but
within the
adult maximum
than an adult
generally
v. Hadden,
would
receive. See Watts
651 F. 2d
(CA10 1981);
Dancy
States ex rel.
Ar-
1354,
United
v.
(CA3 1978).
F. 2d
It is no
nold,
107,
coincidencethat
authority
the Youth Corrections Act vests broad
in the dis-
impose lengthy
trict
YCA sentences and also vests
authority
prison
early
broad
officialsto order
releases of
youth
propo-
offenders from their YCA sentences.14 The
repeatedly emphasized
nents of the Youth Corrections Act
prison
given
officialsmust be
sufficient time to rehabili-
authority
tate
offenders and sufficient
to release re-
habilitated offenders from their custodial sentences.15 As
explained
the then Director of the Bureau of Prisons
before
studying
proposed
the Senate Subcommittee
Youth Cor-
imposition
ordinary adult-length
in 1949,
rections Act
completely
sentences on
offenders was
unrelated to the
(CA8
312,
(CA9
States,
Eller v. United
1965);
2d
1964);
rehabilitative of treatment and of re- early far The promises too short.16 of YCA sentences. longer justified imposition lease is able convert an unex- sentencing judge If a second the quid sentence, adult pro quo into an YCA sentence pired offender who sentenced to a vanishes. The youth longer under the when sentenced YCA than if term of confinement an adult end sentenced as as up, he were holding, serving will under the Court’s lengthier he sentence under the adult conditions to avoid. paid price for Furthermore, he is not entitled the duration of that allowances sentence to the availablе to offend- good-time ers sentenced as adults.17 humanitarian objectives type my “From the hundreds of cases of this which have come across correcting desk I have formed the conclusion that the task of the of Attitudes, habits, interests, fender the crucial element is that of time. changed overnight. Training standards cannot be in work habits and requires skills time. Once the individual has received the maximum bene program, however, fit from just important the institutional it is as that his community release to promptly. person be effected In the of each case period confined prospects making there comes a when he has his best good community. in the His release If he is should occur at that time. ready himself; released earlier he establishing will not be for the task of later, may bitter, himself, he have jittery become unsure like the ath lete who is overtrained. “Rarely day go by does a younger in one offenders of our institutions for youth being without a long received whose sentence is either far too or far short,
too if the carry objective institution is to of correctional out its treatment. “I have seen wrongly pe- thousands rightly prison of men sent to but
riods so short that imprisonment their only expense to the Govern- was ment accomplished or the little so far of the man as the rehabilitation prоtection of the community men sent to was concerned. I have seen prison long for so that all Hear- efforts in their frustrated.” behalf were ings (statement on S. 1114 supra n. 2609, 16, and S. of James V. Bennett). (CA10 1974); 17 See Staudmier States, v. United 496 F. 2d Hale v. States, United (WD Foote 1970); Supp. 307 F. Okla. States, United 1969). (Nev. Supp. 627, 306 F. 628-629
233 justify Act do the Youth Corrections not fundamental unfairness.18 original sentencing judge
If the had known that a subse- expiration quent result in adult sentence could of YCA treat- might sentence, ment but not he YCA well have dis- length of YCA counted the sentence to reflect this respondent possibility.19 pos- if had Moreover, known of this sibility, might he have elected to stand trial than rather plead guilty.20 Speculation of this kind21would be unnec- essary enlarge upon the Court declined the statute that Congress written. If an has amendment to the statute is problem Congress with needed to deal that did foresee, Congress perform isit this Court—that must that task. —not purport I do not whether know effec- youthful general, tive for offenders or would serve 18 1 thought Fortas, had writing eloquently Justice so the Court Gault, re 1, 12-31, specific U. juvenile 387 S. with reference to the justice system, point. had settled that 19 (Dec. Policy 1978), Bureau of Prisons Statement No. 5215.2 which purports to from exclude YCA treatment YCA-sentenced offenders who also are to a term, promul sentenced concurrent adult consеcutive was gated years four and one-half after was sentenced under the Youth Act. Corrections 20Respondent pleaded guilty to the offense for which he was sentenced to years’ Ante,
10
confinement under
Youth
at
Corrections Act.
challenges
For
against
pleas
guilty
such
defendant
ground
on the
that the
fully
was not
apprised
consequences
being
under the
sentenced
Act,
Youth
g.,
States,
e.
see,
262;
Marvel v.
Corrections
U. S.
United
380
States,
Caldwell v.
(CA10
United
v. United
James
1970);
put these considerations to one side: see, I record,
“While on Robinson this think that either no indication to society by treatment, Congress, will benefit continuing the YCA 2d, applicable statute case, 642 F. has mandated the continuance.” at 1083. notes several under the YCA to be sentenced initially offender otherwise be the remain- for what would treated as an adult Ante, at 215. The Court’s ex- der of the YCA sentence.” I do not in the margin.9 disagree are set forth amples a sentence of YCA does not en- imposition the Court that for the full length title an offender to YCA that he commits in the interim, no matter what crimes sentence could have been to subjected that immediate respondent I adult confinement each Court’s do not examples. however, may that a second adult treat- agree, judge impose continues to be ment on an offender who incarcerated not on the basis of a adult sentence but on the basis of subsequent None of the original YCA sentence. Court’s examples course, given length a concurrent sentence of a will result in a shorter ulti- length; mate sentence than a consecutive sentence that but a wish- ing impose longer may simply length to ultimate sentence increase the accordingly.” Ante, 216-217, the concurrent sentence (emphasis n. 9 original). example, permits “For the statute a court to sentence a defendant to an adult term if receiving suspended he commits an adult offense after sen 5010(a). probation § tence and under If had been sentenced 5010(a) initially probation subsequently and had been convicted assault, of criminal the court imposed could have an adult sentence for the original crime, assault, both, begin immediately. or for . . . “Moreover, respondent permits concedes that the to im- statute pose a concurrent serving adult sentence on an offender who is a YCA term. Such an adult sentence im- would commence at the time that it was posed modify and would the YCA treatment would other- that the offender wise receive for the Finally, every remainder of sen- his offender term. tenced under the YCA must conditionally years prior be released two the termination of his However, sentence. of- 18 U. S. C. fender crime, violates the by committing terms of this conditional release may conditional release be revoked and an adult sentence immedi- ately imposed, notwithstanding has not the fact that the yet expired.” (footnotes Ante, at emphasis 215-217 omitted and original). situation; hence there is no reason to poses suppose